功能性监管:我国金融监管模式的最佳选择

在全球金融业混业经营的共同趋势下,我国现行的机构性监管模式面临巨大的挑战。功能性金融监管是基于金融体系基本功能而设计的更具连续性和一致性,并能实施跨产品、跨机构、跨市场协调的监管,因而是金融业混业经营下金融监管模式的最优选择。本文在借鉴国外功能性监管框架基础上,对构建我国功能性金融监管模式进行了探讨。     

我国上市公司管理法规研究

《上市公司股权激励管理办法》（试行）、《上市公司证券发行管理办法》和《上市公司收购管理办法》三大市场法规，构造完成我国上市公司管理的整体法律框架。研究我国上市公司管理的法规，有助于上市公司、管理层、发行人、收购方和投资者等利益相关主体把握新的市场特征和立法精神，实现自身利益的维护和财富增值。     

论宏观调控——对我国2003年来宏观调控的几点认识

界定了宏观调控的内涵,论证了宏观调控的必要性,讨论了宏观调控的类型,对宏观调控成效与政策实施时长进行了模型分析,并对学术界就我国2003年开始的宏观调控成效的争论进行了简要的述评。     

资本约束对信贷扩张及经济增长的影响:分析框架和典型案例

监管当局的最低资本要求改变了传统货币政策传导机制。本文从银行信贷渠道和银行资本渠道两方面并借助简化的商业银行行为决策模型考察资本约束的信贷扩张效应,利用CC-LM模型讨论资本约束对经济增长的影响。本文认为,在资本短缺情况下,严格资本监管将导致贷款供给下降,进而对经济增长产生影响;1990年代美国、日本出现的信贷紧缩部分应归因于1988年资本协议的实施,监管当局和货币当局必须重视资本充足率监管的宏观经济效应。     

Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant

Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natural response to this shortage of resources is targeting and this targeting policy leads to higher compliance than random inspections. This paper uses individual inspection data on the inspection policy of the environmental agency for the textile industry in Flanders (Belgium). We distinguish between three types of inspections and use a survival model to show that the environmental agency inspects firms in a non-random way. Even though the agency solves most environmental problems, it can increase compliance by using the deterrence effect of more stringent inspections and sanctions.      

Utility Regulation and Risk Allocation: The Roles of Marginal Cost Pricing and Futures Markets

The effects on consumer welfare of requiring a utility facing cost or demand risk to use either a fixed retail price or marginal cost pricing are assessed. With marginal cost pricing and cost volatility an efficient futures market allows consumer welfare to be at least as high in every state as with the fixed price. With demand risk marginal cost pricing can benefit the consumer in every state without harming the firm if the profit difference is transferred to the consumer. A futures market can act as a partial replacement for the transfer.     

Collusive Long-Run Investments Under Transmission Price-Caps

In the short run, constraints in the electricity transmission system may give market power to generators. This paper examines whether the constraints themselves are a long-run equilibrium outcome in a competitive environment. We show that independent transmission companies and generators can tacitly collude to raise prices to consumers and divide the resulting profits. We also show that price cap regulation does not prevent this behavior and may in fact contribute to it. The mechanism for collusion is that generators locate their plants so that a capacity-constrained transmission line lies between them and their consumer market. We show that this constraint-based collusion can be sustained in a static game without any punishment strategies.     

Corporate Lobbying, Regulatory Conduct and the Porter Hypothesis

Michael Porter, the influential Harvard management guru, has promoted the idea that compliance with stricter environmental regulations can afford secondary benefits to firms through improved product design, innovation, corporate morale and in other ways. Once these secondary benefits are factored, the net cost of compliance is argued to be lower than conventionally thought and may even be negative. Whilst environmental economists have rejected the Porter Hypothesis as being based on excessively optimistic expectations of the likely size of such secondary benefits the underlying ideas do enjoy significant credence in the business community. In the context of a lobbying model of regulatory policy-making we argue that the EPA should change the way it conducts regulatory policy to take account of Porter's views – even if it knows those views to be misguided. The model serves to illustrate the more general point that fashions in management thinking can be expected to impact the optimal conduct of regulatory policy.     

金融监管效率的基石:激励相容的监管机制

本文通过金融监管过程中的博弈分析,揭示了当前的金融监管制度安排在信息不对称条件下导致的监管当局提供有效监管激励的缺失及金融机构普遍的道德风险是造成金融监管失灵的主要原因.因而解决金融监管低效率或失灵问题的关键,在于通过金融市场透明度建设、监管制度安排的合理设计及金融机构治理结构的完善,实现社会公众、监管当局、金融机构之间的激励相容.     

我国制造业环境管制的实证研究

从制造业的角度出发,分析了政府对环境管制(ER)的两种形式:正式管制(FER)和非正式管制(I-ER),建立了环境管制均衡方程,并且采用面板数据的分析方法对理论假设进行了验证。研究表明,假设的影响制造业环境管制的主要因素:政府保护意愿、劳动密集程度、产业规模、经济外向度、产业国有化程度、科技吸收转化支出和劳动力素质的高低均产生了显著的影响。