人民银行员工激励机制设计的进化博弈分析

博弈理论是当代主流经济学发展最迅速和影响最大的分支学科之一。其中,进化博弈理论由于引入了“进化稳定策略”（ESS）的概念,有效解决了博弈双方有限理性的现实问题,在解释经济管理现象时更具说服力和生命力。本文结合人民银行实际,通过构建进化博弈理论的复制动态模型,试述人民银行员工激励路径的选择及机制设计的有关问题。     

股份制取代合作制是历史的必然——对中国农村金融制度选择的思考

目前，合作金融在中国遇到了种种困惑，这不是合作金融本身的错。一方面中国从来就没有建立过真正的合作金融；另一方面合作金融与中国当前的经济环境也不相适应。而那种异化了的合作金融既没有存在的必要，也没有存在的可能。股份制取代合作制是一种历史的必然。     

国库集中支付操作风险产生机理的博弈分析

国库集中支付操作风险是指国库资金支付过程中出现违规操作行为的可能性。国库集中支付制度框架下财政资金支付活动是财政部门、预算单位、代理银行和人民银行共同参与的博弈过程。本文运用博弈理论首先分析国库集中支付操作风险产生的内在机理，然后剖析国库集中支付操作风险产生的外在博弈条件，最后从优化博弈条件出发，提出建立健全监督激励机制以防范国库集中支付操作风险的建议。     

论政府信用失缺及其解决措施

从寻租的角度,主要运用政府官员和民众之间所形成的囚犯困境博弈,分析政府官员腐败产生的机制及原因,并提出相应的解决措施。     

Price matching and product differentiation strategies considering showrooming

Showrooming, a phenomenon in which customers use brick-and-mortar stores to assess products and then purchase them from online retailers (o-retailers) for lower prices, is considered a great threat to traditional retailers (t-retailers). To combat showrooming, many t-retailers have executed price matching which enables customers to pay o-retailers' lower prices for the identical product. To avoid direct competition with t-retailers who execute price matching, many o-retailers have begun to sell differentiated products from t-retailers, which weakens the information advantage to customers from practicing showrooming. Motivated by these observations, we construct a duopoly game, where a t-retailer and an o-retailer sell products in a same category, to study the profitabilities of product differentiation and price matching in the context of showrooming. The results show that in the scenario without price matching, the o-retailer is likely to benefit from product differentiation only when the o-retailer's differentiated product is more popular with customers than the t-retailer's product. However, in the price matching scenario, the o-retailer also has the opportunity to benefit from product differentiation when the o-retailer's differentiated product is less popular with customers than the t-retailer's product, and product differentiation can be a win-win strategy for the two retailers under certain conditions. Considering the o-retailer's product differentiation decision, the t-retailer is only likely to execute price matching if the non-digital attributes of the product category sold by two retailers are not very obvious.     

建设抚—哈合作开发区的设想

抚远县和一江之隔的哈巴罗夫斯克市及其周围地区,以其优越的地缘优势、资源优势和互补性,具有发展双边(多边)经济技术合作的广阔前景。建设抚哈合作开发区,不仅有利于振兴当地经济,而且可作为参与东北亚国际分工与合作的窗口,通过外参内联,实现由边疆到内地,由双边到多边的多种形式的经贸合作,带动和促进两国内地经济的发展。     

Greening transportation fleets: Insights from a two-stage game theoretic model

The greening of organizational transportation fleets, especially trucks and automobiles, has gained increasing attention by companies in a variety of industrial sectors. The reasons for this concern and attention are due to regulatory and competitive pressures, but also increasing costs of fossil-fuels. Surprisingly the amount of research and modeling for fleet management overall has been rather limited, with the focus on managing green vehicle investments virtually non-existent. In this study we develop a two-stage game theoretic model that helps evaluate, from both policy and organizational perspectives, the implications of greening of transportation fleets. Various parameters are evaluated including factors such as innovations in green vehicle technology, levels of service differences, cost of fuel, adjusting tax policy, regulatory compliance requirements, and adaptation costs. This evaluation provides practical insights into actions that could be considered by regulators and organizations to encourage environmental investments.     

广佛同城化的博弈分析

由于广州和佛山分属不同行政区域,两地政府的地方保护主义和机会主义行为导致广佛同城化难以深入进行并陷入困境.要走出广佛同城化困境,应考虑构建责任明确、在管理和协调广佛同城化方面权威、高效的超广佛政府的第三方组织--"广佛管理协调行政委员会".     

境外战略投资者与国有商业银行在股权定价中的博弈

引进境外战略投资者是我国金融服务业进入全面开放后,国有商业银行改革的重要策略.其中的股权定价问题是这一改革过程中关注和讨论的重要问题,形成了多种不同的观点.在境外战略投资者与国有商业银行进行股权议价的过程中,存在着影响溢价和折价的多种因素,最终价格的确定正是双方通过多种因素博弈的结果.     

地方政府政策变迁对跨国公司企业社会责任的影响

笔者运用合作博弈的谈判模型研究地方政府政策对跨国公司企业社会责任合约的影响。模型推导出在宽松、适度、严格三种政策下,地方政府收益最大时对跨国公司社会责任履行合约的取值要求,研究认为政策的选择取决于地方政府谈判成本大小和声誉损失系数以及跨国公司在当地的社会责任履行成本系数,并就三种政策下跨国公司企业社会责任的影响因素进行分析。