银行监督、企业社会性成本与贷款融资体系

本文从政府机构控股国有企业所造成的企业行为扭曲的角度来研究银行贷款策略组合的微观机制,即银行对国有企业和私营企业进行事前筛选的程度及贷款利率设定,并建立了关于银行贷款融资体系的微观模型和理论框架。首先,将企业社会性成本和银行监督功能(事前筛选)引入债务合同模型,说明国有企业在面临破产做清算决策时会考虑到社会破产成本,从而推导出国有企业的还款机制有别于私营企业,信息不对称条件下银行事前对贷款筛选的激励也会有所不同,并提供了一般性推导和数值解拟合分析;同时,事前筛选存在一定的反转效应,因此需要就监督效率的社会剩余价值进行权衡。     

信贷配给及信息甄别博弈理论的文献分析及评述

自从Stiglitz＆Weiss和Jaffee＆Russell这两篇经典文献从信息不对称角度解释信贷配给现象之后,涌现出众多的理论文献对信贷市场的信贷配给现象和信息甄别问题进行了研究。现有的信贷市场基本理论研究在以下几方面取得成果：一是信贷配给的信息不对称成因;二是抵押物可以成为银行的风险分类工具：三是贷款额度可以成为银行的风险分类工具。同时其理论研究框架在银行类型假定、借款人类型假定、以及描述借款人行为的效用函数等方面存在局限性,有待进一步深入研究。     

The good,the bad and the ugly: agent behavior and efficiency in open and closed organizations

Current literature has largely ignored the fact that some organizations are highly selective when admitting new agents while others are more open. In addition, some organizations audit or sort agent behavior within the organization more aggressively than others. One might expect a priori that closed, highly selective, organizations would always be more efficient because they screen out the worst types, which could lead to better agent behavior. We show that this is not the case. Specifically, when agent behavior in equilibrium is uniform across organizations (i.e., when the number of agents behaving the same way is identical), closed organizations are inefficient. However, when agent behavior varies across organizations, closed organizations may or may not be inefficient, depending on net payoffs to the organization and the agents. Our analysis implies that organizations should choose the open type when screening or sorting costs are high, when there is a high frequency of good agent types in the population, when agent misbehavior does not reduce output significantly, and when penalties for misbehavior are large. The paper has benefitted from useful comments by David Flath, Charles Knoeber, Claudio Mezzetti, two anonymous referees and participants of the Spring 2005 Midwest Economic Theory meetings at Vanderbilt University, the 2005 meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in Vigo, Spain, the 2005 conference on Research in Economic Theory and Econometrics in Syros, Greece, and workshops at North Carolina State University, Texas A&M University and McGill University.     

Endogenous market structures and contract theory: Delegation, principal-agent contracts, screening, franchising and tying

I study the role of unilateral strategic contracts for firms active in markets with price competition and endogenous entry. Traditional results change substantially when the market structure is endogenous rather than exogenous. They concern (1) contracts of managerial delegation to non-profit maximizers, (2) incentive principal-agent contracts in the presence of moral hazard on cost-reducing activities, (3) screening contracts in case of asymmetric information on the productivity of the managers, (4) vertical contracts of franchising in case of hold-up problems and (5) tying contracts by monopolists competing also in secondary markets. Firms use always these contracts to strengthen price competition and manage to obtain positive profits in spite of free entry.     

Disaggregation and consolidation of imperfect quality shipments in an extended EPQ model

We consider a standard economic production quantity (EPQ) model. Due to manufacturing variability, a fraction P of the produced inventory will have imperfect quality, where P is a random variable with a known distribution. We consider a 100% inspection policy and further assume that the inspection rate is larger than that of production. Thus, all imperfect quality items will be detected by the end of the production cycle. For such an augmented EPQ model, we first derive the new optimal production quantity assuming that the imperfect quality items are salvaged once at the end of every production cycle. Then, we extend this base model to allow for disaggregating the shipments of imperfect quality items during a single production run. Finally, we consider aggregating (or consolidating) the shipments of imperfect items over multiple production runs. Under both scenarios we derive closed-form expressions for both the economic production quantity and the batching policy, and show that our desegregation/consolidation schemes can lead to significant cost savings over the base model.     

黑龙江省垂直绿化攀缘树种的筛选

在分析垂直绿化植物生长主要限制因子--土壤干旱与贫瘠的基础上,从黑龙江省山地植被中引种栽培19种攀援树种,对其生物学特性、生活习性、抗旱性等关键因素进行了试验研究。根据试验及露地栽培观察结果,采用百分法综合评价出17种适宜立体绿化的攀援树种,为立体绿化与植被恢复提供了更多可供参考的植物种类,以满足绿化中对景观多样性、植物多样性的要求。     

Economic design of one-sided screening procedures based on a correlated variable with all parameters unknown

Summary Economic design of one-sided screening procedures for improving outgoing product quality based on a screening variable is considered for the case with all parameters unknown. It is assumed that the performance and screening variables are jointly normally distributed and that costs are incurred by screening inspection, acceptance of an imperfect item, and disposition of a rejected one. A method for finding optimal cutoff value based on the predictive distribution is presented.     

煤矿提高块煤率的实践与探索

本文分析介绍了文玉煤矿从原煤运输、煤炭储存、回采工艺、二次筛分等生产过程全方位提高块煤率的途径,并通过实践取得很好效果,显著提高煤矿经济效益。     

脱氧雪腐镰刀菌烯醇毒性和检测方法研究进展

本文综述了脱氧雪腐镰刀菌烯醇毒素的毒理以及在世界各国的有关现状,介绍了国内外食品检测中该毒素的提取、纯化和定量检测的最新进展及存在问题,建议应加强对国内市场食品特别是进出口食品中该毒素的检测。     

政府背景风险投资对创新的甄选与培育效果——不同区域环境视角的检验

以创业板企业数据为样本,使用Logit模型及工具变量法,研究不同区域环境下政府背景风险投资对企业创新的事前甄选与事后培育作用,并对其机制进行探讨。结果表明：①经济区域对政府背景风险投资行为影响有限,与非核心发达地区相比,金融发达地区的政府背景风险投资对企业技术创新没有表现出差异性甄选行为,但却有更好的事后培育作用,而且这种培育作用会随着地区投资环境优化而增强;②行政区域对政府背景风险投资行为影响显著,与异省投资相比,本省政府背景风险投资对技术创新的事前甄选具有显著优势,但对被投企业后续创新投入产生了一定的负面作用,这种作用会因政府背景风险投资占有董事会席位而加大。