Output and expected returns

This paper shows for 1929–2003 U.S. data and also for international G-7 data that the ratio of share prices to GDP tracks a large fraction of the variation over time in expected returns on the aggregate stock market, capturing more of that variation than do price–earnings and price–dividend ratios and often also providing additional information about excess returns. The price–output ratio tracks long-term U.S. cumulative stock returns almost as well as the cay-ratio of Lettau and Ludvigson [2001a. Journal of Finance 56, 815–849, 2005. Journal of Financial Economics 76, 583–626], although the cay-ratio tracks variation in U.S. excess returns better. The price–output ratio, however, involves no parameter estimation and is easily constructed for non-U.S. countries.     

Measures of brand attitude: Are cognitive structure approaches really needed?

Recent research on attitude toward the advertisement provides a theoretical base that questions the usefulness of multiattribute attitude measures. Arguments for global measures of brand attitude in affect-referral choice situations are presented. The two types of measures are tested as predictors of purchase intentions for ten supermarket brands. Global brand attitudes demonstrated greater predictive value for nine of the ten test brands.     

A Simple Proof of the Equivalence of the Limiting Distributions of the Continuous-Time and the Embedded Process of the Queue Size in the M/G/1 Queue*

This paper presents an extremely simple proof of the known remarkable fact that for the M/G/1 queue the continuous-time process describing the number of customers in the system has the same limiting distribution as the embedded process describing the number of customers in the system just after service completion epochs.     

Political relationships,global financing,and corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia

This study examines the role of political connections in firms’ financing strategies and their long-run performance. We view political connections as an example for domestic arrangements which can reduce the benefits of global financing. Using data from Indonesia, we find that firms with strong political connections are less likely to have publicly traded foreign securities. As a result, estimates of the performance consequences of foreign financing are severely biased if value-creating domestic arrangements such as political relationships are ignored. Connections not only alter firms’ financing strategies, they also influence long-run performance. Tracking returns across several regimes, we show that firms have difficulty re-establishing connections with a new government when their patron falls from power, leading closely connected firms to underperform under the new regime and subsequently to increase their foreign financing.     

Tax-induced Dissimilarities Between Domestic and Foreign Mutual Funds in Italy

Using data from Italy over the period 1998–2002, this study investigates whether tax effects can account for differences in return patterns between domestic and foreign mutual funds, and if this dissimilarity translates into performance. The paper presents evidence that much of the difference between domestic and foreign funds is explained by the different tax systems. The asymmetry between the two groups, due to the fact that domestic funds are obliged to pay taxes on a daily basis while foreign funds are taxed when capital gains are collected, also affects performance. We prove that comparing pre-tax returns, Italian funds are virtually indistinguishable from their foreign counterparts in terms of risk-adjusted returns, while when comparing after-tax returns, foreign funds outperform.     

Tunneling,propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong

We examine a sample of connected transactions between Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders. We address three questions: What types of connected transactions lead to expropriation of minority shareholders? Which firms are more likely to expropriate? Does the market anticipate the expropriation by firms? On average, firms announcing connected transactions earn significant negative excess returns, significantly lower than firms announcing similar arm's length transactions. We find limited evidence that firms undertaking connected transactions trade at discounted valuations prior to the expropriation, suggesting that investors cannot predict expropriation and revalue firms only when expropriation does occur.     

The strategy of professional forecasting

We develop and compare two theories of professional forecasters’ strategic behavior. The first theory, reputational cheap talk, posits that forecasters endeavor to convince the market that they are well informed. The market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the realized state. If the market expects forecasters to report their posterior expectations honestly, then forecasts are shaded toward the prior mean. With correct market expectations, equilibrium forecasts are imprecise but not shaded. The second theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting contest with pre-specified rules. In a winner-take-all contest, equilibrium forecasts are excessively differentiated.