What explains the lack of monetary policy influence on bank holding companies?

In this paper, we investigate how monetary policy innovations affect the equity returns of bank holding companies (BHCs). We also examine bank characteristics to determine what explains the cross-sectional and time-series variation in the returns' sensitivity. Similar to non-financial firms, we find that only unanticipated components affect bank equity returns; however, this effect is absent in the second half of our sample period. Smaller, less liquid banks have higher sensitivity; a higher ratio of time deposits to total deposits reduces this sensitivity. A higher ratio of non-interest income to total income also reduces this sensitivity, while capital-constrained banks have a higher sensitivity to monetary policy innovations. We argue that a higher dependence on non-interest income and the use of interest rate derivatives together may explain the disappearing influence of monetary policy on these BHCs.     

Bank Earnings Management and Tail Risk during the Financial Crisis

We show that a pattern of earnings management in bank financial statements has little bearing on downside risk during quiet periods, but seems to have a big impact during a financial crisis. Banks demonstrating more aggressive earnings management prior to 2007 exhibit substantially higher stock market risk once the financial crisis begins as measured by the incidence of large weekly stock price “crashes” as well as by the pattern of full‐year returns. Stock price crashes also predict future deterioration in operating performance. Bank regulators may therefore interpret them as early warning signs of impending problems.     

Elections,political competition and bank failure

We exploit exogenous variation in the scheduling of gubernatorial elections to study the timing of bank failure in the US. Using hazard analysis, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political control (i.e., lack of competition) can explain all of this average election year fall in the hazard rate. In particular, we show that the reduction in hazard rate doubles in magnitude for banks operating in states where the governor has simultaneous control of the upper and lower houses of the state legislature (i.e., complete control) heading into an election.     

Can investor-paid credit rating agencies improve the information quality of issuer-paid rating agencies?

This paper examines how the information quality of ratings from an issuer-paid rating agency (Standard and Poor's) responds to the entry of an investor-paid rating agency, the Egan-Jones Rating Company (EJR). By comparing S&P's ratings quality before and after EJR initiates coverage of each firm, I find a significant improvement in S&P's ratings quality following EJR's coverage initiation. S&P's ratings become more responsive to credit risk and its rating changes incorporate higher information content. These results differ from the existing literature documenting a deterioration in the incumbents' ratings quality following the entry of a third issuer-paid agency. I further show that the issuer-paid agency seems to improve the ratings quality because EJR's coverage has elevated its reputational concerns.     

IPv6过渡期安全防护探讨

从下一代网络谈起,研究ipv4过渡ipv6时的网络状态中的拒绝服务攻击方法,深入分析了反弹全连接拒绝服务攻击(Reflection complete connection Denial of Service attack)在ipv6环境下攻击原理并创造性的提出了防护原理以及防护的试验过程。     

Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II

We analyze the relationship between bank size and risk-taking under the Basel II Capital Accord. Using a model with imperfect competition and moral hazard, we show that the introduction of an internal ratings based (IRB) approach improves upon flat capital requirements if the approach is applied uniformly across banks and if the costs of implementation are not too high. However, the banks’ right to choose between the standardized and the IRB approaches under Basel II gives larger banks a competitive advantage and, due to fiercer competition, pushes smaller banks to take higher risks. This may even lead to higher aggregate risk-taking.     

Banking Competition and Capital Ratios

Empirical studies provide evidence that bank capital ratios exceed regulatory requirements. But why do banks maintain capital levels above regulatory requirements? We use data for more than 2,600 banks from 10 European countries to test recent theories suggesting that competition incentivises banks to maintain higher capital ratios. These theories also predict that banks that engage in arm's length lending have lower capital ratios, and that shareholder rights and deposit insurance characteristics affect capital ratios. Consistent with these theories, our evidence robustly indicates that competition increases capital holdings. Banks that lend at arm's length exhibit lower capital ratios, whereas banks in countries with strong shareholder rights operate with higher capital ratios. We also show some evidence that generous deposit protection schemes that exclude non‐deposit creditors are associated with higher capital ratios. Our results have important policy implications. First, while the traditional view suggests imposing restrictions on bank activities in order to restrain competition, our analysis indicates the opposite, even after adjusting the regressions for risk‐taking. Second, weak shareholder rights undermine market forces that would otherwise encourage banks to hold higher capital ratios.     

6S管理在生产管理中的推行方法探析——小议“奥奇丽”推行6S活动

文章介绍了6S管理模式的产生背景、内涵，以及广西奥奇丽股份有限公司推行6S活动的情况，并就该公司推行6S活动的方法进行讨论。     

Regime-switching effects of debt on real GDP per capita the case of Latin American and Caribbean countries

In this paper, we try to investigate how the debt and real GDP per capita relationship varies with indebtedness levels and other country characteristics in a balanced panel of 21 developing Latin American and Caribbean countries over the period 1992–2006. The empirical results indicate that there exist two threshold values of 32.88% and 55.89%. The latter is lower than the Maastricht criterion and Stability and Growth Pact of a total external Debt per GDP ratio at 60% in the OECD countries. Both thresholds divide our panel into three regimes. In the middle (stimulus) regime, the Debt per GDP ratio has a positive impact on real GDP per capita, which is consistent with the stimulus view (Eisner, 1984). However, the impact becomes negative and consistent with the crowding-out view (Friedman, 1977, 1985) in the left and right (crowding-out) regimes. Based on our findings, we find no supportive evidence for Ricardian view (Barro, 1989). Therefore, our empirical results have important implications for fiscal policymakers in these Latin American and Caribbean countries.     

IPv6网络部署

文章对ipv6基本概念,及ipv4向ipv6过渡的现行技术进行了阐述,并给出了路由协议及ipv4向ipv6过渡技术的实现方法,结合学校校园网的ipv6实际解决方案,系统描述了ipv6校园网中的实际应用.