Payments for environmental services to promote “climate‐smart agriculture”? Potential and challenges

Payments for environmental services (PES) have gained wide popularity as approaches to promote environmentally friendly land use or agricultural production practices. Yet academics have also voiced concerns against seeing PES as a panacea. This article discusses whether PES is an appropriate and promising approach to promote so‐called “climate‐smart agriculture” (CSA) practices, which we define as agricultural production practices that contribute to CO₂ emission reductions and/or removals and provide benefits to farmers via increased productivity and profits and reduced vulnerability to climate change. PES appears most promising for the promotion of CSA practices in small‐scale farming contexts with low incomes. Effective design, however, requires solid estimates of cost and benefit flows from CSA adoption over time, accounting for differences in socioeconomic and ecological conditions, and addressing the risk of leakage. Funding for such PES will likely have to come from public sources, and seems most promising where synergies with other objectives such as agricultural development, food security, and climate adaptation or other environmental services exist. The potential of alternative approaches for CSA support such as taxation with rebates for CSA practices, CSA‐related investment support such as microcredits, and hybrid approaches such as conditional microcredit should be further investigated.     

Novel approaches to the regulatory control of financial services providers: The importance of cultural context

This study investigates the effectiveness of a public sector financial management initiative. Specifically, the powers awarded to the Irish Financial Services Ombudsman (FSO) in 2013 to name and shame malfeasance by financial service providers (FSPs) in its annual reports. As the first country to award such powers to its public sector financial ombudsman, Ireland represents a novel setting in which to test the impact of regulatory disclosure as a way to promote accountability and transparency. Our results show that the number of complaints lodged against malfeasants dropped in the immediate aftermath of this and, following a one-year lag, so did the percentage of complaints lodged that proceeded to a full investigation and legally binding finding. Despite the failure of such strategies in some jurisdictions, the Irish experience indicates that regulatory disclosure can, in line with Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory and consistent with the accounting and accountability literature, have considerable impact where and when contextual preconditions are met. These findings have important implications for the operationalisation of regulatory disclosure as an accountability enhancing measure in other jurisdictions.     

Does employment protection help immigrants? Evidence from European labor markets

High levels of employment protection reduce hiring and firing and have a theoretically ambiguous effect on the employment level. Immigrants, being new to the labor market, may be less aware of employment protection regulations and less likely to claim their rights, which may create a gap between the costs for employers of hiring a native relative to hiring an immigrant. This paper tests that hypothesis drawing on evidence for the EU and on two natural experiments for Spain and Italy. The results suggest that strict employment protection legislation (EPL) gives immigrants a comparative advantage relative to natives. Stricter EPL is found to reduce employment and reduce hiring and firing rates for natives. By contrast, stricter EPL has a much smaller effect on immigrants.     

Subordinated Debt,Market Discipline,and Bank Risk

This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (subdebt thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. By reducing the chance that managers of distressed banks can take value‐destroying actions to benefit themselves, subdebt regulation may encourage banks to lower asset risk. Moreover, subdebt regulation and bank capital requirements can be complements for alleviating the banks’ moral hazard problems. To make subdebt regulation effective, regulators may need impose ceilings on the interest rates of subdebt, prohibit collusion between banks and subdebt investors, and require subdebt to convert into the issuing bank's equity when the government provides assistance to the bank.     

基于4C理论的汽车营销6C模型研究

随着我国汽车行业的迅猛发展,汽车产品和品牌日益丰富,客户需求也日益提高,我国汽车产业的格局发生了巨大的变化。目前,我国汽车营销正处于"大洗牌"的时期,在这一时期中,为了寻求发展,很多汽车企业都引入了市场营销中广为流传的4C理论。但是随着这一理论的广泛引用,很多内容已经不适用于当今汽车营销的发展。因此,需要对这一理论进行完善。在这一背景下,笔者提出了汽车营销的6C模型。     

THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN COMPETITION ON SECTORAL GROWTH: A CROSS‐COUNTRY ANALYSIS

This paper examines the impact of competition on the total factor productivity (TFP) of 21 manufacturing sectors in eighteen OECD countries over the period of time 1990–2006. We assume that the source of TFP growth can be either domestic or foreign innovation or technology transfer from the technological frontier. Trade openness, R&D, and human capital can have two effects: a direct effect on TFP (e.g., through innovation) and an indirect effect depending on the productivity gap between a given country and the technological frontier. We find that tougher domestic competition is always associated with higher sectoral productivity. Both import and export penetrations are positively associated with an increase of TFP. However, the channels through which higher TFP is materialized are different: export penetration works through level effect, while import penetration acts mainly when conditional on the level of technological development. The economical magnitude of the effect is not trivial.     

6kV～35kV电网防雷问题解决方法

文章探讨了当前6kV～35kV电网的防雷现状及存在问题,并提出相应的解决措施。     

Bank ownership,privatization, and performance: Evidence from a transition country

This paper combines the static effect of ownership and the dynamic effect of privatization on bank performance in China over 1995–2010, reporting a significantly higher performance by private intermediaries – joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks – relative to state-owned commercial banks. However, publicly traded banks, subject to multiple monitoring and vetting in capital markets, perform better regardless of ownership status. The privatization of banks has improved performance with respect to revenue inflow and efficiency gains in the short- or long-run (initial public offerings). The positive long-run effect is more relevant and significant for banking institutions with minority foreign ownership. Moreover, this paper innovatively estimates interest income efficiency and non-interest income efficiency at the same time. The results suggest that Chinese banks are much more efficient in generating interest income than raising non-interest revenue, although the latter aspect has improved significantly during the sample period.     

Critical resource: An institutional economics of the Internet addressing-routing space

This paper links the analysis of IP address policy to the established vocabulary and concepts of institutional economics. Internet addressing and routing are usually discussed in technical terms, yet embedded in this highly technical discourse are a number of critical economic concepts, such as scarcity, externalities, common pool resources, tragedy of the commons, and conflict over the distribution of costs. To solve these problems, governance institutions native to the Internet have evolved. Yet despite the centrality of addressing and routing to Internet governance, there is very little research literature that bridges economic, institutional and technical discussions of IP addressing and routing. This paper connects the techno-economic discussion to analysis of institutions and governance arrangements.     

Capital incentives and adequacy for securitizations

This paper analyzes the capital incentives and adequacy of financial institutions for asset portfolio securitizations. The empirical analysis is based on US securitization rating and impairment data. The paper finds that regulatory capital rules for securitizations may be insufficient to cover implied losses during economic downturns such as the Global Financial Crisis. In addition, the rating process of securitizations provides capital arbitrage incentives for financial institutions and may further reduce regulatory capital requirements. These policy-relevant findings assume that the ratings assigned by rating agencies are correct and can be used to build a test for the ability of Basel capital regulations to cover downturn losses.