The Bertrand Paradox,the Useless Auctioneer and the Launhardt Model

We revisit the Cournot–Bertrand debate in the light of Cournot, Edgeworth and Launhardt, tracing back to Launhardt the origin of price competition in duopoly models with constant returns to scale. Then, we discuss the formalisation of consumer utility function for differentiated products, first appearing in Launhardt and then in Bowley. This allows us to point out that assuming that firms know the demand function(s) is equivalent to assuming that they know the structure of consumer preferences. Therefore, we argue that there is no role for the auctioneer, either in Cournot or in Walras.     

Profit Leak? Pre‐Release File Sharing and the Music Industry

Using data from an exclusive file‐sharing Web site that allows users to share music files using the BitTorrent protocol, I exploit exogenous variation in the availability of sound recordings in file‐sharing networks to isolate the causal effect of file sharing of an album on its sales. Using within‐album variation in illegal downloads and sales, I find that the effect is essentially zero: The elasticity of sales with respect to illegal downloads is one‐tenth of one percentage point. However, the finding that file sharing is not harmful to individual artists is not inconsistent with the well‐documented fact that file sharing is harmful to the music industry (the fallacy of composition). More important, I find that file sharing benefits more established and popular artists who are signed to major labels, which is consistent with recent industry trends.     

The determinants of price in 3G spectrum auctions

This article examined the empirical relationship between prices paid for national 3G wireless licenses when spectrums were sold by auction. The reduced-form modelling approach was based on the premise that auction design features can, and do, affect both final (revenue) and intermediate (viz., auction competitiveness and license assignment) auction outcomes. Importantly, the analysis recognizes, and explicitly allows for, the endogeneity of bidder entry and sample selection arising from an absence of bidding. Generally, these key features have only received attention in isolation. In particular, the study addressed the principal question of: which regulator chosen auction design variables determine prices paid in spectrum auctions? The analysis showed that flexible-package formats increased prices paid, and that higher reserve prices had a dampening effect. The article also showed that longer license terms and more competitive auctions (as measured by the bidders-to-licenses ratio) enhance prices paid.     

Bribery,corruption and bureaucratic hassle: Evidence from Myanmar

Corruption has been found to be the most severe obstacle to business operations, according to a recent survey of over 3000 firms in Myanmar. This paper sets out to understand the structure of corruption through an econometric analysis of this survey. It finds that firms with higher ‘ability to pay’ (proxied by sales revenue and employee growth) are more likely to pay bribes. While firms with lower ‘refusal power’ (i.e. those dependent on bureaucratic permissions to export and import) are more likely to find corruption to be an obstacle. A distinct but related question is whether bribes act as ‘efficiency grease’ by allowing firms to circumvent red tape. No evidence is found to support this hypothesis; in fact, firms that pay bribes report greater bureaucratic hassle compared to firms that do not. This result fits in more closely with the view that red tape could be used to extract bribes from firms.     

Scale effects of R&D as reflected in earnings and returns

Using returns to scale as a conceptual foundation, we explore how R&D-related earnings performance and earnings variability depend upon firm size. We find that the positive association between the level of future earnings and R&D intensity increases with firm size, and that the positive association between the volatility of future earnings and R&D intensity decreases with firm size, consistent with R&D productivity increasing with scale. We also show that R&D scale is associated with lower market returns, consistent with the idea that R&D investment risk declines with scale.     

Do Spillovers Stimulate Incremental or Drastic Product Innovations? Evidence from German Establishment Data*

Despite the generally recognized importance of knowledge spillovers, the empirical literature is essentially silent on the type of innovation stimulated by spillovers. We estimate the determinants of product innovations differing in their degree of newness to the adopting firm. Knowledge spillovers from rivals have a positive impact on incremental innovations. This impact is largely independent of participation in R&D cooperation. Spillovers exert no such independent influence on drastic innovation activities. The results support the hypothesis that establishments face difficulties in using knowledge that comes from areas they are not familiar with. Establishments exploit spillovers for incremental innovations rather than for drastic innovations. To some degree R&D cooperation can help to overcome the difficulties in using spillovers for drastic innovations. Furthermore, our estimates provide evidence that the firm's own R&D effort and the use of outside information are substitutes.     

The effect of banking market structure on the lending channel: Evidence from emerging markets

This paper analyses the extent to which the level of bank competition influences monetary policy transmission. Using a large panel dataset of 978 banks from 55 countries, and employing the Lerner index model as a measure of market structure, our results show that an increase in banking sector competition weakens the effectiveness of monetary policy on bank lending. The findings are robust to a broad array of sensitivity checks including control of alternative measurements of the Lerner index, different samples and different methodological specifications. By extension, these results have important policy implications for regulators in assessing the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission mechanisms.     

Workplace organization and innovation

Abstract This study uses panel data on Canadian establishments to explore the relationship between the organization of work – in particular decentralization, information‐sharing, and incentive pay schemes – and innovation. Like other studies, ours finds a clear positive link between these factors. However, the data give strong indications that this relationship is not causal. We show that: (1) the correlation between workplace organization and innovation holds for information‐sharing but is much weaker for decentralized decision‐making or incentive pay programs, (2) controls for unobserved heterogeneity significantly weaken results, and (3) lagged variables give no clear evidence that organizational changes predate innovation.     

How Productive Is Workplace Health and Safety?

In this paper, we investigate the causal impact of workplace health and safety practices on firm performance, using Danish longitudinal matched employer–employee data merged with unique cross‐sectional representative firm survey data on work environment conditions. We estimate standard production functions, augmented with workplace environment indicators, addressing both time‐invariant and time‐varying potentially relevant unobservables in the production process. We find positive and large productivity effects of improved physical dimensions of the health and safety environment, specifically, “internal climate” and “monotonous repetitive work”.     

WHOLESALE PRICES AND COURNOT‐BERTRAND COMPETITION

This note considers the competing vertical structures framework with Cournot‐Bertrand competition downstream. It shows that the equilibrium wholesale price paid by a Cournot (Bertrand)‐type retailer is above (below) marginal costs of a corresponding manufacturer. This result contrasts with the one under pure competition downstream (i.e., Cournot or Bertrand), where the wholesale price is set below (above) marginal costs in case of a Cournot (Bertrand) game at the retail level.