Portfolio optimisation with strictly positive transaction costs and impulse control

One crucial assumption in modern portfolio theory of continuous-time models is the no transaction cost assumption. This assumption normally leads to trading strategies with infinite variation. However, following such a strategy in the presence of transaction costs will lead to immediate ruin. We present an impulse control approach where the investor can change his portfolio only finitely often in finite time intervals. Further, we consider transaction costs including a fixed and a proportional cost component. For the solution of the resulting control problems we present a formal optimal stopping approach and an approach using quasi-variational inequalities. As an application we derive a nontrivial asymptotically optimal solution for the problem of exponential utility maximisation.     

Ten More Years of Error Rate Research

The assessment of the performance of supervised classification rules by estimating their error rate (the proportion of objects misclassified) is an important area of work in statistical pattern recognition. This paper reviews the last ten years of error rate research, bringing up to date the reviews of Hand (1986a) and McLachlan (1987). Since those surveys were published, old estimators have been improved new estimators have been introduced, and new approaches to error rate estimation have been developed. Some of this work has led to deep insights into classification methodology and statistical modelling in general.     

Multiple unit auctions with strategic price-quantity decisions

Summary. I study a multiple unit auction where symmetric risk-neutral bidders choose prices and quantities endogenously. In the model, bidders (a) may place non-linear valuations on the auctioned units, and (b) bid for several units at the same price (“lumpy” bids). I characterize quantity-symmetric and strictly monotone-increasing price equilibria for discriminatory and competitive auctions, and show that (i) if quantity strategy profiles are equal across auctions revenue- equivalence holds, (ii) expected revenue is higher if bidders bid for the entire supply rather than for shares of it, and (iii) equilibrium allocations may fail to be Pareto-optimal. Received: April 14, 1995; revised version: September 3, 1997     

Estimation of posterior probabilities of consumer situational choices with neural network classifiers

This study shows how neural networks can be used to estimate the posterior probabilities in a consumer choice situation. We provide the theoretical basis for its use and illustrate the entire neural network modeling procedure with a situational choice data set from AT&T. Our findings supported the appropriateness of this application and clearly illustrate the nonlinear modeling capability of neural networks. The posterior probability estimates clearly add to the usefulness of the technique for marketing research.     

“I'd like to thank the academy”: An analysis of the awards discourse at the Atlantic Schools of Business Conference

The awarding of prizes has become embedded in all aspects of our society, including academic conferences. At the same time, the reputation economy, an economy where individual standing is based on the opinions of end users, is growing in strength and validity. We analyzed the way in which the awards discourse has been recontextualized within a small academic conference that is struggling to find legitimacy—the Atlantic Schools of Business Conference. With a focus on language and the different meanings words hold in different discourses, we have determined that recontextualization of the discourse within the conference has resulted in two distinct discourses—the discourse of the award giving body and the discourse of the potential award recipient. Copyright © 2008 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices

Summary. Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction. Received: July 31, 1995; revised version: May 28, 1997     

Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm

Summary. At an interim stage players possessing only their private information freely communicate with each other to coordinate their strategies. This results in a core strategy, which is interpreted as an equilibrium set of players' alternative type-contingent contract offers to their fellows. From this set of offers each player then chooses an optimal one and engages in some subsequent action, thus possibly revealing some private information to the others. Now with new information thus obtained from each other, the players play a new game to re-write their contract. In all of the optimization and gaming just described, Bayesian incentive compatibility plays a central role. These ideas are formulated within a model of a profit-center game with incomplete information which formally describes interaction of the asymmetrically informed profit-centers in Chandler's multidivisional firm. Received: May 17, 1996; revised version: January 14, 1997     

Axiomatic characterizations of the Choquet integral

Summary. The Choquet integral is an integral part of recent advances in decision theory involving non-additive measures. In this article we present two new axiomatic characterizations of this functional. Received: January 27, 1997; revised version: April 28, 1997     

Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource games

Summary. A general model of non-cooperating agents exploiting a renewable resource is considered. Assuming that the resource is sufficiently productive we prove that there exists a continuum of Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE). Although these equilibria lead to over-exploitation one can approximate the efficient solution by MPNE both in the state space and the payoff space. Furthermore, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for maximal exploitation of the resource to qualify as a MPNE. This condition is satisfied if there are sufficiently many players, or if the players are sufficiently impatient, or if the capacity of each player is sufficiently high.Received: November 1, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

Capital market imperfections in a monetary growth model

Summary. We consider a monetary growth model essentially identical to that of Diamond (1965) and Tirole (1985), except that we explicitly model credit markets, a credit market friction, and an allocative function for financial intermediaries. These changes yield substantially different results than those obtained in more standard models. In particular, if any monetary steady state equilibria exist, there are generally two of them; one of these has a low capital stock and output level, and it is necessarily a saddle. The other steady state has a high capital stock and output level; either it is necessarily a sink, or its stability properties depend on the rate of money creation. It follows that monetary equilibria can be indeterminate, and nonconvergence phenomena can be observed. Increases in the rate of money creation reduce the capital stock in the high-capital-stock steady state. If the high-capital-stock steady state is not a sink for all rates of money growth, then increases in the rate of money growth can induce a Hopf bifurcation. Hence dynamical equilibria can display damped oscillation as a steady state equilibrium is approached, and limit cycles can be observed as well. In addition, in the latter case, high enough rates of inflation induce the kinds of “crises” noted by Bruno and Easterly (1995): when inflation is too high there are no equilibrium paths approaching the high-activity steady state. Received: November 18, 1995; revised version: March 26, 1996