A model of currency crises with heterogeneous market beliefs

This paper shows that the approach followed by Tamborini (2015) in analyzing and interpreting the euro area public debt crisis, based on the role played by agents characterized by heterogeneous market beliefs, can be applied also to the case of currency crises. By doing so, rather than considering the private sector as an atomistic player endowed with perfect information, and by considering a central bank that optimizes the amount of unsterilized inflow of foreign reserves in a Mundell-Fleming type speculative attack model, allows to explain the interest rates convex non-linearity that characterized, for example, a country like Italy during the 1992–93 EMS crisis.     

AV终结者和ARP病毒的解决方案

但随着网络的普及,病毒的防治变得更加重要了。在2007年各种新型病毒频繁发作,除了熊猫烧香病毒外,AV终结者及ARP病毒在网络上也非常猖獗,肆无忌惮,特别是在局域网上传播更加迅速,本文就AV终结者及ARP病毒的的症状及解决方案进行了详细的阐述。     

计算机网络安全面临的问题及防范措施

随着计算机网络技术的飞速发展和应用,计算机网络系统给用户带来了很多不安全的隐患,计算机网络安全已经越来越受到人们的高度重视,为此,本文从计算网络安全面临的主要问题进行分析,提出了有效的防范措施,目的是为了计算机网络为人们发挥出更大更好的作用。     

局域网内ARP病毒的防范

随着计算机网络技术的不断发展,局域网安全问题越来越受到人们的重视和关注,局域网内病毒的传播严重影响着网络信息的安全性,其中最具代表性的病毒就是ARP病毒。由于ARP病毒在局域网内的传播及对其他计算机的攻击性,为了确保信息的安全与畅通,ARP病毒的预防及清除工作已经成为了网络安全中的重要事情。     

深入剖析ARP病毒

ARP地址欺骗类病毒（以下简称ARP病毒）是一类特殊的病毒,该病毒一般属于木马（Trojan）病毒,不具备主动传播的特性,不会自我复制。但是由于其发作的时候会向全网发送伪造的ARP数据包,干扰全网的运行,因此它的危害比一些蠕虫还要严重得多。     

Speculative attacks and defenses as wars of attrition

This paper extends the currency crisis models in Obstfeld [Obstfeld, M., 1994. The logic of currency crises. Cahiers Economiques et Monetaries], [Obstfeld, M., 1996. Models of currency crises with self-fulfilling features. European Economic Review 40, 1037–1047] by modeling both the government's side and speculators' side and introducing uncertainty about each party's payoff. We argue that a speculative attack (defense) can be well modeled as a war of attrition between the government and speculators under asymmetric information. We then solve for a pure strategy, weakly perfect, Bayesian rational expectation equilibrium in which each party's time until concession depends on her benefits from winning and her costs of fighting. Using this model, we are able to explain important facts of currency crises. First, the model shows that failed defenses (attacks) can be ex-ante rational for governments (speculators). Second, the model predicts systematic variations in the durations of defenses. Finally, we also show that currency crises can be self-fulfilling in the sense that there exist multiple rational expectation equilibria in our model.     

校园网ARP病毒预防与清除

该文针对蔓延泛滥的ARP病毒,特别近期使校园网用户经常掉线,影响正常的学习、工作和生活,同时给网络管理带来了极大的不便.文章从中心路由器、交换机到用户电脑主机,阐述了ARP病毒的预防与清除方法.     

The role of a large trader in a dynamic currency attack model

This paper studies the role of a large trader in a dynamic currency attack model based on Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), who study stock market bubbles and crashes in a dynamic model with a continuum of rational small traders. We introduce a large trader into their model and apply it to currency attacks. In an attack against a fixed exchange rate regime with a gradually overvalued currency, traders lack common knowledge about the time when the overvaluation starts and need to coordinate to break a peg. Both the inability of traders to synchronize their attack and their incentive to time the collapse of the regime lead to the persistent overvaluation of the currency. We find that the presence of a large trader with perfect information induces small traders to attack sooner and leads to an accelerated collapse of the regime. But the presence of a large trader with noisy information may delay the collapse of the regime ex post. Moreover, a large trader with precise information tends to be at the rear of an attack. With noisy information, he could attack earlier or later than small traders. In both cases, the large trader affects market dynamics of the attack substantially.     

Speculation and the decision to abandon a fixed exchange rate regime

This paper demonstrates that the implications of first-generation speculative attack models do not hold if there is a rational, forward-looking policy maker. The policy maker will be able to avoid predictable speculative attacks by introducing uncertainty into the decisions of speculators. This changes the sudden attack into a prolonged period of increasing speculation and uncertainty. In addition, the model provides useful insights into the viability of temporary nominal anchor policies, and a theoretical foundation for a useful empirical methodology.     

Disinflation and fiscal reform: a neoclassical perspective

Many Latin American countries engaged in disinflation programs based on both exchange rate management and fiscal reforms. In most of the cases, part of the fiscal reform was not implemented and the program had to be abandoned. The aftermath of these programs is not encouraging. In this paper we show that, if the reform process is uncertain and inflation has welfare costs, the optimal exchange rate policy indeed implies the initiation of a disinflation program at the announcement of the fiscal reform, even if it implies the possibility of a balance of payments crisis. Finally, we show that it is optimal to engage in a sequence of stabilization programs until one of them is successful.