“交易外部性”:外部性的重新理解及系统整合

基于对外部性和交易本质的理解,当前生产外部性和消费外部性两分的观点有失偏颇。研究提出"交易外部性"概念,即产权交易过程中,交易一方或交易以外的行为主体的权利(束)或权利部分职能被交易另一方强制利用而未被定价或实现对等补偿的现象。据此,按照发生领域和作用主体的不同,外部性可以划分为生产外部性、消费外部性和交易外部性三类,其中,交易外部性进一步包含一类交易外部性、二类交易外部性和三类交易外部性。此处的"二类交易外部性"与史普博的"内部性"具有相同的本质内涵,即"内部性"实质是"交易外部性"范畴下的一个子分类。     

NETWORK EXTERNALITIES AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

In this article, I examine how the network externalities of communications activities and trading opportunities interact to determine the structure of comparative advantage. These interactions are examined by constructing a two‐country, three‐sector model of trade involving a country‐specific communications network sector. The role of the connectivity of network providers, which allows users of a network to communicate with users of another network, is also explored.     

住宅消费外部性及其治理研究

住宅消费的满足程度不仅取决于自身的居住空间,还受到邻居行为、社区公共环境等影响.分析了住宅消费外部性产生的原因和影响,提出了治理住宅消费外部性的相关对策.     

Shared Tax Sources and Public Expenditures

This paper deals with a specific vertical assignment of public functions in a federation: Two levels of government share both the same tax source and expenditure on a productivity increasing public service. We consider surplus maximizing Leviathan governments which provide public services in order to increase their potential tax base. The Nash equilibrium is characterized by overtaxation and relative to surplus maximization—depending on whether or not the public goods are sufficiently complementary with the entire tax base—either underprovision or overprovision of the public service. The implications of these results, in terms of welfare and potential use for earmarking taxes are also considered.     

Duopolistic competition between independent and collaborative business-to-business marketplaces

This paper studies imperfect price competition between two intermediaries in an electronic business-to-business matching market with indirect network externalities. The intermediaries have different ownership structures: an independent incumbent competes with a collaborative buy side consortium to attract buying and selling firms. When firms can register exclusively with one intermediary, the incumbent can deter entry only if the number of consortium owners is sufficiently small. Otherwise, the consortium can enter and monopolize the market. When firms can register with both intermediaries simultaneously, the consortium can always enter and both intermediaries stay in the market with positive profits.     

Competition for goods in buyer-seller networks

Abstract. This paper studies competition in a network and how a network structure determines agents' individual payoffs. It constructs a general model of competition that can serve as a reduced form for specific models. The paper shows how agents' outside options, and hence their shares of surplus, derive from “opportunity paths” connecting them to direct and indirect alternative exchanges. Analyzing these paths, results show how third parties' links affect different agents' bargaining power. Even distant links may have large effects on agents' earnings. These payoff results, and the identification of the paths themselves, should prove useful to further analysis of network structure.     

广告对社会福利的影响及最优投放水平分析

本文首先对广告的作用,包括经济作用与社会作用做了定性的描述,然后运用经济学模型对广告与社会福利的关系进行了分析并探讨了最优的广告投放水平,最后分析了广告的负外部性因素对社会福利的影响。     

论消费外部性及其社会福利影响

消费外部性是指个人或家庭的消费行为影响他人或社会,但个人或家庭并未因此而给予相应补偿或取得相应报酬。无论是正消费外部性还是负消费外部性,其结果都使资源配置达不到怕累托最优状态,导致国民收入减少,从而整个福利也就相应减少。     

宏观审慎监管的基础：政策角度

2013年8月,世界银行经济学家奥古斯托·德拉·托尔（Augusto de la Torre）和阿兰·伊兹（Alain Ize）共同发表《宏观审慎监管的基础》（《The Foundations of Macroprudential Regulation》）。文章从政策的角度出发,研究把政府干预与市场失灵系统性联系起来的金融摩擦,并对宏观审慎监管的基础进行了详细分析。     

Monopoly versus Competition in Setting Accounting Standards

Financial accounting standards are set by organizations granted a significant degree of monopoly power by various governments. While there has been considerable debate on the merits of national (e.g., US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)) versus international (International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)) monopolies, little attention has been paid to the merits of using competing standard‐setting organizations (SSOs) for setting accounting standards. We compare the standard‐setting processes of the FASB/IASB to the processes of four technology‐oriented SSOs to assess the role of competition. We also provide a case study of monopoly and competitive standards in telephony. Both telephony and accounting yield some gains from coordination, and similar arguments are used (under the labels of comparability and consistency of accounting) in debates about granting a monopoly to their respective SSOs. Our results show that a group of volunteers competing with the government‐sanctioned monopoly of International Telecommunications Union transformed the telephone industry. Thanks to this standards competition, we enjoy free video internet calling and massive cost savings. Implications for accounting standard setting are discussed.