我国合理市盈率与股市泡沫的实证分析

市盈率是被广泛用来测量股市泡沫风险的一个重要指标。本根据“股票的理论价格应该是未来各期红利的贴现之和”这一传统金融理论，导出用以衡量股市泡沫成分的基准——合理市盈率的计算方法。通过分析发现市盈率的合理值是一个动态值，据此测量出的上海A股市场泡沫成分自1993年以来呈明显下降趋势，说明我国股票市场上的投资日趋成熟，投资行为日趋理性。     

基于GASA算法的提前或拖期问题优化

针对企业生产的提前 /拖期问题,提出了提前 /拖期问题的数学模型,在此基础上,利用GASA混合优化策略优化之,既保留了传统遗传算法能很快达到最优值领域的优点,又通过结合模拟退火算法大大改善传统遗传算法在后期的收敛性。     

行为资产组合理论：理论基础、内容及对异象的解释

行为金融理论于20世纪80年代兴起，它通过将行为因素引入决策过程从而对传统的金融理论做出补充。谢夫林(Shefrin)和斯特曼(Statman)在现代资产组合理论的基础上提出了行为资产组合理论，该理论是行为金融的理论基础之一。行为资产组合理论的基础包括安全第一组合理论和安全、潜力和期望理论。内容分为单一账户资产组合理论和多重账户资产组合理论。行为资产组合理论能够对市场中的一些异象做出合理的解释。     

ERP中工资管理子系统的解决方案研究与实现

提出典型中小制造企业信息化建设中ERP系统整体解决方案,分析了定单式中小企业ERP系统中工资管理子系统与其它子系统的联系、系统体系结构和系统开发实现的关键技术,并重点讨论了基于B/S架构ERP系统中工资管理子系统开发中的一些关键技术.     

多重关联下PE/VC持股对公司财务风险影响的传导效应

在资本结构、股权结构及市场价值三类多重关联关系下,研究了我国PE/VC持股对公司财务风险影响的多重传导效应。实证检验表明：我国PE/VC的介入会加剧其持股公司发生财务风险的危机,且在该影响过程中,资本结构波动和市场价值波动会增加公司财务风险,而股权结构波动可抑制公司财务风险发生。同时,股权结构波动的遮掩效应最为显著,资本结构波动次之,而市场价值波动的遮掩效应最弱。此外,这三类潜变量在该影响过程中的多重传导效应存在上市板块差异。     

Efficient markets and Bayes’ rule

Summary. A series of financial anomalies motivated the development of new theories that modify the rational expectations ideal. Two possibilities have been systematically explored. The literature on behavioral finance relaxes the assumption that agents form beliefs according to the laws of probability and assume, instead, that simpler heuristic rules are used. Another stream of the literature assumes that agents process information according to Bayes rule, but do not posses sufficient information to know the true data generating process. In this paper, Bayesian and Behavioral agents coexist and trade in a standard dynamic asset pricing model. A long-standing conjecture is demonstrated. It is shown that, under suitable assumptions, Bayesian agents drive Behavioral, non-Bayesian agents out of the market. Hence, asset prices are eventually determined under the Bayesian paradigm.Received: 3 June 2004, Revised: 17 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D83.Preliminary versions have circulated under the titles Markets Favor Bayesian Models and Market Selection of Empirical Models under Limited Information. I thank Larry Blume, David Easley, Larry Epstein, Armando Gomes, Bruce Hansen, Lars Hansen, Richard Kihlstrom, Grace Koo, George Mailath, Werner Ploberger, Andrew Postlewaite and Shakeeb Khan for useful comments. I also thank participants at the NBER GE meetings, Evolutionary Finance conference in Zurich, Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, the Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada, the theory seminar at Brown, Chicago, Harvard-MIT, Minnesota, Penn and Wisconsin. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the National Science Foundation Grant SES 0109650.     

Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration

Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration mechanisms. Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely. This article contains results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called “double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al., 1996). This procedure requires that disputants make two final offers at impasse: a primary and a secondary offer. The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the median of the arbitrator’s preferred settlement distribution. Because the procedure’s rules are that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end. Experimental results indicate that dispute rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional arbitration. However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration. Specifically, in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future-a “narcotic effect.” The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional and final-offer arbitration are.     

Selecting Social Goals: J. M. Keynes and the Emergence of Ontological Rationality in Economics

In this paper we discuss the fundamental inconsistency that results from employing the two traditional concepts of rationality as the basis of selecting social goals. We then consider the possibility that the selection of social goals must be based on explicitly ethical criteria. To do so a third concept of rationality namely, ontological rationality, should be adopted. Moreover, we argue that J. M. Keynes in A Tract Monetary Reform based his public policy recommendations on a modified version of ontological rationality, thereby introducing ontological rationality into economics as the basis for selecting social goals.A previous version of this paper was presented at the Fifty-Eighth International Atlantic Economic Conference, October 7–10, 2004. The authors are grateful to session participants for their helpful suggestions, though the authors alone are responsible for the contents of the paper.     

《欧洲风景公约》及其实施导则解析：迈向综合整体的风景园林规划管理

《欧洲风景公约》是第一个将风景作为规范对象的国际公约，这标志着“风景”概念从科学知识转化为行为规范，并成为跨国治理的政策工具。欧洲风景公约作为“软法”的本质特征是其规定性与确定性，精确的概念和严密的逻辑是公约文件的基石。从法规文本解读的角度全面阐释了公约的风景定义及其重要意义；深入解析了公约的总体措施与行动框架，评述了风景知识与风景行动的相互关系；并对公约在国家层面实施的干预机制、具体的实施方法进行了详细的阐述与解释。     

生态系统服务测度下市域生态空间管控体系构建

生态空间承载着人类、动植物和自然生态多种过程，是生态系统服务功能的策源地和枢纽区。以实施生态空间管控为导引，借助多源数据和ArcGIS、C-Plan系统工具，核心应用系统保护规划(SCP)技术，建立生态服务测度下市域生态空间管控体系的构建方法。基于此，以哈尔滨为例，以不可替代性为表征实现生态空间测度指标综合与功效评价，构建生态空间关键区识别、功能区优划以及网络格局优化模型，提出“重点保护-分区指引-格局优化”的市域生态空间管控体系，为新型城镇化及绿色发展战略的实施奠定科学基础和提供技术支撑。