EMERGENCE OF LEADERSHIP IN TEAMS*

This paper provides a simple model to explain the emergence of leadership in an unstructured team. Each agent has partial information about the productivity of the team. Each agent may invest a productive effort in one of two periods. If one agent voluntarily moves first and the other waits for the second period, and if the first‐move action successfully transmits his type, the first mover effectively exercises leadership in affecting the effort choice of the second mover. We prove that, if each agent holds stochastically independent information, leadership emerges with positive probabilities in Cho–Kreps stable outcomes.     

AN EXPERIMENT WITH ULTIMATUM BARGAINING IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT*

We present experimental results on the ultimatum bargaining game which support an evolutionary explanation of subjects’ behaviour in the game. In these experiments subjects interacted with each other and also with virtual players, i.e. computer programs with pre‐specified strategies. Some of these virtual players were designed to play the equitable allocation, while others exhibited behaviour closer to the subgame‐perfect equilibrium, in which the proposer's share is much larger than that of the responder. We have observed significant differences in the behaviour of real subjects depending on the type of “mutants” (virtual players) that were present in their environment.     

UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN FINITELY REPEATED GAMES WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING*

This paper examines when a finitely repeated game with imperfect monitoring has a unique equilibrium payoff vector. This problem is nontrivial under imperfect monitoring, because uniqueness of equilibrium (outcome) in the stage game does not extend to finitely repeated games. A (correlated) equilibrium is equilibrium minimaxing if any player's equilibrium payoff is her minimax value when the other players choose a correlated action profile from the actions played in the equilibrium. The uniqueness result holds if all stage game correlated equilibria are equilibrium minimaxing and have the same payoffs. The uniqueness result does not hold under weaker conditions.     

Bargaining one-dimensional social choices

We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q?2. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all single-peak, strictly quasi-concave and concave utilities) that assures uniqueness for every q whenever player's utilities are symmetric around the peak. Without symmetry, the monotonicity condition assures uniqueness for qualified majorities, q>n/2, provided that agents are sufficiently patient and utilities satisfy an additional regularity condition. Asymptotic uniqueness is assured for qualified majorities by imposing only the monotonicity condition.     

货代物流信息系统研究

随着经济全球化的发展，物流业也迅速成为一个庞大的产业。货运代理也成为了物流系统全球供应链中一个重要的环节。传统的货代企业及相关的环节各自为政，存在重复工作、工作效率较为低下的弊端。文章以桥安达货代物流信息系统为例，探讨如何构建一个现代的货代物流信息系统，将与货代企业相关的环节统一考虑，通过系统的实施，能够大大地提高货代企业及相关环节的工作效率。     

On distribution-free goodness-of-fit testing of exponentiality

There is a need to test the hypothesis of exponentiality against a wide variety of alternative hypotheses, across many areas of economics and finance. Local or contiguous alternatives are the closest alternatives against which it is still possible to have some power. Hence goodness-of-fit tests should have some power against all, or a huge majority, of local alternatives. Such tests are often based on nonlinear statistics, with a complicated asymptotic null distribution. Thus a second desirable property of a goodness-of-fit test is that its statistic will be asymptotically distribution free. We suggest a whole class of goodness-of-fit tests with both of these properties, by constructing a new version of empirical process that weakly converges to a standard Brownian motion under the hypothesis of exponentiality. All statistics based on this process will asymptotically behave as statistics from a standard Brownian motion and so will be asymptotically distribution free. We show the form of transformation is especially simple in the case of exponentiality. Surprisingly there are only two asymptotically distribution free versions of empirical process for this problem, and only this one has a convenient limit distribution. Many tests of exponentiality have been suggested based on asymptotically linear functionals from the empirical process. We illustrate none of these can be used as goodness-of-fit tests, contrary to some previous recommendations. Of considerable interest is that a selection of well-known statistics all lead to the same test asymptotically, with negligible asymptotic power against a great majority of local alternatives. Finally, we present an extension of our approach that solves the problem of multiple testing, both for exponentiality and for other, more general hypotheses.     

Joint and marginal specification tests for conditional mean and variance models

This article proposes a class of joint and marginal spectral diagnostic tests for parametric conditional means and variances of linear and nonlinear time series models. The use of joint and marginal tests is motivated from the fact that marginal tests for the conditional variance may lead to misleading conclusions when the conditional mean is misspecified. The new tests are based on a generalized spectral approach and do not need to choose a lag order depending on the sample size or to smooth the data. Moreover, the proposed tests are robust to higher order dependence of unknown form, in particular to conditional skewness and kurtosis. It turns out that the asymptotic null distributions of the new tests depend on the data generating process. Hence, we implement the tests with the assistance of a wild bootstrap procedure. A simulation study compares the finite sample performance of the proposed and competing tests, and shows that our tests can play a valuable role in time series modeling. Finally, an application to the S&P 500 highlights the merits of our approach.     

Finite Sample Correction Factors for Panel Cointegration Tests*

In this paper we present finite T mean and variance correction factors and corresponding response surface regressions for the panel cointegration tests presented in Pedroni (1999, 2004) , Westerlund (2005) , Larsson et al. (2001) and Breitung (2005) . For the single equation tests, we consider up to 12 regressors and for the system tests vector autoregression dimensions up to 12 variables. All commonly used specifications for the deterministic components are considered. The sample sizes considered are T ∈ {10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,90,100,200,500}.     

Reaffirming the management ethic in industrial firms

These then are the ground rules underlying what I call “the manegement ethic.”They are based on common sense, logic, and a sense of fair play—but then, that is quite simply what good management is all about. There is nothing original about these ideas; nor, as can be seen from the following quotation, is there anything new about them.We trained hard—but it seemed that every time we were beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganized. I was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing. And what a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency and demoralization.     

A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution

A strategy revision process in symmetric normal form games is proposed. Following Kandori et al. (Econometrica 61 (1993) 29), members of a population periodically revise their strategy choice, and choose a myopic best response to currently observed play. Their payoffs are perturbed by normally distributed Harsanyian trembles, so that strategies are chosen according to multinomial probit probabilities. As the variance of payoffs is allowed to vanish, the graph theoretic methods of the earlier literature continue to apply. The distributional assumption enables a convenient closed form characterisation for the weights of the rooted trees. An illustration of the approach is offered, via a consideration of the role of dominated strategies in equilibrium selection.