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81.
以第三方物流企业的实际需求为例,给出了适合该第三方物流企业商业运作流程的物流信息系统整体解决方案,包括基于J2EE系统技术架构、系统功能、网络体系结构、系统接口等.该解决方案适用于目前大多数的第三方物流企业. 相似文献
82.
In this paper I propose an alternative to calibration of linearized singular dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Given an a-theoretical econometric model as a representative of the data generating process, I will construct an information measure which compares the conditional distribution of the econometric model variables with the corresponding singular conditional distribution of the theoretical model variables. The singularity problem will be solved by using convolutions of both distributions with a non-singular distribution. This information measure will then be maximized to the deep parameters of the theoretical model, which links these parameters to the parameters of the econometric model and provides an alternative to calibration. This approach will be illustrated by an application to a linearized version of the stochastic growth model of King, Plosser and Rebelo. 相似文献
83.
84.
Ingrid Seinen 《European Economic Review》2006,50(3):581-602
In the economic literature, reciprocity is typically studied in situations of repeated interaction between two individuals. It refers to one individual rewarding kind acts of the other or punishing hostile acts. In contrast, this paper studies indirect reciprocity, where a cooperative action is rewarded by a third actor, not involved in the original exchange. We provide experimental evidence on indirect reciprocity. The experiment is based on the ‘repeated helping game’ developed by Nowak and Sigmund (J. Theoret. Biol. 194 (1998) 561; Nature 393 (1998) 573), involving random pairing in large groups. Pairs consist of a donor and a recipient. Donors decide whether or not to provide costly ‘help’ to the recipients they are matched with, based on information about the recipient's behavior in encounters with third parties. We observe clear evidence of indirect reciprocity. Many decision-makers respond to the information about previous decisions (whether or not to help others) of the recipients. In our experiments, this indirect reciprocity is largely based on norms about how often the recipient should have helped others in the past. We show that these norms develop similarly within groups of interacting subjects, but distinctly across groups. This leads to the emergence of group norms. 相似文献
85.
Huseyin Yildirim 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,136(1):167-196
This paper studies a sequential bargaining model in which agents expend efforts to be the proposer. In equilibrium, agents’ effort choices are influenced by the prize and cost effects. The (endogenous) prize is the difference between the residual surplus an agent obtains when he is the proposer and the payment he expects to receive when he is not. Main results include: (1) under the unanimity voting rule, two agents with equal marginal costs propose with equal probabilities, regardless of their time preferences; (2) under a nonunanimity rule, however, the more patient agent proposes with a greater probability; (3) while, under the unanimity rule, the social cost decreases in group heterogeneity, it can increase under a nonunanimity rule; and (4) when agents are identical, the unanimity rule is socially optimal. 相似文献
86.
The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted. 相似文献
87.
Abstract. Researchers have used stylized facts on asset prices and trading volume in stock markets (in particular, the mean reversion
of asset returns and the correlations between trading volume, price changes and price levels) to support theories where agents
are not rational expected utility maximizers. This paper shows that this empirical evidence is in fact consistent with a standard
infinite horizon – perfect information – expected utility economy where some agents face leverage constraints similar to those
found in todays financial markets. In addition, and in sharp contrast to the theories above, we explain some qualitative differences
that are observed in the price-volume relation on stock and on futures markets.
We consider a continuous-time economy where agents maximize the integral of their discounted utility from consumption under
both budget and leverage constraints. Building on the work by Vila and Zariphopoulou (1997), we find a closed form solution,
up to a negative constant, for the equilibrium prices and demands in the region of the state space where the constraint is
non-binding. We show that, at the equilibrium, stock holdings volatility as well as its ratio to stock price volatility are
increasing functions of the stock price and interpret this finding in terms of the price-volume relation.
We would like to thank the editor and two anonimous referees for valuable substantive comments. Our gratitude also to Franklin
Allen, Kerry Back, Domenico Cuoco, Xavier Freixas, Sanford Grossman, Michel Habib, Lutz Hendricks, Richard Kihlstrom, Fernando
Restoy, Mary Thomson, Jean-Luc Vila, participants to seminars at Birkbeck College, Carnegie-Mellon, Columbia, ESSEC, HEC,
IAE, INSEAD, London Business School, London School of Economics, McGill, Michigan, National University of Singapore, Pompeu
Fabra, North Carolina, Washington-St-Louis, Wharton, the Jornadas de Economía Financiera BBV, and the Meetings of the Society
for Economic Dynamics and Control and the American Finance Association. Special thanks are due to Süleyman Basak for his enthusiastic
support and many helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the BBV and Caja
de Madrid Foundations and CREF (both authors) and of the Spanish Ministry of Education under DGICYT grant no. PB93-0388 (first
author). 相似文献
88.
This paper employs duration analysis to investigate the timing of default in the UK mortgage market. Our analysis is performed on an ex ante basis, in that our explanatory variables are available to mortgage lenders when the loan is first made. We estimate both standard Weibull distributions and generalizations of the Weibull that permit non-monotonic hazard functions. The models fit the data well, suggesting that we have captured the major sources of variation in duration. We find that ‘cash flow’ variables, such as salary and interest rate paid, play the largest role. Surprisingly, loan-to-value ratios are either insignificant or influence default times in a counter-intuitive direction. 相似文献
89.
Sanjeev Goyal 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):460-492
We consider a setting where every pair of players that undertake a transaction (e.g. exchange goods or information) creates a unit surplus. A transaction can take place only if the players involved have a connection. If the connection is direct the two players split the surplus equally, while if it is indirect then intermediate players also get an equal share of the surplus. Thus, individuals form links with others to create surplus, to gain intermediation rents, and to circumvent others who are trying to become intermediary.Our analysis clarifies the interplay between these forces in the process of strategic network formation. First, we show that, in the absence of capacity constraints on links, it leads to the emergence of a star network where a single agent acts as an intermediary for all transactions and enjoys significantly higher payoffs. Second, we study the implications of capacity constraints in the ability of agents to form links. In this case, distances between players must be long, which induces players who are “far off” to connect in order to avoid paying large intermediation rents. A cycle network then emerges, payoffs being equal across all players. 相似文献
90.
We formally incorporate the option to gather information into a game and thus endogenize the information structure. We ask whether models with exogenous information structures are robust with respect to this endogenization. Any Nash equilibrium of the game with information acquisition induces a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game with an exogenous structure. We provide sufficient conditions on the structure of the game for which this remains true when ‘Nash’ is replaced by ‘sequential’. We characterize the (sequential) Nash equilibria of games with exogenous information structures that can arise as a (sequential) Nash equilibrium of games with endogenous information acquisition. 相似文献