交易透明度与信息揭示制度：国际趋势与启示

由于经济文化环境、交易制度、市场结构，技术模式和投资者分布等方面的差异，不同交易所在交易信息揭示的种类，数量和程度方面有所区别。本文首先总结了采取指令驱动的主要交易所的交易信息揭示制度和市场透明度，在比基础上分析了交易所交易信息揭示制度变革与市场透明度的发展趋势．希望能对我国证券市场交易信息揭示制度的发展提供一点有益的借鉴和启示。     

股权结构影响下的上市公司融资倾向研究

本文选取深沪两市的900家上市公司为样本,以2001-2004年的财务及相关数据为基础,从我国上市公司特殊的股权结构出发,运用一般描述性统计分析、偏相关分析、独立样本T检验等方法,分析我国上市公司股权结构与融资倾向之间的关系,以探究在相同市场环境中,不同的股权结构安排是否会导致其融资倾向的差异性。研究结果表明,股权结构对上市公司融资倾向具有显著的影响,不同股权结构安排下的公司有不同的融资倾向,特殊的股权结构是造成我国上市公司融资结构不合理的主要因素。     

不完全竞争、交易效率和证券风险

本文提出了一种崭新的理论观点———不完全竞争的市场结构是证券风险的一个重要来源,并利用市场数据进行了实证分析。此外,本文还发现不完全竞争的市场结构会通过影响买卖双方的交易策略而降低市场的交易效率。     

东北老工业基地产业结构与经济增长的实证分析

现代经济增长的过程,是经济增长与产业结构变动相互促进、相互联系、不断发展的过程。结合当前我国的区域发展重点之一,即振兴东北老工业基地,从区域层次研究产业结构与经济增长的关系,采用动态经济计量学中协整和方差分解的分析方法,利用东北老工业基地经济总量和产业结构的不变价格数据,对其产业结构变动与经济增长效应的关系进行实证分析,有利于我们得出较有价值的结论。     

我国商业银行业公司治理结构与经营绩效的实证研究

通过对8家股份制商业银行的公司治理结构与经营绩效的关系做回归分析,结果显示:经营绩效与董事会规模正相关;与第一大股东持股比例负相关;与前5大股东控制权分散度正相关。因此,国有商业银行应当适度增大董事会规模、明晰产权关系、强化监事会职能、加强管理层激励与信息透明度。     

Consistency conditions for affine term structure models

Sufficient conditions for the application of the Feynman-Kac formula for option pricing for wide classes of affine term structure models in the jump-diffusion case are derived by generalizing earlier results for bond pricing in the pure-diffusion case The author is grateful to Mikhail Chernov and Darrel Duffie for useful discussions and suggestions.     

银行信贷政策与产业结构调整——工商银行构建金融支持体系服务江苏产业结构调整的设想

产业结构的调整与优化是江苏“十一五”期间经济持续快速发展的重要环节，而高效的金融支持体系是确保产业结构调整优化的基本条件。本文分析了银行在产业结构调整中的作用和互动关系，考察了国内外银行调整产业结构的成功经验，围绕江苏产业结构现状及其“十一五”时期产业发展远景目标，提出了工商银行引导区域产业合理布局、促进金融产品组合创新、优化行业资金结构、开辟新的信贷市场领域、实现客户结构战略转型等支持江苏产业结构调整的金融路径；并剖析了银行在支持产业结构调整中的内外部制约因素，进一步提出了工商银行按照产业结构调整要求深化改革的内部措施和构建金融生态环境的外部建议。     

建设工程招标制度探析——大型水电工程投资建设过程的新制度经济学解释

从大型水电建设工程的产权、交易成本、委托代理关系等方面,对招标制度的机理和制度结构进行了分析。认为招标制度是招标人的建设工程由产权的虚拟形态向产权的实物形态转移过程中,具有帕累托效率改进功能的一种制度安排。从制度结构角度,提出了企业招标制度体系的构建建议。     

Agency hazards and alliance portfolios

Prior research over several decades has catalogued many positive motives underlying firms' decisions to engage in joint ventures and other forms of alliances. In this empirical analysis, we investigate whether agency problems brought about by the separation of ownership and control also stimulate the development of firms' joint venture portfolios. By focusing on joint ventures, as opposed to diversification in general or acquisitions, we address the recent debate on agency theory's domain. Results from a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms' alliance portfolios offer supporting evidence, and comparable findings are obtained for international and domestic joint ventures. Agency hazards are also found to bring about extensions of firms' nonequity alliance portfolios in both the international and domestic settings. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Insider Ownership and Firm Value: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

Real estate investment trust (REIT) provides a unique laboratory to study the relation between insider ownership and firm value. One, a REIT has to satisfy special regulations which weaken alternative mechanisms to control agency problems. Empirically, I find a significant and robust nonlinear relation between Tobin's Q and REIT insider ownership that is consistent with the trade-off between the incentive alignment and the entrenchment effect of insider ownership. Two, many REITs are Umbrella Partnership REITs (UPREITs) which have dual ownership structure. They have both common shares and Operating Partnership Units (OP units). Property owners can contribute their properties to the UPREIT in exchange for OP units. Their capital gains taxes remain deferred as long as they hold onto their OP units and the UPREIT does not sell the properties they contributed. OP units owners are locked in with the firm and have incentive to monitor firm management, but their interests diverge from the common shareholders because their tax bases are much lower. Consistent with the trade-off between positive monitoring effect of OP units and tax-induced agency costs, I find that UPREIT's firm value increases with the fraction of OP units, but the effect is significantly weaker for the UPREITs where insiders hold OP units.