Apology and Ambiguity: Adolf Berle on Corporate Power

A sociocognitive foundation for transformative agency requires much deeper exploration to adequately understand the causal origins of human interests, preferences, and choices as they shape both the emergence of institutions and the process of institutional change. In the collegial spirit of rapprochement, reminiscent of earlier efforts at “bridge-building,” our central contention is that the new institutional economics of “late” Douglass C. North (2005) North, Douglass C. Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar] provides such a sociocognitive approach, as well as an important ontological frame for dealing with embedded agency. This agency may afford original institutional economics a complementary meta-theoretical account of how institutions are formed and changed over time.     

Committing to transparency to resist corruption

This paper studies firms' incentives to commit to transparent behavior in a competitive procedure modeled as an asymmetric information beauty contest managed by a corrupt agent. In his evaluation of firms' offers for a public contract the agent has some discretion to favor a firm in exchange for a bribe. While unilateral commitment to transparency is never incentive compatible, under some circumstances a voluntary but conditional commitment mechanism can eliminate corruption. A low quality firm may prefer not to commit only when the agent's discretion is strong and the market's profitability is small. In that situation, the high quality firms commit when commitment decisions are kept secret, but some conditions on firms' beliefs are required when commitment decisions are publicly announced. A mechanism combining both conditionality and a reward (a transparent selection advantage that needs not be large) allows complete elimination of corruption.     

Is the Sky the Limit? Can Japanese Government Bonds Continue to Defy Gravity?

This paper presents a simulation model based on the growth rate, the inflation rate, and the consumption tax rate in the future. Future tax revenues and fiscal expenditures are projected using regression models estimated from past data. The fiscal situation is called unsustainable if the outstanding amount of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) becomes higher than the level of private sector financial assets. We focus on the general account of the central government, which is the source of JGB issues. We find that the higher the economic growth, the more likely it is that the fiscal situation is sustainable. When a larger portion of interest income is reinvested in JGBs, the chance is higher that the fiscal situation is sustainable. Most importantly, raising the consumption tax to 20% guarantees fiscal sustainability in most cases. Our analysis shows that without a consumption tax hike beyond the 10% rate, a fiscal crisis will be almost a certainty, even with a real economic growth rate of 2% despite a shrinking labor force. A reasonably quick hike of the consumption tax, namely a hike by 1% a year, up to 20%, combined with high or moderate economic growth rates, seems to keep the economy out of a fiscal crisis, where a moderate growth rate is defined to be generated by a productivity increase per working‐age population of 1.9%, which was the average during the Koizumi years.     

House Prices and Stock Prices: Different Roles in the US Monetary Transmission Mechanism*

We analyze the role of house prices and stock prices in the monetary‐policy transmission mechanism in the US, using a structural vector autoregressive model. If we allow the interest rate and asset prices to react simultaneously to news, we find different roles for house prices and stock prices in the monetary transmission mechanism. Following a contractionary monetary‐policy shock, stock prices fall immediately, while the response in house prices is more gradual. Regarding the systematic response in monetary policy, stock prices play a more important role than house prices. As a consequence, house prices contribute more than stock prices to fluctuations in gross domestic product and inflation.     

Gambling in contests

This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the highest stopping point wins. Unlike the explicit cost for a higher stopping time in a war of attrition, here, higher stopping times are riskier, because players can go bankrupt. We derive a closed-form solution of a Nash equilibrium outcome. In equilibrium, highest expected losses occur at an intermediate negative value of the drift.     

Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty

This paper studies asymmetric first-price menu auctions in the procurement environment where the buyer does not commit to a decision rule and asymmetric sellers have interdependent costs and statistically affiliated signals. Sellers compete in bidding a menu of contracts, where a contract specifies a vector of characteristics and a payment required from the buyer for delivering these characteristics. The buyer does not commit ex-ante to a decision rule but rather upon observing all the menus offered by sellers chooses the best contract. This paper establishes the existence of a continuum of separating monotone equilibria in this game bounded above by the jointly ex-post efficient outcome and below by the jointly interim efficient outcome. It shows that the jointly ex-post efficient equilibrium outcome is the only ex-post renegotiation-proof outcome and it is also ex-ante robust to all continuation equilibria.     

The trade-off between innovation and defense industrial policy: A simulation model analysis of the Norwegian defense industry

The paper investigates the trade-off between innovation and defense industrial policy. It presents an agent-based simulation model calibrated for the Norwegian defense industry that compares different policy scenarios and examines the effects of a pending EU market liberalization process. The paper points to two main results. (1) It finds that a pure scenario where national authorities focus on, and provide support exclusively for, either a) international competitiveness or b) national defense and security objectives, is more Pareto efficient than a corresponding mixed strategy where policy makers simultaneously pursue both international competitiveness and defense and security objectives. (2) Under the conditions of the new EU liberalization regime, it finds that a stronger and more visible trade-off will emerge between international competitiveness and national defense and security objectives. Policy makers will have to choose which to prioritize, and set a clear agenda focusing on one of the two objectives.     

Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments

We derive several implications of incentive compatibility in general (i.e., not necessarily quasilinear) environments. Building on Kos and Messner (2013), we provide a (partial) characterization of incentive compatible mechanisms.     

How economic rewards affect cooperation reconsidered

Recent studies suggest that payoffs in cents, compared to dollars, produce less defection in a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game. We are unable to replicate these findings with conventional economic procedures or in a direct replication.