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101.
This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted: players evaluate the desirability of a “current” move in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoffs. We define a concept of equilibrium which takes into account farsighted behavior of agents and allows for limited cooperation amongst agents. We show that an equilibrium process of network formation exists. We also show that there are valuation structures in which no equilibrium strategy profile can sustain efficient networks. We then provide sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium process will yield efficient outcomes. 相似文献
102.
Jacob K. Goeree 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,108(2):345-364
This paper considers auctions where bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic interactions. When bidders wish to exaggerate their private information, equilibrium bidding functions are biased upwards as bidders attempt to signal via the winning bid. Signaling is most prominent in second-price auctions where equilibrium bids are “above value.” In English and first-price auctions, signaling is less extreme since the winner incurs the cost of her signaling choice. The opportunity to signal lowers bidders’ payoffs and raises revenue. When bidders understate their private information, separating equilibria need not exist and the auction may not be efficient. 相似文献
103.
This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline.
In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the
bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines
the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline
effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and,
moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition
between the buyers. 相似文献
104.
Abstract. This paper estimates the impact of interest rate shocks on regional output in Germany over the period from 1970 to 2000. We use a vector autoregression (VAR) model to obtain impulse responses, which reveal differences in the output responses to monetary policy shocks across ten German provinces. Next, we investigate whether these differences can be related to structural features of the regional economies, such as industry mix, firm size, bank size and openness. An additional analysis of the volatility of real GDP growth for the period 1992–2000 includes the Eastern provinces. We also present evidence on the interrelationship between firm size and industry, and compare our measure of firm size with those used in previous studies. We conclude that the differential regional effects of monetary policy are related to industrial composition, but not to firm size or bank size. 相似文献
105.
We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents’ choices, which might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study static as well as dynamic infinite horizon economies; we allow for economies with incomplete information, and we consider jointly global and local interactions, to integrate e.g., global externalities and markets with peer and group effects. We provide conditions under which such economies have rational expectations equilibria. We illustrate the effects of local interactions when agents are rational by studying in detail the equilibrium properties of a simple economy with quadratic preferences which captures, in turn, local preferences for conformity, habit persistence, and preferences for status or adherence to aggregate norms of behavior. 相似文献
106.
Jason Shachat 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,114(2):280-309
We describe an experiment based on a simple two-person game designed so that different learning models make different predictions. Econometric analysis of the experimental data reveals clear heterogeneity in the subjects’ learning behavior. But the subjects follow only a few decision rules for basing their play on their information, and these rules have simple cognitive interpretations. There is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and many equilibria in mixed strategies. We find that the only equilibrium consistent with the data is one of the mixed strategy equilibria. This equilibrium is shown, surprisingly, to be consistent with Jordan's Bayesian model. 相似文献
107.
Klaus Kultti 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):721-728
We establish a link between von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the Nash solution in a general n-player utility set. The stable set-solution is defined with respect to a dominance relation: payoff vector u dominates v if one player prefers u even with one period delay. We show that a stable set exists and, if the utility set has a smooth surface, any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution when the length of the period goes to zero. 相似文献
108.
Frédéric Lordon 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》1997,7(1):1-21
The slow and endogenous twist of economic macro-structure makes up an important evolutionary feature of capitalist economies,
and may be at the root of structural crisis. In this line, a Goodwinian growth model with increasing returns and profit-sharing
that tries to picture a simple scenario of the seventies crisis is considered. It is shown that the exhaustion of the Kaldor-Verdoorn
“productivity law” can entail, in a nonlinear framework, a “catastrophic” bifurcation from a “high” to a “low” growth path.
Slow/fast dynamical systems then allow one to formalize a multiple time-scales dynamics where the growth path is shaped by
the structural framework in which it takes place, but has also a long -un feedback. Structural change and crisis appear as
long term and endogenous outcomes. 相似文献
109.
Enrico Bellino 《Journal of Economics》1997,65(1):41-54
In the last 10–15 years a lot of attempts has been devoted to study the calssical process of convergence of market prices toward natural prices. The two forces that one has thought could achieve this target were capital mobility, that determines the dynamics of output, and demand-supply forces, that determine the dynamics of prices. In this article a model of classical competition is proposed in which a full-cost pricing mechanism is adopted in the rule of evolution of market prices. An asymptotical stability result of long-run equilibrium is proved for a two-commodity model with and without a final demand. 相似文献
110.
We propose a natural conjugate prior for the instrumental variables regression model. The prior is a natural conjugate one since the marginal prior and posterior of the structural parameter have the same functional expressions which directly reveal the update from prior to posterior. The Jeffreys prior results from a specific setting of the prior parameters and results in a marginal posterior of the structural parameter that has an identical functional form as the sampling density of the limited information maximum likelihood estimator. We construct informative priors for the Angrist–Krueger [1991. Does compulsory school attendance affect schooling and earnings? Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 979–1014] data and show that the marginal posterior of the return on education in the US coincides with the marginal posterior from the Southern region when we use the Jeffreys prior. This result occurs since the instruments are the strongest in the Southern region and the posterior using the Jeffreys prior, identical to maximum likelihood, focusses on the strongest available instruments. We construct informative priors for the other regions that make their posteriors of the return on education similar to that of the US and the Southern region. These priors show the amount of prior information needed to obtain comparable results for all regions. 相似文献