全文获取类型
收费全文 | 7314篇 |
免费 | 521篇 |
国内免费 | 10篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 1315篇 |
工业经济 | 166篇 |
计划管理 | 1794篇 |
经济学 | 2763篇 |
综合类 | 125篇 |
运输经济 | 11篇 |
旅游经济 | 22篇 |
贸易经济 | 586篇 |
农业经济 | 460篇 |
经济概况 | 603篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 32篇 |
2022年 | 39篇 |
2021年 | 54篇 |
2020年 | 247篇 |
2019年 | 289篇 |
2018年 | 161篇 |
2017年 | 213篇 |
2016年 | 156篇 |
2015年 | 210篇 |
2014年 | 531篇 |
2013年 | 582篇 |
2012年 | 717篇 |
2011年 | 930篇 |
2010年 | 665篇 |
2009年 | 490篇 |
2008年 | 519篇 |
2007年 | 605篇 |
2006年 | 375篇 |
2005年 | 239篇 |
2004年 | 156篇 |
2003年 | 149篇 |
2002年 | 72篇 |
2001年 | 49篇 |
2000年 | 31篇 |
1999年 | 46篇 |
1998年 | 42篇 |
1997年 | 64篇 |
1996年 | 37篇 |
1995年 | 22篇 |
1994年 | 17篇 |
1993年 | 13篇 |
1992年 | 2篇 |
1991年 | 4篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 24篇 |
1984年 | 24篇 |
1983年 | 16篇 |
1982年 | 9篇 |
1981年 | 2篇 |
1980年 | 3篇 |
1979年 | 2篇 |
1978年 | 4篇 |
1977年 | 1篇 |
1975年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有7845条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
91.
Irreversible investment and Knightian uncertainty 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Kiyohiko G. Nishimura 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,136(1):668-694
When firms make a decision about irreversible investment, they may not have complete confidence about their perceived probability measure describing future uncertainty. They may think other probability measures perturbed from the original one are also possible. Such uncertainty, characterized by not a single probability measure but a set of probability measures, is called “Knightian uncertainty.” The effect of Knightian uncertainty on the value of irreversible investment opportunity is shown to be drastically different from that of traditional uncertainty in the form of risk. Specifically, an increase in Knightian uncertainty decreases the value of investment opportunity while an increase in risk increases it. 相似文献
92.
We use a panel data set of 59 developing countries over the 1972–1994 period to study the deforestation process. Relying on both parametric and semiparametric models, we examine nonlinearities and heterogeneity in the deforestation process. We first study the existence of an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) and then analyze determinants of deforestation. Our data sample provides no evidence of an EKC. We also find that political institution failures may worsen the deforestation process in developing countries. 相似文献
93.
Alvaro Sandroni 《Economic Theory》2005,26(4):741-764
Summary. A series of financial anomalies motivated the development of new theories that modify the rational expectations ideal. Two possibilities have been systematically explored. The literature on behavioral finance relaxes the assumption that agents form beliefs according to the laws of probability and assume, instead, that simpler heuristic rules are used. Another stream of the literature assumes that agents process information according to Bayes rule, but do not posses sufficient information to know the true data generating process. In this paper, Bayesian and Behavioral agents coexist and trade in a standard dynamic asset pricing model. A long-standing conjecture is demonstrated. It is shown that, under suitable assumptions, Bayesian agents drive Behavioral, non-Bayesian agents out of the market. Hence, asset prices are eventually determined under the Bayesian paradigm.Received: 3 June 2004, Revised: 17 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D83.Preliminary versions have circulated under the titles Markets Favor Bayesian Models and Market Selection of Empirical Models under Limited Information. I thank Larry Blume, David Easley, Larry Epstein, Armando Gomes, Bruce Hansen, Lars Hansen, Richard Kihlstrom, Grace Koo, George Mailath, Werner Ploberger, Andrew Postlewaite and Shakeeb Khan for useful comments. I also thank participants at the NBER GE meetings, Evolutionary Finance conference in Zurich, Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, the Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada, the theory seminar at Brown, Chicago, Harvard-MIT, Minnesota, Penn and Wisconsin. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the National Science Foundation Grant SES 0109650. 相似文献
94.
Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We determine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for “responsive couples markets”, viz., optimality, filled positions, and manipulation. 相似文献
95.
Hassan Benchekroun 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,111(2):214-239
This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a productive asset by a duopoly. A closed-loop Nash equilibrium of the game is constructed and used to analyze the effects of a unilateral production restriction. Surprisingly, such unilateral action may result in a decrease of the long-run asset's stock. We also exhibit production restrictions that can result simultaneously in an increase of the asset's stock and the long-run profits of the firm that is being imposed the production restriction. Moreover, a unilateral decrease of the production of one firm can induce its rival to also decrease its production. 相似文献
96.
Guillaume Haeringer 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,117(1):140-143
To construct their Equilibrium Binding Agreements, Ray and Vohra (J. Econ. Theory, 73 (1997) 30-78) define a concept of an equilibrium between coalitions and prove its existence for any coalition structure. We show that this result crucially depends on the quasi-concavity of the utility functions, which in turn depends on the type of mixed strategies used by the coalitions. When coalitions use uncorrelated mixed strategies utility functions may not be quasi-concave and an equilibrium may not exist. However, if coalitions use correlated strategies, an equilibrium always exist. 相似文献
97.
Alexander Matros 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,111(1):110-124
Saez-Marti and Weibull (J. Econom. Theory 86 (1999) 268) investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's (J. Econom. Theory 59 (1993) 145) bargaining model, which is how they introduce “cleverness” of players. I analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games and show Young's (Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1998) prediction to be robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategy distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents. 相似文献
98.
We use a game theoretical framework to analyze the intraday behavior of banks with respect to settlement of interbank claims in a real-time gross settlement setting. The game played by banks depends upon the intraday credit policy of the central bank and it encompasses two well-known game theoretical paradigms: the prisoner's dilemma and the stag hunt. The former arises in a collateralized credit regime where banks have an incentive to postpone payments when daylight liquidity is costly, an outcome that is socially inefficient. The latter arises in a priced credit regime where the postponement of payments can be socially efficient. Banks are risk neutral, but we show that most of the results are unaffected by risk aversion. 相似文献
99.
Hamid Sabourian 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,116(2):189-228
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 63-78) consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade. They show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome. Here, I consider Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences, together with the standard payoff in the game, then every equilibrium is stationary/Markov and induces the unique competitive price. Thus, I demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome. 相似文献
100.
This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted: players evaluate the desirability of a “current” move in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoffs. We define a concept of equilibrium which takes into account farsighted behavior of agents and allows for limited cooperation amongst agents. We show that an equilibrium process of network formation exists. We also show that there are valuation structures in which no equilibrium strategy profile can sustain efficient networks. We then provide sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium process will yield efficient outcomes. 相似文献