Analysing the effect of excess cash accumulation on financial decisions

In this current moment of crisis it is very important for firms to hold a suitable amount of cash. But it is also very important to analyse how this amount of cash affects firm value. Here an in-depth study is made of the determination of firm value centring our attention on the problem of excess cash accumulation. This article adds important value to the existing literature since, employing the panel data methodology in the sample of Spanish nonfinancial firms, it identifies whether excess cash holding affects firm value in general, and investment, financing and dividend decisions in particular. The results show how asymmetric information among the economic agents of the firm affects the cash reserves. In particular, shareholders could penalize the investment made by these firms and consider the positive effect that the debt in particular and the dividend policies exert on the firm. Moreover, the results reveal the importance of financial flexibility as opposed to the arguments provided by agency theory.     

NO‐ARBITRAGE PRICING UNDER SYSTEMIC RISK: ACCOUNTING FOR CROSS‐OWNERSHIP

We generalize Merton’s asset valuation approach to systems of multiple financial firms where cross‐ownership of equities and liabilities is present. The liabilities, which may include debts and derivatives, can be of differing seniority. We derive equations for the prices of equities and recovery claims under no‐arbitrage. An existence result and a uniqueness result are proven. Examples and an algorithm for the simultaneous calculation of all no‐arbitrage prices are provided. A result on capital structure irrelevance for groups of firms regarding externally held claims is discussed, as well as financial leverage and systemic risk caused by cross‐ownership.     

我国上市公司股权结构与现金股利政策关系研究——基于半参数模型的分析

多重委托代理关系的存在使得我国上市公司股权结构与现金股利政策之间的关系极其复杂。选取多个代理变量从不同的角度构建半参数模型,利用函数形式来刻画两者之间的非线性关系。利用我国565家上市公司的数据进行实证研究,结果表明:股权制衡度与现金分红数量之间存在倒"S"形关系,拐点分别在30%和60%左右;前十大股东持股比例与现金分红意愿及分红数量之间均存在明显的倒"U"形关系,拐点分别在60%和80%左右。     

Is the relationship between investment and conditional cash flow volatility ambiguous,asymmetric or both?

We investigate the effect of cash flow volatility on investment. Our evidence suggests that financially constrained firms decrease investment (i) when experiencing persistently high volatility; (ii) when experiencing both high volatility and negative cash flow growth realisations; and (iii) when holding low cash levels and experiencing both high volatility and a negative cash flow growth realisations. In financially unconstrained firms, the above effects are either not found or are of relatively low economic importance. Overall, our findings lend support to the financial flexibility literature and tend to contradict predictions of the real options literature.     

Funds Statements and the Two-Entity Test: A Reponse

Robb (1985) criticizes the two-entity test proposed by McKinnon et al. (1983) as confusing and contradictory. This reply demonstrates that his criticisms also are confusing and contradictory.     

融资约束抑或过度投资——中国上市企业投资—现金流敏感度的经验证据

本文以中国上市企业为分析样本,通过检验现金持有量对投资—现金流敏感度的影响,考察企业中的融资约束和代理冲突。结果显示,融资约束与过度投资导致企业投资支出与内部现金流密切相关。民营企业、大规模地方国有企业中存在过度投资,所持有的现金具有明显的壕沟效应、进一步提高投资—现金流敏感度。而中、小规模国有企业面临的融资约束比较突出,为了抵御外部融资约束,持有现金充当对冲工具、降低投资—现金流敏感度。     

Cash Management of Malaysian Banks

ABSTRACT

This study aims to identify seasonal variations in the form of day of the week, month of the year, and time of the month effects on the demand and supply of cash based on daily cash data obtained from a sample of banks in Malaysia. This information would increase the efficiency of vault cash management policies of banks, which would in turn increase the profitability of banks since the degree to which banks optimize their vault cash holding has revenue and cost implications. These seasonal effects have been tested using the one-way ANOVA technique, and the findings revealed that the demand for general cash among Malaysian banks has been on the decline throughout the years due to the introduction of new channels of delivery. There was also sufficient statistical evidence, though to varying extent, that indicates the presence of month of the year and time of the month effects on bank's demand for and supply of cash.     

大股东控制与现金持有价值关系的经验研究

本文以沪深两市2005—2010年391家上市公司为样本,检验了大股东控制对中国上市公司现金持有价值的影响。研究发现,第一大股东持股比例与企业价值间是一种近似U型的非线性关系,第一大股东持股比例的临界点为45%。将第一大股东持股比例与现金持有量的交互项引入模型,回归发现,当第一大股东持股比例小于45%时,交互项的系数显著为负,大股东控制的壕沟效应占主导;当第一大股东持股比例超过45%时,交互项的回归结果不显著。没有证据表明第一大股东性质会对企业价值发挥显著影响。     

Cash holdings of politically connected firms

Politically connected firms benefit from soft-budget constraints and are unlikely to suffer from liquidity constraints. This argument suggests that politically connected firms should hold less cash than non-connected peers. Another view posits that these firms exhibit acute corporate governance problems. In this setting, politically connected firms are more likely to hold more cash than non-connected firms. Using a sample of 50,119 firm-year observations from 31 countries, we find that politically connected firms hold more cash than their non-connected peers. We put forth two explanations for this result. Firstly, politicians use politically connected firms as “cash cows” to advance their political agendas. Secondly, political connections are conducive to agency problems. In additional analyses, we find that the positive relationship between political connections and cash holdings is stronger when corporate governance is weak.     

An investigation of the short‐ and long‐run relations between executive cash bonus payments and firm financial performance: a pitch

This letter is a discussion of the application of the pitch template developed by Faff (2015) to a financial accounting research topic. The pitch template focuses ideas into key areas, giving clear and concise direction in planning and structuring the research idea. In this instance, the template is used in a nonlinear manner to develop a research proposal to investigate the relation between cash bonus payments and firm financial performance.