Does financing influence the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility?

Research shows that asset tangibility substantially impacts firms’ cash levels and investment. Using the deregulation of equity issuance in the U.S. as an exogenous shock to access to equity markets, we investigate the influence of financing on the dependence of cash and investment on asset tangibility. We show that financing dampens the sensitivity of cash and investment to asset tangibility, and promotes investment and firm growth. Our results suggest that greater access to financing allows financially constrained firms to invest in productive projects that may otherwise not be taken up. This provides evidence that public firms even in well-developed financial markets such as the U.S. benefit from financial deregulation that removes barriers to external financing, shedding light on the role of financial markets in fostering growth.     

Cash holdings and real asset liquidity

This paper examines the relationship between the ability of a firm to sell its real assets and its cash holdings behavior. A substitution effect exists between the size of cash balances and the liquidity of a firm’s real assets when access to external capital markets is limited. Among financially constrained firms, higher asset liquidity is related to lower cash holdings. Additionally for financially constrained firms, the market value of cash is lower for firms with higher asset liquidity.     

Deregulation of short selling and corporate cash dividend policy: A quasi-natural experiment from China

This study takes China’s short selling deregulation as a quasi-natural experiment, employs a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2017, and tests the impact of a short selling pilot on firms’ cash dividends using a difference-in-differences model (DID). We find that China’s short selling pilot significantly increases the pilot firms’ cash dividends. The mechanism test shows that short selling can improve the pilot firms’ cash dividends by playing a corporate governance role to restrain dual agency costs such as management fees and major shareholders’ tunneling. Furthermore, we identify that short selling restrains the behavior of “large stock dividends” and increases the cash dividends of “large stock dividends” firms. Moreover, the governance effect of short selling is complementary to the external governance environment. The higher the degree of marketization and government quality, the more significant the governance effect of short selling to increase the pilot firms’ cash dividends. This study enriches not only the research related to cash dividends in emerging economies, but also provides new empirical evidence for the evaluation of China’s short selling deregulation and offers valuable lessons to other emerging economies.     

数字经济对企业现金持有水平影响研究 ——基于"宽带中国战略"的准自然实验

全面推进以“宽带中国战略”为主的数字化经济建设是带动企业数字化转型，优化企业资源配置，进而促进企业长期稳定发展的重要步骤。以“宽带中国战略”为准自然实验，基于2008-2020年中国上市公司数据，采用DID（双重差分）模型考察数字经济对企业现金持有水平的影响。研究表明：数字经济显著抑制企业现金持有水平，有效促进经济流通；中介效应模型检验发现，积累人力资本和缓解融资约束是数字经济降低企业现金持有水平的重要机制；异质性检验发现，数字经济对东部地区企业和中小企业现金持有水平的抑制作用更显著。基于以上研究，充分识别了当前我国数字经济对于企业现金持有水平的抑制作用，同时有助于推进“宽带中国战略”的进一步落地实施。     

非国有股东超额委派董事与企业现金持有

基于持股权与控制权非对等配置逻辑，文章以2009—2019年A股国有上市企业为研究主体，实证检验非国有股东超额委派董事对企业现金持有水平的影响。研究发现，非国有股东超额委派董事显著提高参股国企的现金持有水平，且随着超额委派比例增加更加显著；进一步地，该正向作用在中央层级企业及市场化进程较高地区表现更为显著；明晰其作用机理，发现其通过抑制超额持现所致的过度投资行为、迫使无效耗散的现金尽快回流进而提高持现水平；此外，非国有股东超额委派董事和超额委派比例均有助于优化现金二次配置，促使企业将超额现金用于发放现金股利及进行创新投入，并最终提升现金持有价值和企业价值。文章结论不仅印证和延伸混改推进过程中非国有资本在高层治理维度所发挥的积极作用，更为进一步深化混合所有制改革及完善中小股东保护体系提供借鉴。     

Evaluating the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on unemployment,income distribution and poverty in Turkey

In the recent World Economic Outlook, the IMF indicates that world output shrank by 3.5% in 2020. Despite all pessimistic expectations, the Turkish economy was one of the few countries to have a positive, albeit low, economic growth rate in 2020. This was, however, achieved at the expense of high social and economic costs. The present research examines the distributional costs of this economic growth during the pandemic and suggests economic measures required to control them. The empirical examination is based on generating unavailable income and living conditions for 2020 by using the results available in TurkStat’s 2017 Income and Living Conditions Survey. The actual changes in sectoral output and employment, which are available as of March 2021, are used to generate changes in the income levels of households in TurkStat’s 2017 survey. The research empirically shows that adequate fiscal support with a large scope for households and businesses is necessary to compensate for economic losses caused by the pandemic. The short-run working allowance policy appears to have been very important to improve income distribution, which might have deteriorated due to the pandemic. Direct cash support to households is considered another essential policy measure that is required to mitigate the severity of increased poverty.     

Are all types of real transaction management equal in the eyes of bank lenders?

This study examines whether bank lenders react differently to various types of real transaction management (RTM) by borrowing firms. Drawing upon the differential cash and cash flow effects of alternative forms of RTM, we predict and find that banks provide more favorable loan terms, that is, lower interest spread and reduced likelihood of required collateral, for firms reporting more discretionary reductions in research and development (R&D) expenditures. In contrast, lending banks respond unfavorably to borrowers’ engagement in RTM through aggressive sales discounts and overproduction of inventories. Additional analysis reveals that the favorable effect of discretionary R&D reductions on loan pricing is greater (smaller) for borrowing firms with a prior relationship with the bank or with a lower level of cash holdings (loans with longer maturity). Overall, our findings suggest that banks, with their unique payoff functions and monitoring incentives, do not view all forms of RTM negatively.     

Proxy contests and debt contracting behavior: The interplay of managerial,shareholder and creditor incentives

We evaluate how heterogeneity in the strategic interplay among shareholder, creditor and manager incentives influences debt contracting behavior around proxy contests. We find that, after proxy contests, new loan originations have significantly higher spreads and more stringent non-pricing contracting terms. The effect, however, occurs largely in contest firms where Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are provided with risk-taking incentives. Further, creditors’ simultaneous equity holdings and credit default swaps (CDS) trading attenuate the impact of proxy contests on debt contracting costs. Finally, proxy contests that culminate in voting and dissident victory experience the largest increase in loan pricing. Overall, our results suggest an increase in the agency cost of debt occurs after proxy contests, particularly when managerial risk-taking incentives are high, and when creditors do not simultaneously hold target firms’ equity or CDS.