Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

Allocating an advertising budget to international travel markets

Deciding on advertising appropriations is a common problem to all National Tourist Offices. The Austrian National Tourist Office now employs a decision support model allowing for inclusion of managerial judgments. In tourism, like elsewhere, application of standard optimization routines to marketing decision making is straight- forward, once the relationship linking market response to input has been modeled adequately. A tailor-made decision calculus procedure eliciting managerial judgments on the relative importance of the factors determining a receiving country's travel market share provides the weights otherwise inaccessible by objective parameter estimation. A tourism manager thus can evaluate countries as tourism generators and allocate an advertising budget accordingly.     

Economic Implications of Alternative Allocation Schemes for Emission Allowances*

For reasons of political feasibility, emission trading systems may have to rely on free initial allocation of emission allowances in order to ameliorate adverse production and employment effects in dirty industries. Against the background of an emerging European‐wide emission trading system, we examine the trade‐off between such compensation and economic efficiency under output‐based and emissions‐based allocation rules. We show that the emissions‐based allocation rule is more costly than the output‐based rule in terms of maintaining output and employment in energy‐intensive industries. When the international allowance price increases, the inferiority of emissions‐based allocation vis‐à‐vis output‐based allocation becomes more pronounced, as emission subsidies drastically restrict efficiency gains from international trade in emission allowances.     

Cities under stress

This paper studies the effect of terrorist attacks on the internal structure of cities. We develop an urban framework with capital structures suitable for the study of this question and analyze the long and short term implications of this type of events. In the long run, the analysis shows that a terrorist attack will affect urban structure only modestly, relative to the potentially large decrease in the level of economic activity in the city. Land rents will not decline at all locations. In the short run, agglomeration forces will amplify the effect of the original destruction and will reduce urban economic activity temporarily.     

Are the Best Small Companies the Best Investments?

Previous research finds that large companies previously judged to be excellent growth companies have subsequently been poor investments. We examine small companies selected by Business Week on the basis of multiple criteria used in annual articles featuring highly rated growth companies. We study the investment performance over the three years before eleven annual Business Week publications and the three years after publication. We find positive excess returns in the pre‐publication period, but negative excess returns in the post‐publication period. This reversal in investment performance appears to be due to a mean‐reversion tendency in operating performance, in which the earnings and the past rates of return on capital of such companies subsequently decrease significantly.     

Choice of Distribution System in the New Zealand Life Insurance Industry

Using 1988–93 panel data drawn from the New Zealand life insurance industry, this paper examines empirically the notion that the choice of distribution system is an efficient contracting solution to incentive conflicts between owners, managers and sales agents in life insurance firms. Consistent with what was hypothesised, the empirical results suggest that choice of distribution system is distinguished by organisational form, firm size, and sales commission. However, contrary to expectations, the variables representing product diversity and asset specificity were found not to be statistically significant. The empirical results thus lend mixed support for prior predictions.     

A note on the existence of unique equivalent martingale measures in a Markovian setting

Simple sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique equivalent martingale measure are provided. Furthermore, these conditions give us a handle on situations where an equivalent martingale measure cannot exist. The existence of a unique equivalent martingale measure is of relevance to problems in mathematical finance. Two examples of models for which the question of existence was unresolved are studied. By means of our results existence of a unique equivalent measure up to an explosion time is proved.     

On optimality in intergenerational risk sharing

Summary. This paper defines and studies optimality in a dynamic stochastic economy with finitely lived agents, and investigates the optimality properties of an equilibrium with or without sequentially complete markets. Various Pareto optimality concepts are considered, including interim and ex ante optimality. We show that, at an equilibrium with a productive asset (land) and sequentially complete markets, the intervention of a government may be justified, but only to improve risk sharing between generations. If markets are incomplete, constrained interim optimality is investigated in two-period lived OLG economies. We extend the optimality properties of an equilibrium with land and give conditions under which introducing a pay-as-you-go system at an equilibrium would not lead to any Pareto improvement. Received: October 5, 1998; revised version: April 3, 2001     

Estimation of the mean in ranked set sampling with non responses

The estimation of the population mean when ranked set sampling [rss] is used for selecting the sample and non responses [nr] are present, is studied. The nr stratum is sub sampled using simple random sampling with replacement. Two strategies are analyzed. One of them is based on the selection of a sub sample from the nr in each cycle. The other uses sub samples selected among the nr in each rank.  The accuracy of the proposed estimators is characterized by the corresponding expected variances. Simulations and real life data are used for analyzing the behavior of them. Acknowledgements: This paper was developed partially during the visit of the author to Université des Antilles et Gouyane. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful suggestions of the referees and thanks the support of DAAD for visiting Humboldt University where a version of the paper version was made.