The pernicious effects of contaminated data in risk management

Banks hold capital to guard against unexpected surges in losses and long freezes in financial markets. The minimum level of capital is set by banking regulators as a function of the banks’ own estimates of their risk exposures. As a result, a great challenge for both banks and regulators is to validate internal risk models. We show that a large fraction of US and international banks uses contaminated data when testing their models. In particular, most banks validate their market risk model using profit-and-loss (P/L) data that include fees and commissions and intraday trading revenues. This practice is inconsistent with the definition of the employed market risk measure. Using both bank data and simulations, we find that data contamination has dramatic implications for model validation and can lead to the acceptance of misspecified risk models. Moreover, our estimates suggest that the use of contaminated data can significantly reduce (market-risk induced) regulatory capital.     

Explaining bank market-to-book ratios: Evidence from 2006 to 2009

This paper examines the market-price to book-value ratio for 6604 bank stock observations from December 31, 2006 through June 30, 2009. We relate each bank’s market-price to book-value ratio to several fundamental ratios and whether the bank took funds from the US Treasury under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). The results of this study show that banks who took TARP funds have lower market-price to book-value ratios. In addition, lower relative costs, higher non-interest income, and lower assets in non-accrual or foreclosed status are associated with higher market-price to book-value ratios while controlling for size and other bank attributes.     

Ownership, control, and pyramids in Spanish commercial banks

Using the law and finance approach we analyze how the ultimate ownership and control structure influences the performance of Spanish commercial banks during the period 1996-2004. Our evidence shows that 96% of Spanish commercial banks have an ultimate controlling owner. Also, we observe that whenever there is a gap between the ultimate controlling owner’s cash flow and control rights, than the bigger the gap, the poorer the bank’s performance. We find that whenever there is no difference between the ultimate controlling owner’s cash flow and control rights, there is a non-monotonic relation between ownership concentration and the bank’s performance.     

Can pure play internet banking survive the credit crisis?

This paper positions the pure-play internet banking model (PPI) as a hybrid business model that combines features of both relationship and transaction banking. Although in terms of customer orientation PPI banks may partly resemble relationship banks, they lack their comparative advantage in generating borrower-specific information. Instead, the characteristic features of PPI banks are low costs and easy scalability. While the latter may enable PPI banks to quickly capture market share, it may also generate overexposure in risky markets. We present a case study on ING Direct, one of the leading global PPI banks and address the sustainability of the PPI business model by comparing the ING Direct foreign operations. The findings for ING Direct are validated using data for E-Trade Bank. We conclude that managing growth appears to be the prime challenge to PPI banks.     

Profit or politics? Understanding renationalizations in Russia

This study examines firm-level determinants of the government incentives to acquire controlling stakes in private companies. Using a novel hand-collected dataset of 153 largest listed and unlisted Russian companies, I investigate the methods and the rationales of a 2004–2008 wave of selected nationalizations in a post-privatization market. I find robust evidence that formerly privatized and domestically-owned companies in strategically important sectors face the highest risks of corporate control transfers from private to state hands. I also find that the corporate tax evasion is another significant determinant of a firm nationalization. Contrary to commonly held beliefs, there is little evidence that renationalizations in Russia are driven by firm profitability factors: the government neither systematically “cherry-picks” best performers nor addresses market failures by rescuing national champions in financial distress. These results contribute to t'he politics and finance literature by providing new firm-level evidence on the importance of strategic nationalism in the government's decision to intervene into the corporate control structures.     

A bright side of financial constraints in cash management

This paper tests whether financial constraints play a disciplinary role in cash dissipation in the presence of agency problems. We hypothesize that when firms have difficulty raising external funds, empire-building managers of cash-rich firms will be less likely to spend cash on negative NPV projects as compared to unconstrained managers. Empirically, we examine firm performance after cash dissipation and associate it with the degree of financial constraints. We find that cash spending by managers in financially constrained firms is associated with higher future profitability and stock returns compared to cash spending by managers in unconstrained firms. Further tests reveal that the positive effect of financial constraints on firm performance is not driven by differences in corporate governance. Financial constraints actually substitute for good governance in disciplining managers. We find that corporate governance improves the efficiency of cash dissipation in unconstrained firms, but not in constrained firms. Likewise, financial constraints' disciplinary effect is found to be concentrated in firms that are poorly governed.     

Are there monitoring benefits to institutional ownership? Evidence from seasoned equity offerings

We provide new evidence on the monitoring benefits from institutional ownership by analyzing the impact of institutional ownership on stock price and operating performance following seasoned equity offerings, a setting where the effects of monitoring are likely to be especially important. We find that announcement returns are positively and significantly related to total and active institutional ownership levels and concentration. Post-issue stock returns are positively and significantly related to the contemporaneous post-issue changes in total and active institutional ownership and the concentration of their shareholdings. Operating performance improvements are also related to institutional monitoring in the one, two, and three years following the equity issue. Our results continue to hold even after accounting for the possibility that institutional investors have an informational advantage that enables them to identify and invest in subsequently better performing firms. We also empirically eliminate the possibility that our findings are driven by institutions buying past winners and selling past losers as a way to window-dress their portfolio holdings.     

A note on the returns from minimum variance investing

Disappointed with the performance of market weighted benchmark portfolios yet skeptical about the merits of active portfolio management, investors in recent years turned to alternative index definitions. Minimum variance investing is one of these popular concepts. I show in this paper that the portfolio construction process behind minimum variance investing implicitly picks up risk-based pricing anomalies. In other words the minimum variance tends to hold low beta and low residual risk stocks. Long/short portfolios based on these characteristics have been associated in the empirical literature with risk adjusted outperformance. This paper shows that 83% of the variation of the minimum variance portfolio excess returns (relative to a capitalization weighted alternative) can be attributed to the FAMA/FRENCH factors as well as to the returns on two characteristic anomaly portfolios. All regression coefficients (factor exposures) are highly significant, stable over the estimation period and correspond remarkably well with our economic intuition. The paper also shows that a direct combination of market weighted benchmark portfolio and risk based characteristic portfolios will provide a statistically significant improvement over the indirect pickup via the minimum variance portfolio.     

Are incentives for earnings management reflected in the ERC: Large sample evidence

In this study, I examine the effect of exposure to earnings management (EM) incentives on the earnings response coefficient (ERC). Drawing from several anecdotes and normative arguments about the implications of managers' incentives for investor perception, I predict and test that exposure to EM incentives is negatively associated with the ERC. I find that ERC is reliably lower for firms with elevated exposure to EM incentives, holding constant the effects of actual EM and other factors that affect the returns–earnings relation. Furthermore, the effect of the incentive exposure on cash flows as well as on total accruals is reliably negative. These results are robust across alternative price– and returns–earnings specifications, and are insensitive to the inclusion of other measures of earnings quality. Additional analysis shows that the effect of such incentives on the ERC is more pronounced at higher levels of institutional stock ownership. However, a certain class of institutional owners – transient institutions – are less sensitive to the implications of such incentives for earnings quality.     

An examination of the effects of management earnings forecast form and explanations on financial analyst forecast revisions

Using a sample of 978 quarterly management earnings-per-share forecasts made during the period 1993 to 1999, we document that financial analyst revisions to management earnings forecasts are a function of management forecast form. More precise forecasts (measured three different ways) lead to greater revision of financial analyst consensus EPS forecasts for a given level of unexpected earnings as predicted by Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Bayesian adjustment models. Also, consistent with our arguments, maximum forecasts are interpreted as bad news by analysts. Our results, while consistent with theory, are inconsistent with recent experimental studies which do not reject the null hypothesis of no effect of management earnings forecast form on the association between unexpected earnings and financial analyst forecast revisions. We also re-examine Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough's (2004) finding that attributions used to explain management forecasts affect the reaction to the forecast using analyst data. Consistent with their findings using stock prices, the attribution presence (especially external attributions) increases financial analyst revisions pursuant to management forecasts.