On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games

There are many situations where two interacting individuals can benefit from coordinating their actions. We examine the endogenous choice of partners in such social coordination games and the implications for resulting play. We model the interaction pattern as a network where individuals periodically have the discretion to add or sever links to other players. With such endogenous interaction patterns we see multiple stochastically stable states of play, including some that involve play of equilibria in the coordination game that are neither efficient nor risk-dominant. Thus the endogenous network structure not only has implications for the interaction pattern that emerges, but it also has a significant impact on the play in the coordination game relative to what would arise if the same interaction network were exogenous.     

集团公司竞争力的来源分析及其形成

集团公司竞争力属于大企业竞争力范畴。集团公司竞争力既有内部来源，又有外部来源。不同的竞争力来源渠道存在不同的竞争力资源，不同的竞争力资源又形成不同的竞争力要素；集团公司的各种竞争力资源，在市场竞争环境下进入系统转换过程，经过全面的、多方位的整合、转换，形成集团公司竞争力。     

丁家屋子地区孔店组高凝油增产措施选层技术

文章通过对丁家屋子地区孔店组高凝油测试资料进行分析，将储层分为四类，并对每类储层的试油工艺及效果进行了分析，找到了增产措施选层原则。     

Strongly stable networks

We analyze the formation of networks among individuals. In particular, we examine the existence of networks that are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals. We show that to investigate the existence of such strongly stable networks one can restrict focus on a component-wise egalitarian allocation of value. We show that when such strongly stable networks exist they coincide with the set of efficient networks (those maximizing the total productive value). We show that the existence of strongly stable networks is equivalent to core existence in a derived cooperative game and use that result to characterize the class of value functions for which there exist strongly stable networks via a “top convexity” condition on the value function on networks. We also consider a variation on strong stability where players can make side payments, and examine situations where value functions may be non-anonymous—depending on player labels.     

An analytical model for the formation of economic clusters

A simple spatial economy derived from microeconomic foundations is presented to gain insight into the formation of economic clusters. In this model, the formation of economic clusters is a consequence of the competition between economic forces that are consistent with atomistic agents maximizing their utility. An analytic approach is used to obtain the evolution of economic clusters. With this approach, the number of clusters which will grow can be predicted. These results are derived in the traditional one-dimensional geometry and extended to the more realistic two-dimensional landscape.     

Inequality and Social Conflict Over Land in Africa

The paper proposes that reports of pervasive competition and conflict over land in sub-Saharan Africa belie a current image of negotiable and adaptive customary systems of landholding and land use but, instead, reveal processes of exclusion, deepening social divisions and class formation. Cases of ambiguous and indeterminate outcomes among claimants over land do occur, but the instances of intensifying conflict over land, deepening social rifts and expropriation of land beg for closer attention. More emphasis needs to be placed by analysts on who benefits and who loses from instances of 'negotiability' in access to land, an analysis that, in turn, needs to be situated in broader political economic and social changes taking place, particularly during the past thirty or so years. This requires a theoretical move away from privileging contingency, flexibility and negotiability that, willy-nilly, ends by suggesting an open field, to one that is able to identify those situations and processes (including com-modification, structural adjustment, market liberalization and globalization) that limit or end negotiation and flexibility for certain social groups or categories.     

再生水定价的形成机制分析

进一步推进再生水的利用不仅依赖于政策的扶持,也依赖于再生水水价所具有的优势。再生水与自来水之间的价格差是促使用户接受再生水的主要原因之一。在借鉴合理水价定价方法基础上,详细分析再生水合理价格构成与定价机制以及再生水的定价区间,分析常规水价与再生水的比价关系对再生水利用的影响,提出了建立合理的地表水、地下水、自来水、再生水等之间的比价关系,分类制定再生水定价,完善相关配套政策等方面的政策性建议。     

大型水利工程信用风险的形成路径及治理对策

基于业主与承包商的博弈模型,从一次和多次博弈两方面剖析了大型水利工程中承包商信用缺失动机的形成机理,并根据行为心理学理论分析信用风险的形成路径。结果表明:强监督力度、强惩罚力度、适度奖励是有效控制承包商信用风险的途径。在此基础上建立信用风险的动态管理机制,为大型水利工程中的信用风险系统管理提供参考。