外部性、负外部性及其在生态保护中的应用

外部性是社会生活生产中很常见的一种经济现象,由于行为和结果的不一致造成的负外部性更是普遍,负外部性一般的解决办法为庇古税和科斯定理。以国内影视剧组破坏环境为例,分析负外部性在生态保护中的应用,提出通过科斯手段、庇古税、法律手段、媒体社会力量等多种方法解决外部性问题。     

企业内部控制评价:基于管理层和审计师的博弈分析

企业内部控制评价是企业内部控制执行机制的一个重要组成部分,这一评价过程主要包括管理层的自我评价和审计师的鉴证,是多方利益主体相互协调的结果。在企业内部控制评价中,管理层与审计师之间存在相互博弈,成本效益原则是该博弈的约束条件。运用贝叶斯法则,分析内部控制评价过程中系统内各方的信念修正及作用过程,考察内部控制评价中各利益主体的连动效应,旨在构建一个有效的分析框架。     

企业理论的起源和发展:一个时间演绎视角

民众、企业、政府是经济社会的三大主体;现在是,以后是,甚至永远都是.正因如此,企业理论成为了过去三十多年间主流经济学中发展最为迅速、也最富有成果的领域之一,它与博奕论、信息经济学、激励机制设计理论、新制度经济学和演化经济学相互交叉,大大丰富了微观经济学内容,改进了人们对市场机制及企业组织制度运行的认识.本文作者以时间为序,搜集、整理了企业理论起源和发展方面的内容,分三个阶段阐述了曾在学界产生一定影响的企业理论观点.     

交易费用和制度变迁

“交易费用”、“社会成本”概念的提出是经济学领域的一场革命 ,它们都涉及到经济生活中的具体操作如资源优化配置和效率问题。中国在深化改革过程中 ,不仅必须考虑到资源优化配置、改革成本和经济运行效率 ,而且应以此作为检验改革成效的标尺。上述方方面面又都与一定的制度     

Continuity of the payoff functions

Summary. In his Nash equilibrium paper, Glicksberg states that the payoff functions are continuous. Such a function is defined on the product of mixed strategies, which are the Borel probability measures on a compactum, endowed with the product of the weak topologies. The continuity property is used in proving the existence of Nash equilibria. This note proves that the payoff functions are continuous, which is not immediate to establish. Received: June 10, 1999; revised version: June 24, 1999     

Should refusal to sell be illegal?

We analyse a private firm's decision of whether to refuse to sell to a particular group of consumers whose interaction with other consumers generates negative externalities. The literature has rarely incorporated this motive directly into the firm's profit-maximisation problem. Discriminatory refusal-to-sell policies can increase profits and consumer utility among those affected by the negative externality. Of course it also reduces utility among consumers who are refused, raising the possibility of an indeterminate effect on social welfare. We obtain a stark and rather surprising result: The refusal-to-sell policy is socially optimal whenever it is individually optimal for a profit-maximising firm to adopt such a policy. No legislation or regulation is required from a social-welfare perspective (under the assumptions used in the specification of the social welfare function). We prove this result analytically for the case of linear demand functions. Numerical simulations show that the result also holds for constant-price-elasticity demand functions.     

An application of Ramsey theorem to stopping games

We prove that every two-player nonzero-sum deterministic stopping game with uniformly bounded payoffs admits an -equilibrium, for every >0. The proof uses Ramsey Theorem that states that for every coloring of a complete infinite graph by finitely many colors there is a complete infinite subgraph which is monochromatic.     

Efficient political contributions with conditional Coasian contracts

The externalities associated with political contributions imply agents choose a socially inefficient level. A typical market solution to these externalities would involve Coase bargaining where agents form contracts with payments conditional on the actions of others. These contracts, however, are hard to enforce because political contributions can be unobservable or unmeasurable. In this study, we modify these Coasian contracts, making the payments conditional on the outcome of the political election. We show the agents that form these contracts contribute the socially efficient amount.     

如何理解“制度重要”命题——从哈耶克“知识问题”视角看科斯的比较制度分析

虽然自科斯定理出现以来,人们普遍接受了在一个交易成本为正的世界中制度重要命题,但由于各种原因该命题存在着极大的被新古典化的风险,制度分析被窄化为制度的均衡分析。从这种分析出发,作为外在第三方的经济学家被认为可以基于对有关交易成本信息的完全掌握而对制度效率进行事前比较。本文从哈耶克的知识问题出发对这种分析路径进行批判,认为这实际上相当于以另外一种方式将人们重新拉回到零交易成本世界。     

碳市场:原理、实践和前景

全球气温变暖使得减少二氧化碳等温室气体的排放变得十分必要,由《京都议定书》催生出来的以交易温室气体排放权为主的国际碳市场就是解决这一问题的有益尝试。本文从经济理论出发,分析了国际碳市场的形成基础和运行条件,通过对该市场现状的研究,指出了其存在的问题和今后的发展前景,并对我国如何发展碳市场提出了相关建议。