The Coasean analysis of lighthouse financing: myths and realities

In ‘The Lighthouse in Economics’ (Coase, R. H. Journalof Law and Economics, vol. 17, no. 2, 357–76, 1974), Coasereached the conclusion that in England there existed a relativelyefficient privately financed lighthouse system, which wouldrefute economists' traditional statements concerning the productionof public goods. The purpose of this paper is to challenge hisconclusion. We first show that, from a methodological and theoreticalperspective, ‘The Lighthouse’ is consistent with‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (Coase, R. H. Journalof Law and Economics, vol. 3, 1–44, 1960). Then, applyingCoase's own method (historical case studies), we attempt tore-examine the respective roles and efficiencies of privateinitiative and government.     

The Issue of Insider Trading in Law and Economics: Lessons for Emerging Financial Markets in the World

Growth of the private sector and privatization of state companies around the world have led to the emergence of various stock markets, some of which are depicted by insider trading. Law literature uses the arguments of unfairness, breach of fiduciary rights and damage to others to define and rule against insider trading. Economic literature can be used to interpret insider trading from other perspectives. This study argues that the question of insider trading in developing markets can be resolved by the extent stock markets generate externalities and are public goods. It advocates structural changes in the developing markets and examines the conditions under which the Coase Theorem would work.     

Edvard Jäderin

Abstract

Im Jahre 1928 hat Frau Dr. H. Pollaczek-Geiringer ² H. Pollaczek-Geiringer: Die Charliersche Entwicklung willkür licher Funktionen, Skandinavisk Aktuarietidskrift 1928, p. 98–111. in dieser Zeitschrift einen Konvergenzbeweis für die Charlier'sche B-Reihe unter der folgenden Voraussetzung bewiesen:     

极限的运算方法

本文利用极限与某些概念、定理、公式间的联系，介绍了几种常用方法之外的求极限的方法，目的在于开拓解题思想，更深入地理解高等数学各部分的联系。     

Durable goods with quality differentiation

We study the optimal strategy of a durable-goods monopolist who can offer goods in different qualities. The key finding is that the presence of the additional sorting variable further undermines the firm's commitment problem, leading to results that contrast sharply with those of standard durable-goods models or those of models where the firm can commit.     

The informational dimension of real estate development: A case of a “positive non-interventionist” application of the Coase Theorem

Informed by Coase's (1988) idea that state rules can enlarge a market, Rosa's (2006) idea of information as a private good usable as memes, and Yu's (1981) economics of patent pooling, Schuster's (2005) proposition that government can collect and distribute information as an active tool to influence actors, this paper advances the viewpoint that real estate development forms sign structures for adding information that enhances the values of a site under strategically selected property names. The ideal case of Hong Kong's planning and development by contract is used and compared to the practice in Mainland China to demonstrate these ideas with special reference to its open land registration and information systems, which sell important information memes and the names of properties that can be protected by trademark law.     

Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security

This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining.