A statistical treatment of the problem of division

The problem of division is one of the most important problems in the emergence of probability. It has been long considered solved from a probabilistic viewpoint. However, we do not find the solution satisfactory. In this study, the problem is recasted as a statistical problem. The outcomes of matches of the game are considered as an infinitely exchangeable random sequence and predictors/estimators are constructed in light of de Finetti representation theorem. Bounds of the estimators are derived over wide classes of priors (mixing distributions). We find that, although conservative, the classical solutions are justifiable by our analysis while the plug-in estimates are too optimistic for the winning player.Acknowledgement. The authors would like to thank the referees for the insightful and informative suggestions and, particularly, for referring us to important references.Supported by NSC-88-2118-M-259-009.Supported in part by NSC 89-2118-M-259-012.Received August 2002     

Satisficing behavior, Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem and Nash Equilibrium

Summary. We show that Nash Equilibrium points can be obtained by using response maps or reply functions that simply use better responses rather than best responses. We demonstrate the existence of a Nash Equilibrium as the fixed point of a better response map and since the better response map is continuous the fixed point can be established by simply using Brouwers fixed point theorem. The proof applies to games with a finite number of strategies as well as to games with a continuum of strategies. In case the games have a continuum of strategies the payoff functions have to be continuous on the action sets and quasi concave on the players action set.Received: 22 September 2003, Revised: 31 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D00, D40. Correspondence to: Robert A. BeckerWe have benefited from comments on an earlier draft made by participants at Indiana Universitys Microeconomics workshop (October 2002) and the Midwest Economic Theory Conference held at the University of Pittsburgh (May 2003). We also thank Roy Gardner for comments on earlier versions. We thank the Associate Editor, Mark Machina, for his detailed comments and suggestions. This project began when Subir Chakrabarti was a visitor in the Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington in the Spring of 2002. He thanks that department for its support.     

石油与黄金产业价格联动关系研究

2002-2006年石油与黄金产业价格变动之间的关系可以用格兰杰因果关系进行检验,并根据格兰杰表示定理建立石油与黄金价格联动之间的误差修正模型来考察二者之间的长期关系和动态关系.本文认为石油价格和黄金价格上涨之间是单向的,从石油价格上涨到黄金价格上涨的因果关系,而且这种关系是长期稳定的,并没有随时间而发生结构性变化.     

"产权":一个内涵不确定的概念

“产权”是一个内涵非常不确定的概念。在我国经济体制改革中运用“产权”概念会加大制度变迁成本。我国政府文件和经济学理论对“产权”概念的误置源于对科斯定理的误解。迄今,西方经济学乃至制度学派对“产权”概念并没有给出被公认的内涵,即它可以给出多种解释。由于“产权”概念内涵的不确定性,将使我国经济体制改革中各个主体间(如国家与国有企业之间)权利界定带来不确定性。因此,应该用具体的“权利”概念替代内涵不确定的“产权”概念。     

环境保护政策分析:兼论环境税的相对优势

通过对环境污染外部成本的经济学分析,实现社会最优污染水平的手段:政府直接管制、排污收费制度、污染权交易制度、财政补贴制度、科斯定理机制、环境税收制度等,都存在一定的弊端和缺陷,比较而言,环境税收制度是目前解决环境污染问题的最优手段,也是解决外部负效应的重要方式。     

排污权交易--解决外部不经济问题的一个新思路

本文分析了污染这种外部不经济问题的形成 ,接着探讨了运用科斯定理解决这种外部不经济的可能 ,随后分析了用排污权交易解决污染这种外部不经济的两种途径 :污染者———受害者交易和污染者———污染者交易。最后提出了排污权交易在中国推广的必要性及其推广中需要注意的问题。     

交易成本理论的现实意义

科斯的交易成本理论包括交易成本和科斯定理.交易成本的本质是与交易有关的制度的运行成本,科斯定理最根本的是明确产权对减少交易成本的决定性作用.体制的创新、企业的改革、外部效应所产生的污染问题及政府的职能转变等充分诠释了交易成本理论的现实意义.     

法经济学视角下的环境规制问题研究

环境规制是一个已经讨论了很长时间的问题,其主要规制手段——行政手段和市场手段早已为人们所熟知。近年来,相对于坚持两种规制手段均为主的美、日、德等环境规制效果较好的国家,我国越来越倾重于以市场手段为主来进行环境规制,但规制效果相对以上国家却仍然存在较大差距。找到环境规制效果差别巨大的原因对于构建和谐社会,促进人与自然协调发展具有极为重要的关键性作用。以法经济学作为切入点来考察坚持两种环境规制手段均为主的原因以及这样做的意义和影响,从而指出我国环境规制政策中的不足和效果不佳的原因,并为我国进一步完善环境规制政策和改善环境规制效果提出意见建议。     

Segmented Work and Divided Workers: A Review Article

The Coase theorem is often interpreted as demonstrating why private negotiations between polluters and victims can yield efficient levels of pollution without government interference. It is considered by many to provide the theoretical underpinnings for "free-market" solutions to environmental problems. This article explains why misinterpreting Coasian negotiations as a market driven process leads to erroneous conclusions. More importantly, this article demonstrates why negotiations between polluters and victims would fail to yield efficient outcomes even if property rights were well-defined, even if there were only a single victim, even if negotiations entailed no transaction costs, and even if negotiators behaved rationally and reached a successful agreement. Unlike other critiques of the Coase theorem that focus on irrational behavior and transaction costs, our critique identifies perverse incentives that arise even under conditions most favorable to the theorem. By accepting, rather than challenging, the premises of the theorem, our analysis provides an "internal" critique that strengthens well-known "external" criticisms.     

The principle of institutional direction: Coase's regulatory critique of intervention

That Coase's political convictions changed from an early socialismto a later neo-liberalism stands in apparent contrast to thetheoretical consistency of his early (‘The Nature of theFirm’) and later (‘The Problem of Social Cost’)contributions to economics. Offering further evidence abouthis early views in particular, this paper takes a fresh lookat Coase's views on competition and antitrust to show that heconsistently stressed the role of what we shall call the principleof ‘institutional direction’, and that this principleinvolves an important criticism of both neo-liberal and socialistviews on regulation and state intervention.