Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination

We test a two-stage compensation mechanism for promoting cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games. Players first simultaneously choose binding non-negative amounts to pay their counterparts for cooperating, and then play the induced game knowing these amounts. In our games, all payment pairs consistent with mutual cooperation in subgame-perfect equilibrium transform these games into coordination games, with both mutual cooperation and mutual defection as Nash equilibria in the second stage. When endogenous transfer payments are not permitted, cooperation is much less likely. Mutual cooperation is most likely when the (sufficient) payments are identical, and it is also substantially more likely with payment pairs that bring the mutual-cooperation payoffs closer together. Both the Fehr–Schmidt and Charness–Rabin models predict that transfers that make final payoffs closer are preferred; however, they do not explain why equal transfers are particularly effective. Transfers are also effective in sustaining cooperation even when they are imposed and not chosen.     

Sampling inspection by variables: nonparametric setting

A classic statistical problem is the optimal construction of sampling plans to accept or reject a lot based on a small sample. We propose a new asymptotically optimal solution for acceptance sampling by variables setting where we allow for an arbitrary unknown underlying distribution. In the course of this, we assume that additional sampling information is available, which is often the case in real applications. That information is given by additional measurements which may be affected by a calibration error. Our results show that, first, the proposed decision rule is asymptotically valid under fairly general assumptions. Secondly, the estimated optimal sample size is asymptotically normal. Furthermore, we illustrate our method by a real data analysis and investigate to some extent its finite-sample properties and the sharpness of our assumptions by simulations.     

Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto

Following Mongin [J. Econ. Theory 66 (1995) 313; J. Math. Econ. 29 (1998) 331], we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility preferences in a Savage framework. We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto indifference and conforming to the state-dependent expected utility model is provided.     

The likelihood of dubious election outcomes

Summary. A disturbing phenomenon in voting, which causes most of the problems as well as the interest in the field, is that election outcomes (for fixed preferences) can change with the way the ballots are tallied. This causes difficulties because with each possible choice, some set of voters can be dubious about whether it is the “correct” one. But, how likely are these settings allowing multiple election outcomes? By combining properties of the geometry of voting developed by Saari with a analytic-geometric technique created by Schlafli, we determine the likelihood that a three candidate election can cause these potentially dubious outcomes. Received: April 11, 1997; revised version: November 12, 1997     

A turnpike property of optimal programs for a class of simple linear models of production

Summary. This paper establishes a ‘turnpike theorem’ for a closed linear model of production with a primitive input requirement matrix. Optimal programs of resource allocation have a ‘turnpike property’ if the growth factor of every sector in the economy converges, in the long run, to a common value. The usefulness of such a theorem is due to the fact that the input requirement matrix for an economy with a large number of goods may be primitive (some power of the matrix is strictly positive). Received: April 19, 1998; revised version: July 15, 1998     

The preferential option for the poor and the Marxian-Christian perspective on distributive justice

Using a social economics perspective, this essay examines the positive and negative effects of job security, insecurity and the perceptions thereof on the welfare of workers, organizations, and society, as well as policy options that could alleviate the negative socio-economic consequences of job insecurity. The essay questions perceived job insecurity as a device to increase worker effort, both on efficiency and ethical grounds. It also suggests that increased perceptions of job insecurity have adversely affected workers' well-being and have undesirable macroeconomic and social effects. Public policy makers and researchers should examine ways to minimize the negative consequences associated with involuntary job loss. They should also consider to what extent both limiting firms' ability to layoff workers and providing incentives to firms that downsize to use alternatives to layoffs are socially desirable.     

NO‐ARBITRAGE PRICING FOR DIVIDEND‐PAYING SECURITIES IN DISCRETE‐TIME MARKETS WITH TRANSACTION COSTS

We prove a version of First Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing under transaction costs for discrete‐time markets with dividend‐paying securities. Specifically, we show that the no‐arbitrage condition under the efficient friction assumption is equivalent to the existence of a risk‐neutral measure. We derive dual representations for the superhedging ask and subhedging bid price processes of a contingent claim contract. Our results are illustrated with a vanilla credit default swap contract.     

基于科斯定理的我国地质公园管理模式探析

在世界地质公园网络计划的推动下,我国地质公园发展迅速,然而管理水平却相对滞后,存在产权不清、政企不分、协调不力等问题,严重影响了地质公园综合效益的发挥。针对这些问题,在分析专家建议的基础上,依据科斯定理,从＂产权—效率＂角度,构建了覆盖全行业、全方位、权威的地质公园管理模式。