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31.
Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules
We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and find both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and significant variation of efforts, which we term ‘overspreading.’ We investigate the effects of allocating the prize by a lottery versus sharing it proportionally, and of convex versus linear costs of effort, while holding fixed the Nash equilibrium prediction for effort. We find the share rule results in average effort closer to the Nash prediction, and lower variation of effort. Combining the share rule with a convex cost function further enhances these results. We can explain a significant amount of non-equilibrium behavior by features of the experimental design. These results contribute towards design guidelines for contests based on behavioral principles that take into account implementation features of a contest. 相似文献
32.
Generalized contest success functions 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
The key element of models of contest is the contest success function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents.
The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes
these axiomatizations to the case where each agent can have multiple types of investments. This allows us to provide a unified
framework to extend and interpret the results of Skaperdas (Econ Theory 7:283–290, 1996) and Clark and Riis (Econ Theory 11:201–204,
1998), and rationalize some seemingly ad hoc CSFs used by applied researchers.
This paper has benefitted from the comments of Aicke Hinrichs, Rene Levinsky, and two anonymous referees. We are especially
thankful to one of the referees for detailed comments which have helped improve every aspect of this paper. 相似文献
33.
We consider asymmetric winner-reimbursed contests. It turns out that such contests (Sad-Loser) have multiple internal pure-strategy equilibria (where at least two players are active). We describe all equilibria and discuss their properties. In particular, we find (1) that an active player is indifferent among all her non-negative choices and her expected payoff is zero in any internal equilibrium, (2) that a higher-value (stronger) player always spends less than a lower-value (weaker) player and therefore always has a lower chance to win a Sad-Loser contest in any internal equilibrium, and (3) a sufficient condition for a net total spending to be higher in a Sad-Loser contest than in the corresponding asymmetric contest. 相似文献
34.
35.
Kai A. Konrad 《European Economic Review》2004,48(6):1301-1308
This paper reconsiders the comparison between hierarchical contests and single-stage contests. A condition is given that characterizes whether and when the aggregate equilibrium payoff of contestants is higher in the single-stage contest, and when the single-stage contest is more likely to award the prize to the contestant who values it most highly. The outcome depends on inter- and intra-group heterogeneity, and is not driven by free-rider incentives. 相似文献
36.
We introduce the serial contest by building on the desirable properties of two prominent contest games. This family of contest
games relies both on relative efforts (as Tullock’s proposal) and on absolute effort differences (as difference-form contests).
An additional desirable feature is that the serial contest is homogeneous of degree zero in contestants’ efforts. The family
is characterized by a parameter representing how sensitive the outcome is to contestants’ efforts. It encompasses as polar
cases the (fair) lottery and the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Equilibria have a close relationship to those of the (deterministic)
all-pay auction and important properties of the latter hold for the serial contest, too.
相似文献
37.
Johannes Münster 《Economic Theory》2009,41(2):345-357
This paper extends the axiomatic characterization of contest success functions of Skaperdas (Econ Theory 7:283–290, 1996)
and Clark and Riis (Econ Theory 11:201–204, 1998) to contests between groups.
Comments by Dan Kovenock significantly improved the paper and are gratefully acknowledged. I would also like to thank Pavlo
Blavatskyy, Aron Kiss, Kai Konrad, Florian Morath, Dana Sisak, participants of the SFB/TR 15 meeting in Gummersbach 2004,
the 2004 meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik in Dresden, and two anonymous referees. Any errors are mine. Financial support
from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
38.
本文通过对竞争和垄断对经济效率作用的分析,指出了产业组织理论的核心问题在于产业组织如何能促进经济效率提高,并指出了一些可用的手段。 相似文献
39.
40.
I show that the effect of heterogeneity on contest investments depends on the structure of the competition, which implies that heterogeneity matters for optimal contest design. This insight helps to explain empirical evidence on the comparison of different contest structures. 相似文献