海外油气投资目标筛选决策支持系统研究

受全球一体化趋势的影响，油气资源与世界经济、政治、外交和军事的关系更加密切，围绕油气资源展开的国际竞争变得异常激烈。随着不确定外部环境的无序演化，油气安全的影响因素日益复杂。海外油气资源的争夺和中国海外油气资源供给渠道的稳定，需要科学的投资目标筛选决策。基于海外油气投资环境的动态演化和石油公司跨国经营非合作博弈特点，全方位构建了包含动态指标的海外油气目标国家投资环境评价指标体系，运用多层次灰色模型建立了海外油气投资目标筛选模型，通过编程建立和实现其决策支持功能。为系统评估海外油气资源争夺的战略机遇提供了方法借鉴。     

基于矿业监管博弈的激励约束机制研究

资源型城市地方政府在执行矿业监管权时，通常由于信息不对称及矿业政策执行力度范围限定与中央政府博弈。基于由此导致的矿业生产外部性，通过分析中央政府与地方政府各自的目标偏好和效益函数，利用经济博弈论和矩阵对策，试图寻求矿业监管存在问题的原因。文章尝试在利用行为经济学“前景理论”建模的基础上，借助贝叶斯理论分析，提出贝叶斯风险成本诱导机制，进而得出在该机制的激励约束下矿业监管倾向于帕累托有效。文章最后结合研究结论给出政策建议，为制定我国的能源资源开采政策提供了重要的理论参考。     

集体所有制经济的性质形式及其改革

本文分析了我国集体所有制产生和形式的多样性及其与集体所有制性质界定的矛盾；以及改革以来所暴露出来的传统的集体所有制不适应市场经济发展的制度缺陷；最后指出，建立社会主义市场经济，必须重新认识集体所有制，并提出了相应的改革路。     

交易成本与新型农村合作医疗制度可持续发展

新型农村合作医疗制度的试点极大地推进了我国农村医疗保障制度的构建过程,但是该项制度推进并不顺利。本文试从交易成本理论视角,分析当前新农合制度存在较高的交易成本导致制度创新不足。在此基础上,本文提出要使新农合制度可持续发展,政府必须从制度完善和机制创新两个方面降低交易成本,以提高新农合制度绩效。     

Self-reporting mechanism for risk regulation

One problem in implementing risk regulation has to do with asymmetries in information between regulators and licensees. A possible solution is to provide incentives (e.g., more lenient standards) if violations (e.g., risk levels above some specified standard) are disclosed voluntarily by regulated firms, rather than being discovered through the regulator's monitoring efforts. This study adapts game-theoretic work in regulatory economics (where firms are usually viewed as being either compliant or non-compliant) to apply to the case of risk regulation (where firms can be described by continuously varying risk levels). This article derives equilibrium solutions for the self-reporting mechanism under different model formulations, and discusses the conditions under which these solutions are better than a traditional direct-monitoring regulatory scheme. For example, when firms can benefit (in the form of reduced costs) by increasing their risk levels, the results show that offering a loosened standard to encourage voluntary disclosure of risk levels is worthwhile only when a sufficiently large proportion of firms is believed to have high risk levels.     

Selfishness, cooperation, the evolutionary point of view and its implications for economics

The assumed selfishness of market actors could be considered in the context of two perspectives: macroeconomic and microeconomic. The first concerns the market mechanism as the most effective from the social well-being or the wealth of a nation points of view. The latter is based on the premises of the nature of human beings. I have distinguished between two possible ways of understanding selfish forms of behaviour in the market: as rational economic behaviour i.e. the most effective from the gains and losses point of view (i.e. public interests in the works of A. Smith) or as selfish from the psychological point of view (this is mostly presented by J. S. Mill's theory). The first approach seems to be concerned with the creation of the most effective market mechanism from the State's point of view. In the context of historical processes over 400 years, cultural evolution “has been promoting” selfish behaviour; for example, it was widely presented in T. Hobbes' works and then for over 200 years, the theory of A. Smith has been supporting and moulding the institutional context of market and social behaviour. Thus, positive economics describes the market created by the ideas of a neo-classical paradigm, which is based on the normative premises of A. Smith and J. S. Mill. Moreover, the virtual market behaviour described by “effects” (f. e. Veblen's effect) and failures seems to be a manifestation of a discrepancy between market reality and the classical assumptions.The social evolution of human beings has been advantageous to the human species. Moreover, from the social point of view, pro-social behaviour is “natural” as well as desirable and it has been preferred by the cultural evolution. Competitiveness assumes that somebody has to lose, because someone gains. Cooperation looks for gains for all the players. The choice is political, and not imposed by selfishness.     

"退而更化":中国合作金融的改良之路

合作金融的现代化从社会哲学上看,涉及到如何处理现代化与传统之间的紧张关系;涉及到否定传统、移植西方体制的思维方式对错的问题.从回答这个基本社会哲学问题入手,检讨中国传统合作金融组织——舍会的珍贵遗产,申明白愿原则是合作金融的灵魂以及这个灵魂对当今中国合作金融的改良所具有的价值.在此基础上,本文提出了以组建中国农村合作银行为核心的政策建议,而中国农业银行出售非农业务、回归农村,与农村信用社进行资本重组与业务整舍,是现实可行的一条最佳途径.     

基于零售商促销的渠道协调及数量折扣契约设计

定量研究当零售商具有促销策略时的渠道协调。在此种情形下，渠道成员独立决策时线形契约无法促成渠道协调，通过博弈模型分析，给出一种协调数量折扣价格契约，并对渠道协调后的利润分配作了初步探讨。结果表明，制造商促使该类渠道达成协调的数量折扣有无穷多个，在一定条件下渠道成员双方利润均会增加，并给出了算例分析。同时根据数量折扣形式，对传统的“入场费”问题进行了再讨论，得出了“入场费”与渠道协调之间的关系，进而揭示出“入场费”在实践中深层含义。     

基于经济理论的高校大学生诚信道德教育

近些年来,高校大学生诚信缺失与道德现状越来越受到教育界和社会公众的关注,这无疑提醒我们高校大学生需要诚信道德教育。从经济理论出发,对高校大学生诚信缺失进行博弈分析,探究其深层次原因,基于道德与经济的一致性的理论,将经济理论中的微观均衡理论、效用最大化规律、机会成本理论、收益与责任对称理论与诚信道德教育结合,提出大学生诚信道德教育的新理念。     

企业异质性与服务贸易保护水平的决定——基于中国数据的实证检验

笔者从政治经济学的分析视角,运用博弈论的分析方法,对企业异质性和服务贸易保护水平的相关性进行了理论分析,并结合中国服务部门的数据进行实证检验。结果表明:一个服务部门的产业集中度越高,劳动生产率越低,资本密集度越低,其贸易保护水平也越高。此外,中国所有制结构的特殊性赋予企业异质性更多的内涵,在一个服务部门内,国有企业的比重越大,贸易保护水平也越高。