A cliometric analysis of the Aldo Moro kidnapping and assassination

In Rome, on 16 March 1978, the Red Brigades kidnapped Aldo Moro. They kept him a prisoner for 55 days, and ultimately killed him. Why did they decide to kill Moro since it appears a posteriori that they did not improve their situation by doing so? Our paper answers this question by building mainly on the model of kidnapping by Selten (A simple game model of kidnapping. In: Henn R, Moeschlin O (eds) Mathematical economics and game theory. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol. 141. Springer, Berlin, pp 139–156, 1977). We develop an integrated game-theoretic model that reliably captures both the problem of kidnapping for some sort of non-monetary ransom and the problem of assassination of prominent political figures. We embed our model within the historical evidence surrounding the Moro case. We show that, in the Moro case, there is a continuum of equilibria implying the death of the hostage.     

COOPERATION: THE POWER OF A SINGLE WORD? SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON WORDING AND GENDER EFFECTS IN A GAME OF CHICKEN

Framing has been widely shown to affect decision making. In this paper, we investigate experimentally whether, and to what extent, cooperative behaviour in a Game of Chicken may be impacted by a very basic change in the labelling of the strategies. Our within‐subject experimental design involves two treatments. The only difference between them is that we introduce either a socially‐oriented wording (I cooperate/I do not cooperate) or colours (red/blue) to designate strategies. The level of cooperation appears to be higher in the socially‐oriented context, but only when uncertainty as regards the type of the partner is manipulated, and especially among females.     

Behavior in one-shot traveler’s dilemma games: model and experiments with advice

We report results of one-shot traveler’s dilemma game experiments to test the predictions of a model of introspection. The model describes a noisy out-of-equilibrium process by which players reach a decision of what to do in one-shot games. To test the robustness of the model and to compare it to other models of introspection without noise, we introduce non-binding advice. Advice has the effect of coordinating all players’ beliefs onto a common strategy. Experimentally, advice is implemented by asking subjects who participated in a repeated traveler’s dilemma game to recommend an action to subjects playing one-shot games with identical parameters. In contrast to observations, models based on best-response dynamics would predict lower claims than the advised. We show that our model’s predictions with and without advice are consistent with the data.      

司法者激励对司法公正影响的模型分析

司法公正与法官激励是当前司法领域中所面临的最为紧迫而关键的问题.本研究运用博弈论来模拟现实的审判过程.通过分析基于个人效用最大化的法官最优选择的基础上来研究法官的法律遵从度、工作勤勉程度、工资收入、外部干预(如贿赂)、司法权的有效配置等重要因素对法官裁判的影响,进而解决社会所获得的公正执法水平.对于不同法律遵从度的法官而言,贿赂、工资等因素的影响是不同的.提高法官法律遵从度并调整法官与社会之间的效用关系,从制度上实现司法权的有效配置,对于实现司法公正至关重要.这为解决当前司法领域所存在的问题提供了理论依据和方法.     

海外油气投资目标筛选决策支持系统研究

受全球一体化趋势的影响,油气资源与世界经济、政治、外交和军事的关系更加密切,围绕油气资源展开的国际竞争变得异常激烈。随着不确定外部环境的无序演化,油气安全的影响因素日益复杂。海外油气资源的争夺和中国海外油气资源供给渠道的稳定,需要科学的投资目标筛选决策。基于海外油气投资环境的动态演化和石油公司跨国经营非合作博弈特点,全方位构建了包含动态指标的海外油气目标国家投资环境评价指标体系,运用多层次灰色模型建立了海外油气投资目标筛选模型,通过编程建立和实现其决策支持功能。为系统评估海外油气资源争夺的战略机遇提供了方法借鉴。     

Social Game和SNS发展研究

近年来,随着互联网的飞速进步和发展,以SMS为代表的网络社交时代已经悄然到来。大量SNS网站不断涌现,积累了为数众多的用户,SNS作为WEB 2.0时代的代表,呈现出蓬勃发展的良好势头。Social game是一种通过互动娱乐方式增强人与人之间交流的互动行为。Social Game在SNS网站中究竟应该如何定位?Social Game能在SNS中发挥怎样的作用?呈现何种发展趋势?文章对此进行了探讨。     

基于微分博弈的乳制品供应链质量管理研究

考虑到合理的成本分担及公平的利润分配是影响乳制品供应链系统稳定及乳制品质量保证的重要环节,本文以一个乳制品加工企业、一个奶农(牧场)和一个零售商所构成的三级供应链为研究对象,引入微分博弈的方法,研究在4种不同的乳制品质量管理博弈情形下,乳制品供应链上各成员企业愿意为质量管理工作付出的努力及其收益.研究结果表明,乳制品加工企业的质量控制和质量改进两种工作的努力程度在3种非合作质量管理博弈情形下具有相同的表现,而在合作质量管理博弈情形下,为了供应链整体利益考虑,核心企业即乳制品加工企业的质量管理工作努力程度发生了变化.而对于乳制品供应链上游的奶农和下游的零售商而言,二者对于质量管理工作的努力程度随着乳制品供应链合作的深化而不断提高,在理想的合作博弈情形下达到了最高.     

基金羊群行为的博弈分析

本文从博弈角度对信息不完全和声誉报酬型羊群行为的生成机理进行了剖析，最后从博弈均衡解出发，给出了弱化羊群行为的对策。     

我国畜产品贸易动物福利壁垒的博弈分析

我国在“入世”以前，关税、数量限制是影响畜产品出口的主要壁垒。而近年来，越来越多的发达国家开始关注畜产品在养殖、生产和加工过程中的状况，并以动物福利为借口限制我国畜产品的出口。我国作为世界畜产品的出口大国，在动物福利方面还是空白，如果不采取应对措施，我国的畜产品出口将会受到严重影响。本文介绍了动物福利的基本情况，利用博弈论分析了畜产品贸易中各利益主体的价值取向,并提出了应对措施。     

地方政府与污染企业动态博弈分析

近年来,中央和地方政府相继出台了一系列保护环境的激励政策和相关措施,但效果并不理想。人口的压力,资源的短缺,环境的胁迫,生态的危机,这一系列的世界性问题,已经成为21世纪中国乃至世界急需考虑并解决的问题。为了实现经济与环境的可持续发展,近年来,中央和地方政府相继出台了一系列保护环境的激励政策和相关措施,但由于外部性和公共产品属性等因素的存在,环境治理过程中存在市场失灵。为了探求这一现象背后的原因,本文利用博弈论的分析方法进一步考虑财政补贴、税收、罚金等系数对企业支付函效的影响,在更为一般的条件下分别建立政府监管部门和企业的完全信息条件下静态博弈模型和无限阶段重复博弈模型,并且讨论了多种因素对局中人的影响,并导出企业的最优策略和纳什均衡解,以揭示环境治理政策设计的经济机理和提出优化我国节能减排政府政策设计的一系列政策建议,旨在为提高我国节能减排政府政策设计的效果提供理论论证和现实见解。