Capital, corporate income taxes, and catastrophe insurance

We provide estimates of the equity capital needed and the resulting tax costs incurred when supplying catastrophe insurance/reinsurance using a partial equilibrium model that incorporates a specific loss distribution for US catastrophe losses. After consideration of insurer investment in tax-exempt securities, tax loss carry-back/forward provisions, and personal taxes, our results imply that the tax costs of equity finance alone have a substantial effect on the cost of supplying catastrophe reinsurance. These results help explain a variety of industry developments that reduce tax costs. Also, when coupled with non-tax costs of capital, these results help explain the limited scope of catastrophe insurance/reinsurance.     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.     

Board Members and Company Value

This essay surveys research about the value of individual members of boards of directors. When directors join or exit corporate boards, company stock prices respond, often in magnitudes of 1% of firm value or more. Related research shows that when a significant event impacts the stock price of one company, the effects are transmitted to other companies that share board members in common with the primary company. Share price reactions are sensitive to variables such as a director’s occupation, independence, and professional qualifications. Together, this evidence suggests that a well-functioning market for directors might already exist, making direct regulation unnecessary and possibly counter-productive.     

Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany

Recent empirical work shows evidence for higher valuation of firms in countries with a better legal environment. We investigate whether differences in the quality of firm‐level corporate governance also help to explain firm performance in a cross‐section of companies within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a broad corporate governance rating (CGR) for German public firms, we document a positive relationship between governance practices and firm valuation. There is also evidence that expected stock returns are negatively correlated with firm‐level corporate governance, if dividend yields are used as proxies for the cost of capital. An investment strategy that bought high‐CGR firms and shorted low‐CGR firms earned abnormal returns of around 12% on an annual basis during the sample period.     

Industry aspects of takeovers and divestitures: Evidence from the UK

This paper examines takeover and divestiture activity at the industry level for the population of UK firms over the period 1986–2000. Consistent with US research, takeovers in the UK cluster both across industries and over time. The evidence for divestitures indicates clustering across industries only. The paper further investigates whether broad and specific industry shocks (e.g., growth, free cash flow, concentration, deregulation, foreign competition, technology, stock market performance) explain takeover and divestiture clustering at the industry level. The results suggest that broad shocks increase (decrease) the likelihood of takeovers (divestitures), although not significantly for takeovers. Specific industry shocks that increase the likelihood of takeover activity include low growth, the threat of foreign competition and high stock market performance. For divestitures, high industry concentration and deregulation increase activity. Little evidence is found for deregulation as a significant factor in explaining takeover activity.     

Accounting development in Pakistan

This paper examines the origins, growth, and the development of accounting practices and disclosures in Pakistan and the factors that influenced them. We trace the early days of accounting in the Indian subcontinent and discuss the British colonial influence. We examine the development of accounting in Pakistan through three eras: Independence through 1971, Post 1971-1984, and 1984 to present. We describe how the colonial past and later the international financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund played key roles in shaping accounting and reporting practices of the country. Pakistan's adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards as national standards has not led to improvement in the quality of financial reporting. We argue that Pakistan, even though classified as a common law country in literature, exhibits most of the properties of code law countries. We conclude that lack of investor protection (e.g., minority rights protection, insider-trading protection), judicial inefficiencies, and weak enforcement mechanisms are more critical to explaining the state of financial reporting in Pakistan than are cultural factors. This insight has policy implications for developing countries that are making efforts to improve the quality of the financial reporting of their business entities.     

Bank CEO materialism: Risk controls,culture and tail risk

We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, non-CEO executives’ behavior and tail risk vary with CEO materialism. We document that the proportion of banks run by materialistic CEOs increased significantly from 1994 to 2004, that the strength of risk management functions is significantly lower for banks with materialistic CEOs, and that non-CEO executives in banks with materialistic CEOs insider trade more aggressively around government intervention during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that banks with materialistic CEOs have significantly more downside tail risk relative to banks with non-materialistic CEOs.     

商业信用:基于企业融资动机的实证研究

商业信用是企业从外部市场进行短期融资的重要组成部分。本文采用我国上市公司2000年至2004年的数据实证研究了商业信用作为企业外部融资方式的决定因素。实证结果发现企业获得的商业信用与企业规模、财务杠杆、销售增长率以及国有股比例呈显著正相关关系．而与短期银行借款比例以厦毛利润率呈显著负相关关系。这些发现表明,在我国目前所处的融资环境下。商业信用已经成为企业的重要融资手段。与银行信贷相比。商业信用具有一定的融资比较优势,作为提供商业信用的企业,对客户的经营状况等信息的了解更有效。     

企业文化、企业培训对组织绩效的影响研究

本文从实证的角度出发,以大陆上海地区、江苏地区以及台湾地区的企业为研究对象,收集244份有效样本,以LISREL结构方程式为分析工具,企图建立企业文化、企业培训与组织绩效等构面完整的理论模型,并运用大量数据进行统计分析,以解释高阶主管支持、企业文化强度对企业培训、组织绩效的影响。     

公司治理结构中会计目标的法律经济学解释——兼论我国会计法律制度的完善

公司治理涉及各种利益相关者责权利的划分和制衡。会计是连接权利和利益的纽带,会计信息质量在公司治理结构中扮演着重要的角色。公司治理中对各种利益相关者的约束与制衡机制需要以会计信息作保障。会计目标与公司治理目标具有内在的关联性,在我国公司目前所处的经济环境下,公司目标是影响公司治理结构的重要因素.会计法律制度的完善对我国公司治理具有重要的意义。