Board Members and Company Value

This essay surveys research about the value of individual members of boards of directors. When directors join or exit corporate boards, company stock prices respond, often in magnitudes of 1% of firm value or more. Related research shows that when a significant event impacts the stock price of one company, the effects are transmitted to other companies that share board members in common with the primary company. Share price reactions are sensitive to variables such as a director’s occupation, independence, and professional qualifications. Together, this evidence suggests that a well-functioning market for directors might already exist, making direct regulation unnecessary and possibly counter-productive.     

当前我国国内横向税收竞争的实证分析

目前我国理论研究的不足阻碍了对现实生活中各类税收竞争问题的有效治理。为此,着眼于我国国内横向税收竞争的实践,对其进行总结和归类,剖析其背后的体制与制度原因,评价其经济效应,并由此提出促进我国国内横向税收有序发展的政策措施是必要的。     

印花税调整对股票价格影响的实证研究

印花税下调在短期内对大盘股指产生显著影响,但这种影响随时间的推移而逐渐减弱;税率下调对沪市和深市单只股票具有冲击效应,个股产生正的超额收益;税率下调对两市的大盘波动性产生显著影响,刺激了"噪声交易者",在短期内产生了噪声效应。目前印花税仍然存在一些不足,建议:拓宽税基,改双向征税为单向征税,尽快开征股票交易税。     

逃税规模的衡量

逃税造成了政府财政收入的减少,因而政府理所当然地关心社会中的逃税程度,而且逃税程度的大小也代表了一国税务机关税收征管成效的高低.因此从这个意义上讲,对逃税规模的衡量就显得必要了.不过,由于纳税人的逃税行为是隐蔽的,故很难对逃税规模进行直接有效的衡量,尽管如此,还是存在一些方法从侧面去测算一国的逃税规模的.     

改进我国个人工资薪金所得税的思考

个人工资薪金所得税是我国个人所得税的主体。我国现行个人工资薪金所得税的税制设计,在一定程度上制约着其功能的发挥。建议在完善我国个人工资薪金所得税功能定位的基础上,结合我国城乡居民的实际收入状况,对个人工资薪金所得税做进一步改进。     

Reduced Tax Progressivity in Norway in the Nineties: The Effect from Tax Changes

The inequality in pre-tax income increased in Norway in the 1990s, while the concentration of taxes remained largely unaltered. This means that tax progressivity has decreased in the period, as measured by summary indices of tax progressivity. In this paper I analyze individual income data to ascertain whether tax changes in the period can explain the observed decrease in tax progressivity. As marginal tax rates at high income levels have been substantially reduced in the period, for instance through the tax reform of 1992, it is expected that tax changes may have influenced the degree of inequality in pre-tax incomes. This behavioral effect is examined by deriving estimates of the elasticity of gross income with respect to the net-of-tax rate, obtained from various panel data regressions. The tax changes may also have shifted the distributional burden of taxes for unaltered level of pre-tax income inequality. In order to identify this (direct) effect of tax-law alterations, the same fixed distribution of pre-tax income is exposed to various tax-laws in the period.     

Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany

Recent empirical work shows evidence for higher valuation of firms in countries with a better legal environment. We investigate whether differences in the quality of firm‐level corporate governance also help to explain firm performance in a cross‐section of companies within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a broad corporate governance rating (CGR) for German public firms, we document a positive relationship between governance practices and firm valuation. There is also evidence that expected stock returns are negatively correlated with firm‐level corporate governance, if dividend yields are used as proxies for the cost of capital. An investment strategy that bought high‐CGR firms and shorted low‐CGR firms earned abnormal returns of around 12% on an annual basis during the sample period.     

Industry aspects of takeovers and divestitures: Evidence from the UK

This paper examines takeover and divestiture activity at the industry level for the population of UK firms over the period 1986–2000. Consistent with US research, takeovers in the UK cluster both across industries and over time. The evidence for divestitures indicates clustering across industries only. The paper further investigates whether broad and specific industry shocks (e.g., growth, free cash flow, concentration, deregulation, foreign competition, technology, stock market performance) explain takeover and divestiture clustering at the industry level. The results suggest that broad shocks increase (decrease) the likelihood of takeovers (divestitures), although not significantly for takeovers. Specific industry shocks that increase the likelihood of takeover activity include low growth, the threat of foreign competition and high stock market performance. For divestitures, high industry concentration and deregulation increase activity. Little evidence is found for deregulation as a significant factor in explaining takeover activity.     

Accounting development in Pakistan

This paper examines the origins, growth, and the development of accounting practices and disclosures in Pakistan and the factors that influenced them. We trace the early days of accounting in the Indian subcontinent and discuss the British colonial influence. We examine the development of accounting in Pakistan through three eras: Independence through 1971, Post 1971-1984, and 1984 to present. We describe how the colonial past and later the international financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund played key roles in shaping accounting and reporting practices of the country. Pakistan's adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards as national standards has not led to improvement in the quality of financial reporting. We argue that Pakistan, even though classified as a common law country in literature, exhibits most of the properties of code law countries. We conclude that lack of investor protection (e.g., minority rights protection, insider-trading protection), judicial inefficiencies, and weak enforcement mechanisms are more critical to explaining the state of financial reporting in Pakistan than are cultural factors. This insight has policy implications for developing countries that are making efforts to improve the quality of the financial reporting of their business entities.     

Bank CEO materialism: Risk controls,culture and tail risk

We investigate how the prevalence of materialistic bank CEOs has evolved over time, and how risk management policies, non-CEO executives’ behavior and tail risk vary with CEO materialism. We document that the proportion of banks run by materialistic CEOs increased significantly from 1994 to 2004, that the strength of risk management functions is significantly lower for banks with materialistic CEOs, and that non-CEO executives in banks with materialistic CEOs insider trade more aggressively around government intervention during the financial crisis. Finally, we find that banks with materialistic CEOs have significantly more downside tail risk relative to banks with non-materialistic CEOs.