Patterns of strategic alliances between rival firms

This article describes the results of a research project which examined 171 alliances set up by competing firms in an international context. It presents an empirically-based taxonomy of such alliances constructed on the basis of a set of variables chosen for their demonstrated or assumed influence on the evolution and outcomes of strategic partnerships. Three contrasted types of alliances are identified: quasi-concentration alliances, market penetration alliances and shared supply alliances. They differ according to two fundamental dimensions: their symmetrical or dissymmetrical nature and the way in which they alter competition. Legal structure, often emphasized in previous research on the subject, does not emerge as a strongly discriminating factor. Hypotheses on the likely evolution and outcomes of each type of alliance are derived from the taxonomy.We are grateful to Barbara Gray, Stuart Hart, Aneel Karnani, Will Mitchell, Michel Tenenhaus, and to two anonymous reviewers for their very valuable and helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Our research project was funded by Fondation HEC, whose support we gratefully acknowledge.     

Tax Competition and International Public Goods

A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in the limiting case of perfect spillovers, eliminate tax competition. There is, however, always underprovision of the public good in equilibrium, since larger spillovers increase the problem of free riding. In an extension to the model, we demonstrate that congestion costs may result in overprovision of the public good.     

Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.     

审计市场中的合并、产业专用化投资和价格竞争

本文从产业组织的角度，分析了审计市场的合并、产业专用化和价格竞争等竞争行为，并进一步探讨了这些行为对审计质量和社会福利的影响。本文认为，审计质量的信号传递机制推动了产业中的合并行为，而审计产业的专用化投资行为在于策略性地阻止进入。由于审计产品的异质性、信任品特性以及强大的买方谈判能力使得审计市场存在激烈的价格竞争，而合并和产业专用化投资有助于事务所降低成本。因而，审计市场的竞争提高了社会福利。     

逐步剥离:我国铁路重组合理组织边界的初步探讨

引入竞争、提高效率是我国铁路重组改革的重要目标指向，因此组织边界的确定以及与之相配套的竞争激励措施已成为重组模式选择的关键议题。本文以自然垄断和交易成本理论为指导，以竞争激励促进企业运行效率为依据，通过对世界各国多种重组模式的垄断与竞争格局进行比较分析，提出了用逐步剥离的方式逼近我国铁路重组合理组织边界的改革思路。     

Capital mobility,wage bargaining,and social insurance policies in an economic union

In a two-country model with mobile capital we analyse decentralized social insurance policies. These policies are a compromise between the preferences of workers and capital owners. Due to wage bargaining, worker-based social insurance contributions are borne by capital owners. These contributions affect the profitability of investment, and consequently the direction and size of capital flows. Countries will take account of these effects in determining social insurance policy. Noncooperative decision making results in tax competition and an underprovision of social insurance. In addition, increasing economic integration, represented by increasing capital mobility, could imply a divergence of social insurance levels in the two countries.     

国内金融市场完全开放对国有商业银行的影响

按照入世协定书中的开放时间表,我国在入世5年后也即2006年底将实行金融业的全面开放。本文认为,我国金融市场完全开放将对国内商业银行带来深远影响:一是在政策层面,经济政策、金融政策、配套政策的进一步开放将使金融业的进入门槛降低,从而带来竞争主体的多元和竞争的更加市场化;二是在市场层面,客户的金融知识的普及和客户的议价能力的提高造成客户对银行需求也在不断提高;三是在竞争层面上,竞争主体、竞争模式和竞争手段的改变将使银行业面临更为复杂的竞争局面。为应对上述影响,国有商业银行应根据自身优势,扬长避短,根据不同情况,综合运用不同战略,以期达到持续发展的目标。     

中资银行迎接外资银行全面竞争的策略研究

随着中国银行业市场不断扩大对外资银行的开放程度,在华外资银行已在市场份额、客户营销、业务经营及人才吸引等方面对中资银行的经营形成挑战。中资银行只有加快改革进程,进一步提升自身的竞争力,才能在2006年底中国银行业全面开放后从容应对外资银行的激烈竞争。本文结合当前中国银行业的改制过程,提出了中资银行的应对策略,即通过与外资银行的业务及股权合作来弥补自身不足,通过调整经营结构实现经营战略的转型,通过完善公司治理培育自身的核心竞争力,通过解决经营中的实际问题提高市场应变力,通过落实“以人为本”的理念切实提升人力资源价值。     

不完全竞争、交易效率和证券风险

本文提出了一种崭新的理论观点———不完全竞争的市场结构是证券风险的一个重要来源,并利用市场数据进行了实证分析。此外,本文还发现不完全竞争的市场结构会通过影响买卖双方的交易策略而降低市场的交易效率。     

发展中国家的货币错配与汇率制度选择困境

货币错配是诱发发展中国家货币金融危机的一个重要因素,也加大了危机的解决成本。货币错配问题的形成是内外因素双重作用的结果,长期实行的“软”钉住汇率制度是其中的一个重要原因。发展中国家普遍遇到了货币错配与汇率制度选择的两难困境,僵硬的汇率制度为货币错配风险的累积提供了正向激励,加深了货币错配,货币错配程度的加深强化了汇率制度的“浮动恐惧”,必须采取有效措施走出这个困境。