敏捷供应链的战略研究

首先从传统供应链发展状况入手,指出其存在的问题,进而提出了敏捷供应链;通过对敏捷供应链的特点分析,以及战略匹配理论的引进,论证了敏捷供应链的战略优势,为供应链的发展方向提供了依据。     

企业文化构建的探讨

企业的生存和发展,必须适应社会环境的变化,企业文化的建设同样需要与时俱进,培养具备时代特色的企业精神,必须解放思想,更新观念。构建企业文化,必须加强企业的道德建设,制定新的道德规范和标准,从而树立企业新形象,提高企业生产力,增强企业综合竞争力,使企业稳步发展。     

国外标准化战略及其对我国的影响

简要介绍了欧盟及美、日等国的标准化战略及标准化发展趋势，并就其对我国标准化工作的影响进行了分析。     

Delaying integration of immigrant labor for the purpose of taxation

Delayed integration (DI) is a rule for taxing migrants. It requires that immigrants be taxed in the host country only after some period of transition. Conversely, emigrants are released from the obligation to pay taxes only after a certain period. DI is an alternative to the Employment Principle and the Home-Country Principle. The former governs the international taxation of labor. The latter is a close substitute for the Nationality Principle, on which US tax law is based. The paper studies DI in a setting which allows one to trade off the efficiency costs of distortionary taxation and of wasteful government.     

后营销管理观念的兴起

在市场营销活动的竞争重心发生转移的今天 ,后营销管理理论的产生对于指导我国的企业的营销实践 ,锻造企业市场营销能力 ,提升企业核心竞争力和竞争优势有着重要的借鉴意义。     

中国服务贸易竞争力的国际比较研究

服务贸易是当前国际贸易中发展最为迅速的领域,已成为我国经济新的增长点.通过服务贸易的国际横向比较,服务贸易TC指数大部分长期为负值,且各行业之间TC指数差异大,我国服务贸易竞争力水平远远落后于发达国家.从制约因素分析来看,提升我国服务贸易的国际竞争力,必须重视服务贸易营销,寻求国内市场支持,建立服务贸易扶持政策.     

Competition with Congestible Networks

We analyse competition between two network providers when the quality of each network depends negatively on the number of customers connected to that network. With respect to price competition we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Comparative statics show that as the congestion effect gets stronger quantities will decrease and prices increase, under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. In an example with endogenous capacities it turns out that equilibrium capacities are at first increasing and then decreasing in the strength of congestion. Furthermore, capacities are higher under Cournot competition. Welfare comparisons between Bertrand and Cournot competition are unambiguous for fixed capacities, but may turn around for endogenous capacities.     

On strategic complementarity conditions in Bertrand oligopoly

Summary. For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single (counter-)example that: (i) A new monotone transformation of the firms' profit functions may lead to the supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations both fail to do so, and (ii) Topkis's notion of critical sufficient condition for monotonicity of a Bertrand firm's best-reply correspondence cannot be extended to rely only on positive unit costs. Received: January 16, 2001; revised version: March 20, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This work was completed while the first author was visiting the Institute for Industrial Economics at the University of Copenhagen during Spring 2000. Their financial support and stimulating research environment are gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the European Commission. Correspondence to: R. Amir     

Environmental Policy in Open Economies and Monopolistic Competition

This paper analyses the implications of international trade for non-cooperative environmental policy in the case of local production externalities. A particular focus is on the potential effects of regulations on the variety of goods and the resulting international spillover caused by trade. A tougher domestic standard negatively affects the utility of the households abroad, since such a policy reduces their variety of imports (due to fewer domestic product inventions) or their consumption of each imported brand (due to higher import prices). Ignoring the negative spillover, non-cooperative governments implement inefficiently strict standards in equilibrium. In contrast to this clear-cut inefficiency result, the impact of international trade on the state of the environment is ambiguous.     

Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate

This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some fixed distance δ. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fail to exist in this model, except under special conditions about δ and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium with no-gaps, show that candidate A adopts more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates' policies. We find that both players' equilibrium strategies converge to the expected median voter as A's advantage shrinks to 0. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D72.