我国外汇储备货币组合的实证分析

截至2006年2月我国外汇储备达8536亿美元,超过日本成为世界外汇储备持有量第一大国,其后我国外汇储备也呈不断增长的态势,到2007年3月已达12020.31亿美元.外汇储备的持续增加意味着面临的风险也在持续增加.因此,如何确定合理的外汇储备币种组合成为目前需要迫切研究的课题.本文根据国内外已有研究确定了外汇储备货币结构的影响因素,结合因子分析法,得出了我国外汇储备币种组合的新选择,提出了我国外汇储备货币组合的对策建议.     

Failure to learn from failure: The 2008 mortgage crisis as a déjà vu of the mortgage meltdown of 1994

This article traces the developments in the market for residential mortgage-backed securities (MBS) during the period 1970–2008. Drawing on an analysis of trade publications, business press, and interviews with practitioners, it shows that an MBS market meltdown in 1994 provided clear signals of problems with MBS. The market participants did not re-evaluate their use of risk management tools or adjust security design in response to the 1994 crisis, suggesting a lack of understanding of the implications of the crisis. The 1994 meltdown showed that MBS were vulnerable to systematic risks and that these risks could precipitate an MBS market crash. Furthermore, the 1994 meltdown demonstrated that large-scale investment in MBS could affect the primary mortgage market, thereby rendering the MBS risks unpredictable. After 1994, MBS investment shifted to MBS backed by mortgages with default risk – a development that led to the crash of 2008. By drawing parallels between the 1994 and 2008 crises, this article shows how the MBS market failed to self-correct. The results suggest that financial market participants do not always incorporate relevant information in their decision-making and that market participants have difficulties in both foreseeing the effect of financial innovations on markets and interpreting these effects.     

欧元体系财政与货币政策协调性分析

欧元区集中统一的货币政策和权力分散的财政政策 ,已有 4年多的实践历程 ,实践表明财政与货币政策协调性较差 ,欧盟的机构设置与政策结构的设计的确存在缺陷 ,采取扩张性货币政策缓解内部冲击与价格稳定首要目标已处于两难境地。实现统一的“大财政”,通过财政转移 ,重新配置资源 ,以帮助成员国吸收不对称冲击的影响 ,是提高欧元体系财政与货币政策协调性措施之一。     

The telecoms boom and bust 1996-2003 and the role of financial markets

Financial crises are still as much a part of the modern, information-and-communication-technology-based (ICT) economy as they were of previous economies. Why are we apparently unable to learn lessons from the past and avoid what Charles Kindleberger (2000) has called manias, panics and crashes? Why is it that our sophisticated stock of information, made readily and relatively cheaply available to us by our investment in ICTs, and our abundant theories and models, have not allowed us to steer clear of these financial excesses? The aim of this paper is to highlight some of the processes and mechanisms that have played a significant role in causing the Telecoms Boom and Bust, 1996-2003. The question of whether anything can be done about these processes and mechanisms in order to try and modify such financial excesses in the future is taken up in the conclusion.JEL Classification: A12, D8, E3, G1, L63, L96, N2, O30The author would like to acknowledge, without implicating, the helpful discussion with Richard Burns, Fred Bleakley and others who commented on an earlier version of this paper at Institutional Investors European Institute meeting in Berlin in March 2003, and with Stan Metcalfe on other occasions. In addition, thanks are due to many friends in NTT and InfoCom who assisted my learning about the Telecoms Industry and its dynamics.     

Rethinking the role of NCBs in the EMU

Five years after the introduction of unified monetary policy in the EMU, some member countries are wondering whether they have ceded too much of their policy-making powers. The fact that National Central Banks no longer carry out sizable expansionary open market or foreign exchange market operations suggests that they face substantially reduced abilities to set economic policy.This paper demonstrates that, in fact, very little power has been yielded: on the fiscal front, the force of such policy initiatives is enhanced by the fixity of the exchange rate. On the monetary front, we show that there is an observational equivalence between all Central Bank actions under fixed exchange rates. This implies that the authorities retain the same amount of policy flexibility as before. So long as they use an alternative form of policy initiative, carrying out what previously would have been characterized as sterilized foreign exchange market operations, their ability to influence the macro performance of their economy is undiminished.     

预测央行脆弱性的VaR模型

本文旨在研究可将两代货币危机模型有机地结合在一起的用于预测央行脆弱性的VaR模型,这一模型为央行提供了一个预警指标,同时也为市场参与者提供了一个判断央行是否具有偿付能力的依据。     

发展中国家的货币错配与汇率制度选择困境

货币错配是诱发发展中国家货币金融危机的一个重要因素,也加大了危机的解决成本。货币错配问题的形成是内外因素双重作用的结果,长期实行的“软”钉住汇率制度是其中的一个重要原因。发展中国家普遍遇到了货币错配与汇率制度选择的两难困境,僵硬的汇率制度为货币错配风险的累积提供了正向激励,加深了货币错配,货币错配程度的加深强化了汇率制度的“浮动恐惧”,必须采取有效措施走出这个困境。     

Currency crisis early warning systems: Why they should be dynamic

Traditionally, financial crisis Early Warning Systems (EWSs) have relied on macroeconomic leading indicators when forecasting the occurrence of such events. This paper extends such discrete-choice EWSs by taking the persistence of the crisis phenomenon into account. The dynamic logit EWS is estimated using an exact maximum likelihood estimation method in both a country-by-country and a panel framework. The forecasting abilities of this model are then scrutinized using an evaluation methodology which was designed recently, specifically for EWSs. When used for predicting currency crises for 16 countries, this new EWS turns out to exhibit significantly better predictive abilities than the existing static one, both in- and out-of-sample, thus supporting the use of dynamic specifications for EWSs for financial crises.     

利差、美元指数与跨境资本流动

一般认为跨境资本流动由利差决定,政策制定也强调利差对资本流动的指示意义。但本文发现,中国跨境资本流动历史上主要是由套汇而非套息资本决定,且套汇的显著指标是多边美元指数(DXY)而非人民币兑美元双边汇率,我们把这一现象称之为“中国的跨境资本流动之谜”。我们提出,汇率影响大于利率且多边汇率影响大于双边汇率的原因在于人民币兑美元双边汇率历史上波动幅度较小,及时和充分反映中美基本面的分化还不够。美元指数是市场指标,能够预示人民币兑美元双边汇率的走势,进而驱动资本流动。进一步研究发现,由于中国经济的外溢效应,中美经济基本面的分化不仅决定中美利差,还在很大程度上驱动美欧、美日经济基本面的分化,进而略有时滞地驱动美元指数。因此,中美利差在统计意义上是美元指数的同步甚至略微领先的指标,从这个意义上讲,政策制定仍要关注利差。随着人民币汇率弹性增强,中美利差和美元指数对中国跨境资本流动的解释力都会边际减弱。     

Who benefits in a crisis? Evidence from hedge fund stock and option holdings

We use a unique data set of hedge fund long equity and equity option positions to investigate a significant lockup-related premium earned during the tech bubble (1999–2001) and financial crisis (2007–2009). Net fund flows are significantly greater among lockup funds during crisis and noncrisis periods. Managers of hedge funds with locked-up capital trade opportunistically against flow-motivated trades of non-lockup managers, consistent with a hypothesis of rent extraction in providing crisis era liquidity. The success of this opportunistic trading is concentrated during periods of high borrowing costs, in less liquid stock markets, and is enhanced by hedging in the equity option market.