On the Statistical Significance of Event Effects on Unsystematic Volatility

We develop a method for determining the significance of the effect of a certain event (stock split, corporate restructuring, change in regulation, etc.) on unsystematic volatility of asset returns. Simulations show that the suggested tests reject the true null hypothesis of no effect on volatility at appropriate levels, whereas the rejection rates of a false null hypothesis increase with the magnitude of the effect. An application of the method to corporate spin‐offs reveals statistically significant and long‐lasting estimated increases in unsystematic volatility of parent companies' returns.     

Are Venture Capitalists a Catalyst for Innovation?

In this paper we test two hypotheses concerning the presence of innovation in venture capital investments and the growth of innovative venture backed firms. To examine these hypotheses we considered sample of 37 Italian venture backed firms that went public on the Italian Stock Exchange between 1995 and 2004 and by a statistical matching procedure we picked 37 twin firms among the non‐venture backed IPOs for the same period. Our evidence shows that innovation is an important factor during the selection phase but once the investment is made, the company does not promote continued innovation and concentrates all efforts to improve other economic and managerial aspects.     

Some Evidence on the Adjustment of Producer Prices*

We document producer price adjustment using a low‐inflation micro price dataset. On average 24% of prices adjust each month, with an average increase/decrease of 6%. Producer prices adjust more frequently than consumer prices, but their size of adjustment is typically smaller. Sectoral heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustment is strongly related to heterogeneity in the cost structure. Fluctuations in aggregate producer price inflation occur to a large extent through variation in the relative share of upward and downward price adjustment.     

RULE CHANGES AND UNCERTAINTY IN DISCRIMINATORY AND UNIFORM PRICE AUCTIONS

The auction literature indicates that uncertainty about the value of auctioned goods increases underpricing in discriminatory price auctions. Such uncertainty has a smaller effect on uniform price auctions because the pricing rule aggregates bidders' information. We find that uncertainty resulting from inexperience with an auction mechanism has similar effects. Using initial public offering (IPO) data from Japan and Israel, we find that average underpricing increases temporarily in Japan's discriminatory price auctions after changes in the auction rules, which suggests that bidders reduce their bids in response to uncertainty. Underpricing in Israel's uniform price auctions is not affected by rule changes.     

Competitive and Information Effects of Cross-Border Stock Listings

We examine the effect of 269 cross‐border listings on rivals in the listing and domestic markets and find that U.S. rivals experience significant gains whereas domestic rivals do not. Both competitive and information effects are important in explaining the reaction of U.S. rivals. Regarding the competitive effects, the reaction of rivals is less favorable when listings originate in developed countries and more favorable when listing firms do not have prior operating presence in the United States. Regarding the information effects, the reaction is less favorable when listings are combined with equity offerings and more favorable when the listing is the first to occur within an industry.     

Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.     

Partial Horizontal Inequity Orderings: A Non‐parametric Approach*

We provide a partial ordering view of horizontal inequity (HI), based on the Lorenz criterion, associated with different post‐tax income distributions and a (bistochastic) non‐parametric estimated benchmark distribution. As a consequence, several measures consistent with the Lorenz criterion can be rationalized. In addition, we establish the so‐called HI transfer principle, which imposes a normative minimum requirement that any HI measure must satisfy. Our proposed HI ordering is consistent with this principle. Moreover, we adopt a cardinal view to decompose the total effect of a tax system into a welfare gain caused by HI‐free income redistribution and a welfare loss caused by HI, without any additive decomposable restriction on the indices. Hence, more robust tests can be applied. Other decompositions in the literature are seen as particular cases.     

Strategy-proofness in many-to-one matching problems

We search forstrategy-proof solutions in the context of (many-to-one) matching problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962). In this model, whenever the firms can hire as many workers as they want (the capacities are unlimited) the stable set is a singleton. There exists aPareto efficient, individually rational, andstrategy-proof matching rule if and only if the capacities are unlimited. Furthermore, whenever the capacities unlimited, the matching rule which selects the unique stable matching is the only matching rule that isPareto efficient, individually rational, andstrategy-proof.     

露天边坡工程及FLAC数值分析

以高西沟露天煤矿的西北边帮作为研究对象,运用FLAC3D数值模拟软件,经过数值计算得到边坡安全系数为1.57,其与工程类比法计算得到的数值差不多,知该数值分析方法不仅能快速、准确的算出边坡的稳定性系数,还能够形象的描绘边坡的滑移临界场,是一种有效的边坡稳定性分析的方法。     

Free entry in successive oligopolies

In the present paper, we propose an extension of Spengler's (1950) analysis of successive oligopolies, to study the effects of entry in the downstream and upstream markets. Free entry is analyzed using replica economies à la Debreu and Scarf (1963) . We find that free entry may have different effects in the upstream and in the downstream market. Namely, the usual convergence of the price to the corresponding marginal cost only occurs in the downstream market.