Gadi Fibich 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,115(2):309-321

The Revenue Equivalence Theorem is generalized to the case of asymmetric auctions in which each player's valuation is drawn independently from a common support according to his/her distribution function.  相似文献   

    

Shmuel Weinberger 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,115(2):377-384

The main goal of this paper is to show that if a finite connected CW complex admits a continuous, symmetric, and unanimous choice function for some number n>1 of agents, then the choice space is contractible. On the other hand, if one removes the finiteness, we give a complete characterization of the possible spaces; in particular, noncontractible spaces are indeed possible. These results extend earlier well-known results of Chichilnisky and Heal.  相似文献   

    

Christopher M. Anderson  Ken-Ichi Shimomura 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,115(2):209-249

Scarf (Int. Econ. Rev. 1 (1960) 157) proposed a model of dynamic adjustment in which the standard tatonnement price adjustment process orbits around, rather than converges to, the competitive equilibrium. Hirota (Int. Econ. Rev. 22 (1981) 461) characterized the price paths. We explore the predictions of Scarf's model in a non-tatonnement experimental double auction. The average transaction prices in each period do follow the path predicted by the Scarf and Hirota models. When the model predicts convergence the data converge; when the model predicts orbits, the data orbit in the direction predicted by the model. Moreover, we observe a weak tendency for prices within a period to follow the path predicted by the model.  相似文献   

    

Han Hong 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,116(1):1-40

We study the rates at which transaction prices aggregate information in common value auctions under the different information structures in Wilson (Rev. Econ. Stud. 44 (1977) 511) and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (Econometrica 65 (1997) 1247). We consider uniform-price auctions in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned to n bidders, where both n and k are allowed to diverge to infinity, and k/n converges to a number in [0,1). The Wilson assumptions lead to information aggregation at a rate proportional to , but the price aggregates information at a rate proportional to in the PS setting. We also consider English auctions, and investigate whether the extra information revealed in equilibrium improves convergence rates in these auctions.  相似文献   

    

Christoph Lülfesmann 《European Economic Review》2002,46(8):1379-1397

We consider a model where one region in a federation can realize a public project after undertaking value-increasing investments. While negotiations on the federal level ensure that an efficient project size is implemented in equilibrium, non-contractibility of investments causes the overall outcome to differ across regimes. If the region bears the entire implementation costs of its policies, underinvestment prevails and subsidiarity (centralized governance) is superior when spillovers are weak (strong). Conversely, if linear cost sharing arrangements are feasible, decentralized authority often admits a socially optimal outcome while centralized authority (with majority or unanimity rule) does not.  相似文献   

    

Benjamin Bental  Dan Peled 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2002,12(4):397-423

Should government subsidize R&D and does it matter how these subsidies are allocated? We examine these questions in a dynamic model where R&D is described as sequential sampling from a distribution of new ideas. Successful discoveries affect future available resources and incentives for further R&D. Consequently, there may be under-investment in R&D. We study the effect of government interventions aimed at fostering growth through R&D. Calibrating the model with aggregate data from the Israeli business sector allows us to quantitatively compare two forms of support resembling those actually used to encourage R&D in the Israeli business sector: (i) an unrestricted subsidy that may be used at the recipients' discretion to finance R&D or other investments, (ii) a subsidy earmarked by the government for R&D activities only. While there is no theoretical way to determine which of the two subsidies will have a greater impact on search for new ideas and growth, we find that in the calibrated economy both subsidies have a significant but similar impact on the economy's output and TFP growth rates. Accordingly, in the case of the Israeli business sector, the incentives to conduct R&D were sufficiently strong, and no R&D-specific encouragement was needed. However, a sensitivity analysis reveals that for economies characterized by other parameter values this result may not be true. Correspondence to: B. Bental  相似文献   

    

Frank Riedel  Tobias Hellmann 《Theoretical Economics》2015,10(1):1-9

Foster and Hart propose a measure of riskiness for discrete random variables. Their defining equation has no solution for many common continuous distributions. We show how to extend consistently the definition of riskiness to continuous random variables. For many continuous random variables, the risk measure is equal to the worst‐case risk measure, i.e., the maximal possible loss incurred by that gamble. For many discrete gambles with a large number of values, the Foster–Hart riskiness is close to the maximal loss. We give a simple characterization of gambles whose riskiness is or is close to the maximal loss.  相似文献   

    

Itai Sher  Rakesh Vohra 《Theoretical Economics》2015,10(2):597-648

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic—hence, akin to classic third degree price discrimination—independently of nonevidence characteristics. We also find another sufficient condition depending on both evidence and valuations, whose content is that evidence is hierarchical. When these conditions are violated, the optimal mechanism contains a mixture of second and third degree price discrimination, where the former is implemented via sale of lotteries. We interpret such randomization in terms of the probability of negotiation breakdown in a bargaining protocol whose sequential equilibrium implements the optimal mechanism.  相似文献   

    

Joachim Merz  Tim Rathjen 《Review of Income and Wealth》2014,60(3):450-479

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Boriss Siliverstovs  Konstantin A. Kholodilin  Vyacheslav Dombrovsky 《Review of Income and Wealth》2014,60(4):948-966

We suggest using information from the state register of personal cars as an alternative indicator of economic inequality in countries with a large share of shadow economy. We illustrate our approach using the Latvian pool of personal cars. Our main finding is that the extent of household economic inequality in Latvia is much larger than officially assumed. According to Eurostat, the officially published estimate of the Gini coefficient for Latvia is 0.374 for 2009, which is much higher than the Gini coefficient value reported for all the 27 EU member countries (0.304), but significantly lower than 0.48 according to our results.  相似文献