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61.
Hassan Benchekroun 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,111(2):214-239
This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a productive asset by a duopoly. A closed-loop Nash equilibrium of the game is constructed and used to analyze the effects of a unilateral production restriction. Surprisingly, such unilateral action may result in a decrease of the long-run asset's stock. We also exhibit production restrictions that can result simultaneously in an increase of the asset's stock and the long-run profits of the firm that is being imposed the production restriction. Moreover, a unilateral decrease of the production of one firm can induce its rival to also decrease its production. 相似文献
62.
Tobias F. Rötheli 《International Advances in Economic Research》2005,11(1):39-47
Earlier experimental evidence indicates that some decision makers under-invest in information when it is costly. This insight is applied to the cost–benefit analysis of the provision of data obtained by satellites. In fields like agriculture, remotely sensed information of great precision can be provided to additional farmers at minimal extra costs if a service for farmers with similar information needs is set up. Here, the tendency to under-invest in information asks for creative solutions by the private sector: bankers may work together with rational producers in setting up the information service and promoting it. However, if producers financial resources are insufficient, public intervention, in the form of a free information service may be necessary.The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Stephan von Cramon-Taubadel, Sean Flynn, Daniel Heller, and Carlos Lenz and participants of the Lisbon Conference of the International Atlantic Economic Society, particularly Asatoshi Maeshiro, for helpful comments. 相似文献
63.
Felix Kubler 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,110(1):137-153
This paper examines whether general equilibrium models of exchange economies with incomplete financial markets impose restrictions on prices of commodities and assets given the stochastic processes of dividends and aggregate endowments. We show that the assumption of time-separable expected utility implies restriction on the cross-section of asset prices as well as on spot commodity prices. However, a relaxation of the assumption of time separability will generally destroy these restriction. 相似文献
64.
Roland Strausz 《Journal of Economic Theory》2006,128(1):306-314
This paper shows that, contrary to what is generally believed, decreasing concavity of the agent's utility function with respect to the screening variable is not sufficient to ensure that stochastic mechanisms are suboptimal. The paper demonstrates, however, that they are suboptimal whenever the optimal deterministic mechanism exhibits no bunching. This is the case for most applications of the theory and therefore validates the literature's usual focus on deterministic mechanisms. 相似文献
65.
We analyze a class of ‘large group’ Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models by applying different concepts of functional separability to the same set of first-order conditions for utility maximization. We show that multiplicatively quasi-separable (MQS) functions yield ‘constant relative risk aversion’ (CRRA), and, therefore ‘constant elasticity of substitution’ (CES), functions, whereas additively quasi-separable (AQS) functions yield ‘constant absolute risk aversion’ (CARA) functions. We then show that the CARA specification sheds new light on: (i) pro-competitive effects, i.e., profit-maximizing prices are decreasing in the mass of competing firms; and (ii) a competitive limit, i.e., profit-maximizing prices converge to marginal costs when the mass of competing firms becomes arbitrarily large. 相似文献
66.
Hamid Sabourian 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,116(2):189-228
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 63-78) consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade. They show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome. Here, I consider Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences, together with the standard payoff in the game, then every equilibrium is stationary/Markov and induces the unique competitive price. Thus, I demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome. 相似文献
67.
This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted: players evaluate the desirability of a “current” move in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoffs. We define a concept of equilibrium which takes into account farsighted behavior of agents and allows for limited cooperation amongst agents. We show that an equilibrium process of network formation exists. We also show that there are valuation structures in which no equilibrium strategy profile can sustain efficient networks. We then provide sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium process will yield efficient outcomes. 相似文献
68.
Jan I. Haaland 《Empirica》1993,20(2):107-127
In this paper production, trade and welfare effects of European integration are discussed, with particular emphasis on the effects for the EC and EFTA. Insights from previous partial and general equilibrium analyses of the internal market are reviewed, and new model simulations are presented. In addition to the standard experiments of 1992 — as reduced trade costs and as full market integration — for the EC alone, and for the European Economic Area (EEA), an intermediate case, with full integration in the EC but only lower trade costs between the EC and EFTA, is analysed. All cases show that EFTA will benefit significantly from freer trade and closer integration with the EC. With regard to non-European regions, the simulations of European integration show some degree of trade diversion, but stylized model experiments indicate that a successful outcome of the Uruguay-round may more than offset the trade-diverting effects of 1992. 相似文献
69.
Jacob K. Goeree 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,108(2):345-364
This paper considers auctions where bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic interactions. When bidders wish to exaggerate their private information, equilibrium bidding functions are biased upwards as bidders attempt to signal via the winning bid. Signaling is most prominent in second-price auctions where equilibrium bids are “above value.” In English and first-price auctions, signaling is less extreme since the winner incurs the cost of her signaling choice. The opportunity to signal lowers bidders’ payoffs and raises revenue. When bidders understate their private information, separating equilibria need not exist and the auction may not be efficient. 相似文献
70.
Should government subsidize R&D and does it matter how these subsidies are allocated? We examine these questions in a dynamic
model where R&D is described as sequential sampling from a distribution of new ideas. Successful discoveries affect future
available resources and incentives for further R&D. Consequently, there may be under-investment in R&D. We study the effect
of government interventions aimed at fostering growth through R&D. Calibrating the model with aggregate data from the Israeli
business sector allows us to quantitatively compare two forms of support resembling those actually used to encourage R&D in
the Israeli business sector: (i) an unrestricted subsidy that may be used at the recipients' discretion to finance R&D or
other investments, (ii) a subsidy earmarked by the government for R&D activities only. While there is no theoretical way to
determine which of the two subsidies will have a greater impact on search for new ideas and growth, we find that in the calibrated
economy both subsidies have a significant but similar impact on the economy's output and TFP growth rates. Accordingly, in
the case of the Israeli business sector, the incentives to conduct R&D were sufficiently strong, and no R&D-specific encouragement
was needed. However, a sensitivity analysis reveals that for economies characterized by other parameter values this result
may not be true.
Correspondence to: B. Bental 相似文献