城镇居民金融资产与不动产财富效应的比较分析

城镇居民两种资产的财富效应呈现三个特点:一是住房资产的财富效应大于金融资产的财富效应;二是两种资产的财富效应差别不大;三是两种资产的财富效应较微弱。这表明:第一,住房对消费具有一定的支撑作用;第二,金融资产增值性不强和股市的波动限制财富效应的发挥;第三,较强的流动性约束制约住房资产的财富效应;第四,消费的过度敏感性使资产财富效应微弱。为了通过财富效应来促进消费,必须维持股市和房地产市场稳定的预期,大力发展金融市场,抑制住房价格的过快增长并促进住房市场平稳发展。     

基于沃尔评分法的财政资金绩效审计评价指标体系研究

随着财政资金绩效审计的不断深入,构建财政资金绩效审计评价指标体系成为当前财政审计工作的核心。本文采用＂沃尔评分法＂的基本原理对评价指标体系的路径进行了构建,并对指标体系的主要内容从经济性、效率性和效果性三个方面进行了初步研究。     

金融全球化过程中银行危机的传染性及我国的应对策略

随着经济全球化的深化,随着我国整个金融体系开放程度的加深,任何来自国际金融市场的危机都可能对我国商业银行体系造成灾难性冲击,本文从分析银行危机跨国传染的路径着手,提出了我国防范国际金融危机传染的对策和建议,以期为我国银行体系的改革提供新的思路。     

后危机时代中国外贸宏观管理的战略调整:金融经济语境的实证描述

金融经济的全球渗透业已构成后危机时代中国外贸宏观管理的内在要素。通过构造影响实体经济的新机制和增加货币市场需求管理的复杂性重塑全球市场的需求面,辅之以全球化新趋势的供给面变化,金融经济正在构建新的国际贸易政策的全球环境。有鉴于此,中国外贸宏观管理调整应关注金融经济对国际贸易发展的内生性影响,相机实施新的外贸宏观调控以适应金融经济日益深化条件下经济周期的特征变化,同时基于中国开放型经济发展阶段特征的识别,建立国内外需求的统筹调节机制以满足宏观战略和企业组织结构调整目标。近期应当注意统筹运用金融、货币和主权信用手段改进中国的出口贸易环境,整合全球分销网络以建立动态培植和调节需求的新机制,并加强新型贸易品部门监控。     

How to get banks to take less risk and disclose bad news

There is wide agreement that before the recent financial crisis, financial institutions took excessive risk in their investment strategies. At the same time, regulators complained that banks did not reveal the extent of their difficulties in a timely fashion thus reducing the effectiveness of government intervention to prevent or mitigate the deleterious effects of the financial crisis. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how regulators can best use certain tools at their disposal to motivate banks to take less risk and to provide adverse information to regulators early. We argue that two tools, namely (i) allowing bank payouts to equity holders even when banks report they are in trouble and (ii) constraining banks’ future investment strategy when they are in trouble can achieve both goals. We show that, in some cases, it is optimal to use both of these tools in combination. That is, in such cases it is optimal to allow equity payouts when banks report they are in trouble, even though such payouts increase the incentive for banks to take excessive risk and even though these payments are financed by taxpayers. We also show that the more socially costly is constraining the bank’s portfolio selection or the more complex are the bank’s assets, the more likely it is that allowing larger payouts and fewer constraints is optimal. Finally we discuss how changes in bank capital requirements interact with inducing disclosure and preventing excessive risk taking.     

The impact of the French Tobin tax

We analyze the impact of the introduction of the French Tobin tax on the turnover and measures of the liquidity and volatility of the affected stocks with nonparametric tests on individual stocks, difference-in-difference tests and other robustness checks controlling for simultaneous month-of-the-year and size effects. Our findings indicate that the tax produces a significant reduction in turnover and volatility (measured in terms of stock price volatility and the high–low price range) and inconclusive effects on liquidity when the latter is evaluated under the two dimensions of the estimated bid–ask spread and the Amihud (2002) price impact ratio.     

Financial liberalization and bank risk-taking: International evidence

This paper analyzes the channels through which financial liberalization affects bank risk-taking in an international sample of 4333 banks in 83 countries. Our results indicate that financial liberalization increases bank risk-taking in both developed and developing countries but through different channels. Financial liberalization promotes stronger bank competition that increases risk-taking incentives in developed countries, whereas in developing countries it increases bank risk by expanding opportunities to take risk. Capital requirements help reduce the negative impact of financial liberalization on financial stability in both developed and developing countries. However, official supervision and financial transparency are only effective in developing countries.     

Hedging house price risk with futures contracts after the bubble burst

This paper extends the existing literature on managing house price risk. While previous work finds that a hedger would have reduced a large amount of variance in housing returns in Las Vegas, Nevada using Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) futures contracts, we show that neither static nor dynamic strategies would have maintained an effective hedge during the significant decline in housing prices. The inability to hedge house price risk using CME futures contracts ultimately calls into question the long-term viability of housing futures.     

Impact of short selling activity on market dynamics: Evidence from an emerging market

With unique daily short sale data of Borsa Istanbul (stock exchange of Turkey), we investigate the dynamic relationship between short selling activity and volatility, liquidity and market return from January 2005 to December 2012 using a VAR(p)-cDCC-FIEGARCH(1,d,1) approach. Our findings suggest that short sellers are contrarian traders and contribute to efficient stock market in Turkey. We also show that increased short selling activity is associated with higher liquidity and decreased volatility. However this relation weakens during the financial turmoil of 2008. Our results indicate that any ban on short sales may be detrimental for financial stability and market quality in Turkey.     

Risk shifting in the US banking system: An empirical analysis

This paper contributes to the empirical literature on risk shifting. It proposes a method to find out whether risk shifting is present in the banking industry and, if so, what type. The type of risk shifting depends on the group of debt holders to whom risk is shifted. We apply this method to the US banking sector in 1998–2011. To study the relationship between risk shifting and the 2008 crisis, the sample is also split into pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. Our results suggest that the same type of risk shifting is present in the entire sample and in the pre-crisis and crisis subsamples. We find no evidence of risk shifting after the crisis. Furthermore, holding capital buffers seems to disincentivize risk shifting. This finding appears to provide support for the conservative buffer included in Basel III.