Competition For Order Flow, Market Quality, And Price Discovery In The Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock

We investigate competition for order flow, market quality, and price discovery in the Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock (QQQ). The QQQ, an AMEX‐listed, exchange‐traded fund, is the most actively traded security in the U.S. equities market. On July 31, 2001, the NYSE began trading the QQQ, marking the first time it traded securities of companies it does not list. The greatest volume of trading takes place on electronic communication networks (ECNs), following by trading on the AMEX and the NYSE. Most of the block trades are executed on the AMEX, where the bid‐ask spreads are narrower. We find that ECNs contribute the most to the price‐discovery process. The spreads on all trading platforms have decreased and market quality and price discovery have improved since QQQ shares have traded on the NYSE.     

Option pricing in the presence of natural boundaries and a quadratic diffusion term

This paper uses a probabilistic change-of-numeraire technique to compute closed-form prices of European options to exchange one asset against another when the relative price of the underlying assets follows a diffusion process with natural boundaries and a quadratic diffusion coefficient. The paper shows in particular how to interpret the option price formula in terms of exercise probabilities which are calculated under the martingale measures associated with two specific numeraire portfolios. An application to the pricing of bond options and certain interest rate derivatives illustrates the main results.     

Long term dependence in stock returns

We show, using the modified rescaled range statistic, that none of the return series of indices of five European countries, the United States and Japan exhibits long term dependence. This statistic — introduced by Lo (1991) — correct Hurst's (1951) ‘classical’ rescaled range statistic for short term dependence. We also report the classical rescaled range statistic after adjusting the series for short term dependence. This procedure shows, for cases where the results of the modified rescaled range statistic are mixed, that no long term dependence can be found. Simulations indicate reasonable power of this adjustment procedure. Furthermore, we find that estimates of the Hurst exponent, a related measure of long term dependence, are also biased by short term dependence. Simulations show that this measure — that has recently attracted growing interest — cannot distinguish between models with or without long term dependence.     

Does the cost of capital differ across countries? An agency perspective*

In this keynote speech, I ask the question: Does the cost of capital differ for firms located in different countries? I argue that there are two ways to look at the cost of capital. First, there is the neoclassical perspective, which assumes that there are no agency problems. In integrated markets, the neoclassical cost of capital is the same in every country. Second, there is the agency perspective. Agency costs increase the cost of capital understood as the expected rate of return necessary for an investment to leave the value of the firm unaffected. Adjusting the cost of capital for agency costs, I argue that it differs across countries because of differences in corporate governance. I then provide a comparison of the agency-adjusted cost of capital between Japan and the US.     

Back on the balance sheet: The tax effects of contingent claims in commercial banking

Contingent claims separate revenue and cost into two different time periods. Revenue comes in the initial origination process, while the cost comes upon completion of the contract in the event of default. With banks increasing contingent claims in recent years, a higher taxable income leads to a shift in a bank's balance sheet toward tax-free income and tax-shielding liabilities. This provides a valuable case-study of corporate finance theories of tax management. This paper builds a model to illustrate the income features of contingent claims. Call Reports from 1990-1996 are examined, and show significant evidence of increases in leverage associated with contingent claims.     

In search of a residual dividend policy

We survey 309 sample firms exhibiting behavior consistent with a residual dividend policy and their matched counterparts to learn how they set their dividend policies. The findings reveal that the sample firms are more likely than their counterparts to maintain a long-term dividend payout ratio, use long-run earnings forecasts in setting the dividend, and be unconcerned about the cost of raising external funds. Yet, firms behaving as though they follow a residual dividend policy generally do not profess to follow the policy. At best, the sample firms follow a “modified” residual policy in which they carefully manage their payout ratio and dividend trend. Although it may not be an explicit goal of such a dividend policy, consistently low free cash flow typically results.     

How do family ownership,control and management affect firm value?

Using proxy data on all Fortune-500 firms during 1994–2000, we find that family ownership creates value only when the founder serves as CEO of the family firm or as Chairman with a hired CEO. Dual share classes, pyramids, and voting agreements reduce the founder's premium. When descendants serve as CEOs, firm value is destroyed. Our findings suggest that the classic owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms is more costly than the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in founder-CEO firms. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner-manager conflict in nonfamily firms.     

Should business groups be dismantled? The equilibrium costs of efficient internal capital markets

We analyze the relationship between conglomerates’ internal capital markets and the efficiency of economy-wide capital allocation, and we identify a novel cost of conglomeration that arises from an equilibrium framework. Because of financial market imperfections engendered by imperfect investor protection, conglomerates that engage in winner-picking (Stein, 1997 [Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources. Journal of Finance 52, 111–133]) find it optimal to allocate scarce capital internally to mediocre projects, even when other firms in the economy have higher-productivity projects that are in need of additional capital. This bias for internal capital allocation can decrease allocative efficiency even when conglomerates have efficient internal capital markets, because a substantial presence of conglomerates might make it harder for other firms in the economy to raise capital. We also argue that the negative externality associated with conglomeration is particularly costly for countries that are at intermediary levels of financial development. In such countries, a high degree of conglomeration, generated, for example, by the control of the corporate sector by family business groups, could decrease the efficiency of the capital market. Our theory generates novel empirical predictions that cannot be derived in models that ignore the equilibrium effects of conglomerates. These predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence that the presence of business groups in developing countries inhibits the growth of new independent firms because of a lack of finance.     

The outsourcing of R&D through acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry

We examine the performance of 160 pharmaceutical acquisitions from 1994 to 2001 and find evidence that on average acquirers realize significant positive returns. These returns are positively correlated with prior acquirer access to information about the research and development activities at target firms and a superior negotiating position. A unique Desperation Index is employed to determine the current status of a firm's internal productivity. We find that firms experiencing declines in internal productivity or which are more desperate are more likely to engage in an outsourcing-type acquisition in an effort to replenish their research pipelines.     

IPOs,acquisitions, and the use of convertible securities in venture capital

This paper provides a new explanation for the use of convertible securities in venture capital. A key property of convertible preferred equity is that it allocates different cash flow rights, depending on whether exit occurs by acquisition or IPO. The paper builds a model with double moral hazard, where both the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist provide value-adding effort. The optimal contract gives the venture capitalist more cash flow rights in acquisitions than IPOs. This explains the use of convertible preferred equity, including automatic conversion at IPO. Contingent control rights are also important for achieving efficient exit decisions.