Insurgent Building: Emerging Spatial Politics in the Bedouin–State Conflict in Israel

In the conflict between Bedouin representatives and government authorities in the southern Israeli Negev, the term ‘insurgent building’ refers to the construction of buildings erected in the full expectation that they will be demolished by the Israeli police shortly thereafter. This article analyses how insurgent building is employed as a spatial practice by emerging political actors to claim contested Bedouin landownership. Importantly, insurgent building relies on the ability of media and advocacy organizations to mobilize behind the issue. Most of the relevant scholarship takes the interpretative categories advanced by these actors at face value. Following anthropological debates regarding objectification and categorization, I examine the context of a specific case of insurgent building. Emerging political actors who employ insurgent building often rely on predefined ethnic categories and clear‐cut people–state polarities. This case demonstrates the need for a more differentiated understanding of multilayered local dynamics than the one offered by mainstream linear interpretations. At a more abstract level, political actors contribute to the reproduction of the very categories against which they mobilize.     

城市化进程中的社区建设模式探索——以长沙市咸嘉新村为例

城市化进程中的社区建设问题是当前一大热点问题，其模式选择也备受学术界关注。本文在分析国内外社区建设模式优劣的基础上，以长沙市咸嘉新村为实证研究，围绕社区建设主体之间的利益分配和相互作用展开研究，通过构建社区建设的三方“博弈模型”，探索出了“G—D—P联合建设”的新模式，以期为我国城市化进程中的新型社区的建设与完善，旧有社区和城中村的改造提供可行性方案。     

An essay on conceptualization of issues in empirical accounting research

Empirical research in accounting has lately focused much on sophisticated statistical methodology and econometrics and relatively less on conceptualization of the issues concerned. This essay is written to highlight the conceptualization of the issues as an important ingredient of empirical research in accounting. I present two methods of conceptualization – the single-entity approach and the game theoretic approach. I give several examples in accounting research to explain the conceptualization process. I hope that this essay will fill a much needed void in the research process in accounting and restore the balance between conceptualization and methodology.     

Analysis of marine ecological compensation for environmental risk caused by chemical spill based on game theory

The problem of marine environmental risk is ultimately the result of game theory between the marine environmental managers and the enterprise of potential environmental risk. This paper analyzes the internal economic relationship that whether the “protection” policy is applied between the protection action of marine environmental managers and the chemical enterprise. The result shows that the key factor whether the enterprise adopt the “protection” policy or not is the amount of penalty and the government＇s cost of execution, and the compulsive ecological compensation is obligatory from the angle of stimulating the enterprise of canonical action and adopting the “protection” policy. To build the ecological compensation mechanism based on the environmental risk will effectively improve the level of management in sea area and decrease the probability of chemical spill.     

征信体系的作用与效率——基于信息不对称随机有限重复博弈的分析

征信体系的意义可以用重复博弈理论来加以解释.本文建立了一个信息不对称随机有限重复信用博弈模型,证明如果存在征信体系实现的信息共享机制,那么不论借款者的类型是什么,诚实守信是可以作为序列均衡的结果在有限重复博弈的绝大多数时期中出现的.如果不存在信息共享机制,信贷市场有可能消失,即便引入资产抵押,信贷市场仍是不完全的.基于上述序列均衡分析,本文进一步阐释了全面征信、法律保障、市场结构对征信体系效率运行的重要性.就发展中国家而言,成立中性、独立、信息全面的国家信用局和鼓励民营信用公司积极竞争,完善义务征信的法律体系是较为理想和可行的选择     

COOPERATION: THE POWER OF A SINGLE WORD? SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON WORDING AND GENDER EFFECTS IN A GAME OF CHICKEN

Framing has been widely shown to affect decision making. In this paper, we investigate experimentally whether, and to what extent, cooperative behaviour in a Game of Chicken may be impacted by a very basic change in the labelling of the strategies. Our within‐subject experimental design involves two treatments. The only difference between them is that we introduce either a socially‐oriented wording (I cooperate/I do not cooperate) or colours (red/blue) to designate strategies. The level of cooperation appears to be higher in the socially‐oriented context, but only when uncertainty as regards the type of the partner is manipulated, and especially among females.     

海外油气投资目标筛选决策支持系统研究

受全球一体化趋势的影响，油气资源与世界经济、政治、外交和军事的关系更加密切，围绕油气资源展开的国际竞争变得异常激烈。随着不确定外部环境的无序演化，油气安全的影响因素日益复杂。海外油气资源的争夺和中国海外油气资源供给渠道的稳定，需要科学的投资目标筛选决策。基于海外油气投资环境的动态演化和石油公司跨国经营非合作博弈特点，全方位构建了包含动态指标的海外油气目标国家投资环境评价指标体系，运用多层次灰色模型建立了海外油气投资目标筛选模型，通过编程建立和实现其决策支持功能。为系统评估海外油气资源争夺的战略机遇提供了方法借鉴。     

基于矿业监管博弈的激励约束机制研究

资源型城市地方政府在执行矿业监管权时，通常由于信息不对称及矿业政策执行力度范围限定与中央政府博弈。基于由此导致的矿业生产外部性，通过分析中央政府与地方政府各自的目标偏好和效益函数，利用经济博弈论和矩阵对策，试图寻求矿业监管存在问题的原因。文章尝试在利用行为经济学“前景理论”建模的基础上，借助贝叶斯理论分析，提出贝叶斯风险成本诱导机制，进而得出在该机制的激励约束下矿业监管倾向于帕累托有效。文章最后结合研究结论给出政策建议，为制定我国的能源资源开采政策提供了重要的理论参考。     

Self-reporting mechanism for risk regulation

One problem in implementing risk regulation has to do with asymmetries in information between regulators and licensees. A possible solution is to provide incentives (e.g., more lenient standards) if violations (e.g., risk levels above some specified standard) are disclosed voluntarily by regulated firms, rather than being discovered through the regulator's monitoring efforts. This study adapts game-theoretic work in regulatory economics (where firms are usually viewed as being either compliant or non-compliant) to apply to the case of risk regulation (where firms can be described by continuously varying risk levels). This article derives equilibrium solutions for the self-reporting mechanism under different model formulations, and discusses the conditions under which these solutions are better than a traditional direct-monitoring regulatory scheme. For example, when firms can benefit (in the form of reduced costs) by increasing their risk levels, the results show that offering a loosened standard to encourage voluntary disclosure of risk levels is worthwhile only when a sufficiently large proportion of firms is believed to have high risk levels.     

中美评级机构博弈

国际信用评级市场被美国三大评级机构———惠誉,标准普尔和穆迪垄断,而三大机构的独立性,公正性和前瞻性近些年备受质疑,各主权国家的金融安全和产品定价权受到威胁。中国在国际评级市场中要承担起一个大国的责任,运用博弈论的方法分析中国评级机构能否顺利进入由美国垄断的国际评级市场,针对均衡结果提出对抗垄断的评级市场的建议。