On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games

We consider the problem of axiomatizing the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. It turns out that several axiomatizations of the Shapley value on the class of all TU-games do not characterize this solution on the class of assignment games. However, when considering an assignment game as a (communication) graph game where the game is simply the assignment game and the graph is a corresponding bipartite graph where buyers (sellers) are connected with sellers (buyers) only, we show that Myerson’s component efficiency and fairness axioms do characterize the Shapley value on the class of assignment games. Moreover, these two axioms have a natural interpretation for assignment games. Component efficiency yields submarket efficiency stating that the sum of the payoffs of all players in a submarket equals the worth of that submarket, where a submarket is a set of buyers and sellers such that all buyers in this set have zero valuation for the goods offered by the sellers outside the set, and all buyers outside the set have zero valuations for the goods offered by sellers inside the set. Fairness of the graph game solution boils down to valuation fairness stating that only changing the valuation of one particular buyer for the good offered by a particular seller changes the payoffs of this buyer and seller by the same amount.     

Consumers’ Willingness to Pay for Sustainable Seafood Made in Europe

Sustainability of increasing relevance also for seafood markets. The aim of this contribution is to analyze consumer preferences and their willingness to pay (WTP) for different sustainability claims, and to identify consumer segments according to their WTP. The contingent valuation method was applied to elicit consumers’ WTP in eight European countries. The WTP varies between seven and almost 20%, depending on attribute and country. Three consumer groups become apparent: the largest group without any additional WTP, a smaller group with a moderate additional WTP of plus 17%, and a very small group with an additional WTP of more than 40%. Clear differences between countries are obvious regarding preferences for different sustainability attributes, particularly in the segment with the highest WTP. A fraction of the consumers is willing to pay significantly higher prices for sustainably produced fish from Europe: given that trustful standards are applied and well communicated.     

A game theoretic approach to optimize multi-stakeholder utilities for land acquisition negotiations with informality

To combat the critical stresses of rising urbanization, the government acquires land from private owners using the power of eminent domain. This land assembly causes negative externalities such as increasing social tension and injustice that may impose a long-term threat to stability and sustainable development. Therefore, there is a need to make the land acquisition process more transparent and just. Considering the unique Indian context where informality has a strong presence, we propose an approach based on game theory that models the bargain through a three-stage Nash equilibrium game. Four agents – the government, the private developer, the landowner, and the free rider – are considered. We provide conditional solutions for the generalizable Case and proceed to model different stakeholder behavior patterns through two utility functional forms – linear and exponential. In the linear case, we find that the free rider obtains half of the revenue of the project, whereas the landowner gains between one-fourth and one-half of the revenue. Thus, we highlight the undeniably crucial role free riders play in land acquisition negotiations. However, closed form solutions cannot be obtained for the exponential form, due to which we use simulations to demonstrate a solution procedure. We conclude by stating that the proposed model can be useful in formulating future land policies in a sustainable and inclusive manner, with optimal utility derivations for all concerned stakeholders. Our model can also be extended to other spatial contexts where informality features heavily in the land market, especially in the Global South.     

Embracing invention similarity for the measurement of vertically overlapping claims

ABSTRACT

Clear and well-defined patent rights can incentivize innovation by granting monopoly rights to the inventor for a limited period of time in exchange for public disclosure of the invention. However, with cumulative innovation, when a product draws from intellectual property held across multiple firms (including fragmented intellectual property or patent thickets), contracting failures may lead to suboptimal economic outcomes. However, an alternative theory, developed by a variety of scholars, contends that patent thickets have a more ambiguous effect. Researchers have developed several measures to gauge the extent and impact of cumulative innovation and the various channels of patent thickets. This paper contends that mis-measurement may contribute to the incoherence and overall lack of consensus within the patent thickets literature. Specifically, the literature is missing a precise measure of vertically overlapping claims. We propose a new measure of vertically overlapping claims that incorporates invention similarity to more precisely identify inventive overlap. The measure defined in this paper will enable more accurate measurement, and allow for novel economic research on cumulative innovation, fragmentation in intellectual property, and patent thickets within and across all patent jurisdictions.     

Public acceptance of and heterogeneity in behavioral beach trip responses to offshore wind farm development in Catalonia (Spain)

A combined travel cost – contingent behaviour survey of residents and tourists in Catalonia is conducted on-site to examine the effects on beach recreational demand of developing an offshore wind farm (OWF) project. The survey considers four potential OWF scenarios with different degrees of visual impact. We allow for heterogeneity in trip preferences among individuals and control for on-site sampling through the use of a random parameters negative binomial (RPNB) model and a Multivariate Poisson log-normal (MPLN) model, respectively. The welfare measures derived from the RPNB model relate to the current beach users only, whereas those from the MPLN model refer to the general population of residents and tourists in Catalonia. The results show the importance of the specific place of location of the OWF project and how the installation of wind turbines would significantly decrease the demand for trips, depending on their degree of visual impacts, leading to a substantial welfare loss. However, the results also show that the project mainly would cause a displacement of trips to other beaches within Catalonia rather than outside Catalonia and that the welfare per trip measures generated by the RPNB and MPLN models substantially differ. Policy implications of these findings are discussed.     

The uncertainty challenge of contingent collaboration

Contingent knowledge workers will play an increasingly important role in organisational success as workers transition in and out of project‐based innovation teams with more frequency. Our research finds that collaborators in the contingent, high‐skill workforce face uncertainty challenges to their work that are unique from the independent, contingent professionals more often studied. The article proposes a theoretical framework of uncertainty to guide us in understanding collaborative contingent knowledge workers’ work experience. Interviews with postdoctoral researchers reveal four findings about the influence of these highly uncertain work environments on collaborative contingent knowledge workers – collaboration isolation, frustrated independence, performance anxiety and internalised blame. Perhaps most concerning is that the workers internalise the negative impacts as personal failings instead of recognising them as consequences of a poorly designed work environment. This study argues for the need to manage and mitigate different sources of uncertainty to avoid creating an unnecessary burden on contingent knowledge workers, and to enable a sustainable, contingent knowledge workforce.     

地方政府政策变迁对跨国公司企业社会责任的影响

笔者运用合作博弈的谈判模型研究地方政府政策对跨国公司企业社会责任合约的影响。模型推导出在宽松、适度、严格三种政策下,地方政府收益最大时对跨国公司社会责任履行合约的取值要求,研究认为政策的选择取决于地方政府谈判成本大小和声誉损失系数以及跨国公司在当地的社会责任履行成本系数,并就三种政策下跨国公司企业社会责任的影响因素进行分析。     

系统重要性金融机构或有资本问题研究

系统重要性金融机构(SIFIs)倒闭产生的巨大负外部性使得各国在危机处置中更倾向于救助而非任其倒闭,但"太大而不能倒"又会引发道德风险,扭曲公平竞争。国际组织就SIFIs的危机处置提出一系列解决方案及建议,其中自救安排中的或有资本计划作为一项重要的资本工具而广受关注。或有资本不仅具有预防和早期救助、自救之功效,还能有效改善公司治理结构,与《巴塞尔协议II》的三大支柱原则完美契合。但或有资本亦存在不确定性较大、价格变动及成本效用减损等问题,需要结合我国具体的金融市场环境论证、设计、草拟相关规则及配套制度,需要在发行规模、发行程序、转化设计和转化条件等方面谨慎论证、不断完善。     

The promise and peril of dynamic targeted pricing

Dynamic pricing is widely adopted in many industries, such as travel and insurance. These industries are also gaining extensive capabilities in identifying and segmenting customers, partly fueled by the increasing availability of data. It is natural to ask whether firms should take advantage of such developments by charging different prices to different customer segments. If so, under what conditions? We seek answers to these highly managerially relevant questions.We consider a market with two customer segments served by a monopolist. The monopolist can choose among a set of pricing strategies to exploit consumers’ inter-temporal preferences and/or inter-segment variations. At one end of the spectrum, the firm can charge a constant price to all customers, which is called static pricing. At the other end of the spectrum, the firm can charge different prices to different customer segments and vary these prices over time, which is referred to as dynamic targeted pricing. We systematically compare these alternative pricing strategies. We show that dynamic pricing without targeting can be more effective than static targeted pricing when customers are not very forward looking, which corroborates the findings in the empirical literature. Interestingly, we find that the monopolist can be worse off when she adopts targeting in addition to dynamic pricing. We conduct laboratory experiments to test several key model predictions. The studies show that individuals behave in a manner consistent with the predictions of our model.     

Delivery leadtime and channel structure decisions for make-to-order duopoly under different game scenarios

We develop game-theoretic models to explore the quoted delivery leadtime, price, and channel structure decisions for a make-to-order duopoly system under three game scenarios. Under the integrated-manufacturer first scenario, we find that (i) decentralization of the supply chain increases quoted leadtime; and (ii) both manufacturers may choose different channel structures under symmetric duopoly. By comparing with the symmetric scenario and the retailer first scenario, we find that a manufacturer facing a decentralized rival adopts decentralization when leadtime sensitivity, leadtime cost, and price elasticity are very small; the effect of decentralization on quoted leadtime largely depends on game scenario.