高职学生英语学习心理分析

文章通过调查探讨了高职学生英语学习存在的问题,透过数据分析了问题存在的心理原因,并提出了改善措施,以期提高高职学生英语学习的质量。     

What Determines Real Exchange Rates? The Nordic Countries

The model derived in this paper yields testable implications concerning the long‐run co‐movements of real exchange rates, relative labor productivity, the trade balance and terms of trade. Countries with relatively higher output growth, trade deficits or improved terms of trade are found to have more appreciated real exchange rates, with the main channel of transmission working through the relative price of nontraded goods. Exogenous terms‐of‐trade shocks are found to be the most important determinant of long‐run movements in the real exchange rate for Denmark and Norway, while demand shocks account for most of the long‐run variance in the real exchange rate for Finland and Sweden.     

城市房屋拆迁中的公共利益在程序法上的界定——兼评《城市房屋拆迁管理条例》第十六条

公共利益内涵在立法上的缺失,造成大量个人利益被侵犯的案例,在城市房屋拆迁中尤其突出。本文通过探讨如何从程序上赋予受公共利益影响者参与对公共利益内涵的确定以及在个人利益受到侵犯时给予司法救济的途径的问题,试图从法律程序上限制政府对公共利益的滥用,并最大程度地维护公民的个人利益,以此暂时回避对公共利益内涵问题的探讨。     

Why Money Growth Determines Inflation in the Long Run: Answering the Woodford Critique

Woodford argues that it is not appropriate to regard inflation in the steady state of New Keynesian models as determined by steady‐state money growth. Woodford instead argues that the intercept term in the monetary authority's interest rate policy rule determines steady‐state inflation. In this paper, I offer an alternative interpretation of steady‐state behavior, according to which it is appropriate to regard steady‐state inflation as determined by steady‐state money growth. The argument relies on traditional interpretations of the central bank's power in the long run and appeals to model properties that are common to textbook and New Keynesian analysis. According to this argument, the only way the central bank can control interest rates in the long run is via affecting inflation, and its only means available for determining inflation is by determining the money growth rate.     

Relative Guarantees

Many real-world financial contracts have some sort of minimum rate of return guarantee included. One class of these guarantees is so-called relative guarantees, i.e., guarantees where the minimum guaranteed rate of return is given as a function of the stochastic return on a reference portfolio. These guarantees are the topic of this paper. We analyse a wide range of different functional specifications for the minimum guaranteed rate of return, hereunder both so-called maturity and multi-period guarantees. Several closed form solutions are presented.     

Optimal failure rates and penalty-bonus policies in the offshore petroleum sector

We characterize optimal time profiles of risk-reducing expenditures and wreck probabilities for petroleum platforms. The input to our analysis is the development of wreck cost, direct and imputed. Particular attention is paid to the question of how private companies deviating from socially optimal standards may be induced to comply with such standards by means of a) a time-variant penalty, b) a no-wreck bonus and c) a time-invariant penalty.     

西方货币政策有效性理论综述

本文从西方经济学家对市场是否出清和要素价格变化是否完全弹性观点得出的货币政策是否有效结合的角度，来论述货币政策有效性理论。     

The Structural Relation Between Mortgage and Market Interest Rates

This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between primary and secondary mortgage markets and the short-term and long-term market interest rates. Using a series of monthly data on fixed rate mortgage rates and GNMA rates, we explore the dependence and speed of adjustment in these primary and secondary mortgage rates to each other as well as to the long and short-term government rates. The results indicate that residential mortgage rates in general, appear to follow the long-term rate and are not very sensitive to movements in the short-term interest rate.     

Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?

The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy‐maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one‐country and a two‐country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy‐maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some—sometimes even all—citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of “informational lobbying” are also discussed.