政府干预、盈余管理与信息披露质量——来自深圳股票市场A股上市公司的经验证据

通过以深圳证券交易所2006-2010年信息披露质量评级报告结果及3185家上市公司的A股数据为研究样本,从政府干预的角度分析了盈余管理与信息披露质量之间的内在关系。实证表明,政府干预与盈余管理呈负相关关系;政府干预与信息披露质量显著负相关;盈余管理与信息披露质量呈负相关关系,且政府干预行为影响其负相关关系。这说明在政府干预的情况下,上市公司可能通过降低信息披露质量来配合其盈余管理,从而使信息使用者与上市公司信息不对称。     

宏观调控、所有权结构与商业银行信贷扩张行为

本文结合公司金融和商业银行相关理论,厘清了股权结构对商业银行信贷扩张的作用机理,重点分析政府宏观调控政策目标和意图如何通过股权结构作用于信贷行为。选用21家银行2003-2010年间的面板数据,估计得出中央政府控制、民营化程度低、大股东持股比例高的银行具有更强的信贷扩张冲动;并利用2009年宏观经济扩张政策外生冲击形成的"自然实验"环境,通过双重差分(Difference-in-Difference)估计策略发现,宏观调控对中央政府控制、民营化程度低、大股东持股比例高的银行的信贷行为影响更为显著。本文的研究从政府控制和银行内部治理的视角为信贷扩张的微观机制以及商业银行市场化改革之后政府宏观经济调控的传导渠道提供了一个新的解释。     

Government quality,auditor choice and adoption of IFRS: A cross country analysis

We examine the association between country-level government quality and firms' choice of external auditors. Using a cross-sectional sample of 142,193 firm-year observations from 46 countries over 1998–2007, we show that the government quality of a country has a significant positive effect on the likelihood of choosing Big 4 auditors by firms in that country. We also show that firms in countries with strong governments that have adopted IFRS are more likely to choose Big 4 than non-Big 4 auditors. To our knowledge, this is the first study of its kind to provide direct evidence on the role of government quality in firms' choice of external auditors. Choice of a Big 4 auditor may be regarded as a proxy for the demand for high quality financial reporting, and thus the results provide insights for policy makers on the importance of government quality toward improving financial reporting quality in a country.     

政府治理、控制权结构与投资决策—基于家族上市公司的经验证据

本文基于双重代理视角分析了地方政府治理水平和控制权结构影响家族企业投资行为的机理。以2002～2008年间我国家族上市公司为研究样本,实证检验发现,超额控制程度较高的家族企业,其内部人有动机为实现其私人收益,忽略资本市场股票价格所提供的投资机会信号,偏离最优投资决策,降低公司投资股价之间敏感度。而较高的地方政府治理水平一方面通过约束内部人的机会主义行为,另一方面使企业拥有更多的外部融资便利,减少与政府的协调成本,提高市场配置资源的能力,从而提高投资股价敏感度。进一步研究发现,家族超额控制降低投资-股价敏感度的动机在地方政府治理水平较差的家族企业中更为显著,并且会降低投资对公司业绩的贡献程度。该研究发现不仅有助于我们从理论层面更好地理解镶嵌于政府层面代理问题的中国家族企业的投资行为,而且对于提高地方政府在维持证券市场的公共治理水平,进而推动我国家族企业健康发展有着重要的政策意义。     

权力异化、国家审计与地方政府负债

地方官员权力异化和国家审计监管对地方政府负债行为有显著影响。官员权力异化越严重,地方政府债务增长速度越快,债务风险越大。但是,国家审计监管力量越强,越有可能降低官员权力异化对地方政府负债的影响程度,进而降低地方政府负债增长速度和债务风险。结果表明,较强的国家审计监管力度有助于防止地方政府官员权力滥用和寻租,规范地方政府融资行为。     

法治与法制的离合探寻

法治与法制均经历了历久的演进过程,其内涵的倾向性上存在着巨大的差异。西方文化的性格更倾向于法治的理念和实践,而中国及东方社会的文化内涵则更倾向于利用法制工具性的价值。法治和法制在现代社会并不是对立的两种社会运作方式,二者具有区别基础上的统一性和整合性。     

地方政府大部门制改革的困境及对策研究

在中央政府大部门制改革告一段落后,推行大部制改革成为地方政府发展的必然趋势。在改革中,部门整合协调难,人员分流安排难,部门有效监督难,"刚性"利益破除难,是地方政府大部制改革面临的四大困境;而如何有效调整权力与利益的关系,转变地方政府职能,完善监督机制,结合实际进行地方政府的大部制改革成为相应的解决措施。     

“旋转门效应”、审计独立性与政府监管

20世纪90年代以来,独立审计市场上逐渐出现了一种现象即会计师事务所的审计人员转到客户公司任职,且进入客户公司后仍与原事务所保持亲密的联系,由此形成了旋转门效应。旋转门效应能够帮助事务所在未来的竞争中获得新业务并规避审计风险,但其负面影响是可能对审计师的独立性产生影响和加剧审计市场垄断。本文对此提出了相应的监管对策。     

The relation between the equity risk premium and the bond maturity premium in the UK: 1900–2006

Using a rich data set for the UK for over a century, we find that the relation between the equity risk premium and the government bond maturity premium is nonlinear and subject to stochastic regime switching. We identify a regime in which both premia are jointly characterized by low volatility and another regime in which both premia are characterized by high volatility. The occurrence of the high volatility regime chronologically coincides with major changes in the pound exchange rate. The low volatility regime has a higher probability of turning up over two consecutive years than the high volatility regime, but it is not perceived by investors to be an absorbing regime. The lagged maturity premium is a strong predictor of the equity risk premium only in the regime of low volatility. In addition, the lagged equity premium is a predictor of the maturity premium also in the low volatility regime. This result on regime-dependent bidirectional predictability is robust to alternative definitions of the equity premium, and to the inclusion of real interest rate and real growth effects.

Financing government investment and its implications for public capital: A small open economy perspective

Expenditure reductions played a key role in many small open economies during fiscal consolidation, with large declines in public investment. This led to a reduction in public capital stock and affected the competitiveness of these economies. After the sovereign debt crisis, the governments that consider increasing investment to replenish the public capital stock have limited fiscal space and have to avoid external imbalances. We show that using budget-neutral investment spending can generate long-term benefits of higher public capital stock while at the same time limiting negative consequences for the public finances and the trade balance. The best way of financing government investment, which preserves fiscal and trade balances, and increases welfare, is by reducing other government spending. The second-best is financing investment with value-added tax. Financing with debt worsens fiscal and trade balances, while using distortionary labour taxes reduces labour supply, increases wage costs and worsens the trade deficit in the short run.