政府干预、政治关联与企业非效率投资——基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证研究

以2004~2009年间701家上市公司为样本,研究政府干预、政治关联对企业非效率投资行为的影响。研究发现:政府干预一方面会加剧有自由现金流量公司的过度投资,对国有企业过度投资的影响更为严重;另一方面可以有效地缓解融资约束企业的投资不足,尤其是国有企业的投资不足。这说明,出于自身的政策性负担或政治晋升目标,政府会损害或支持所控制的企业,这为政府"掠夺之手理论"和"支持之手理论"提供了实证支持。研究还发现,政治关联与过度投资和投资不足均负相关,这表明,政治关联可以作为法律保护的替代机制来保护企业产权免受政府损害,并为企业谋取利益。     

河北省财政运行风险及防范对策研究

近年来,面对经济社会各领域公共风险,河北财政通过减收、增支、加债等方式,有效防控了公共风险的暴发,全省财政经济运行整体平稳,但也导致财政自身风险的累积,体现在财政收入持续增长后劲不足、财政支出保障难度逐步增加、地方政府债务风险存有隐患、其他领域风险趋向财政转移等.防控地方财政经济运行风险,需要充分发挥财政职能,加强财源建设,推动财政收入持续增长;调整支出方向,确保地方财政平稳运行;完善管理机制,防范地方政府债务风险;深化体制改革,消除财政风险转移隐患.     

地方政府债务、金融营商环境与实体企业融资约束

文章基于“财政金融关联”视角,利用2015至2020年省级层面的面板数据,实证检验了地方政府债务、金融营商环境与实体企业融资约束三者间的作用效果。研究结果表明：地方政府债务与企业融资约束存在正向推高关系,而良好的金融营商环境对实体企业融资约束存在负向抑制关系;异质性检验显示,地方政府债务对民营实体企业、中西部实体企业融资约束的推高作用更强;交互效应结果显示,金融营商环境的优化能有效缓解地方政府债务对实体企业融资约束的推高作用。因此,提出改善地区金融营商环境、对差异化企业性质实施优惠帮扶政策以及严控地方政府隐性债务增量是缓解实体企业融资困境,促进地区经济平稳发展的重要措施。     

政府采购为中小企业发展注入动力

中小企业是整个经济社会发展的重要部分,实现中小企业又快又好的发展,除了依靠企业自身经营,还依赖于政府政策扶持,其中,政府采购的作用不容小视。但目前我国中小企业参与政府采购的现状不容乐观,对此,应完善政府采购制度,推动中小企业发展。     

系统论视角下CBE模式的成功因素分析及启示

CBE模式的开发理念、方法与过程等都对后继的教育改革产生了深远影响,并得到了广泛应用。文章以系统论为研究视角,将CBE模式看作信息加工的过程,分析了环境、制度、实施过程、评价主体等要素以及要素间的相互关系,并试图在市场需求分析以及企业和行业协会的参与作用方面进行创新,为更好借鉴CBE模式提供参考依据。     

制度变迁与近代中国的对外贸易——以1913-1926年北京政府时期的对外贸易为例

本文对北京政府时期的对外贸易政策进行了研究,分析了1913-1926年对外贸易的基本特点和进出口商品结构,并对该时期对外贸易与经济发展的互动关系进行了研究。应该肯定这一时期的对外贸易取得了近代化的一小步,但总体而言,仍是畸形的发展,这与当时中国的社会环境有很大关系。     

经济政策不确定性与家族企业创新 ——融资约束及政府补助视角

家族企业作为社会发展的主要参与者,在促进经济增长方面发挥着不可替代的作用。家族企业若想实现长期发展,必然依靠创新。然而,我国家族企业普遍面临创新投入不足、创新产出效率低下等问题。基于2010—2018年中国上市家族企业数据,分析经济政策不确定性对于家族企业创新是否存在激励作用。结果发现,经济政策不确定性提高,会对家族企业创新研发活动投入与产出产生正向激励作用,促进家族企业创新。从融资约束与政府补助视角,分析两者在上述正向激励作用中的调节作用。结果表明,对于融资约束小以及受到政府补助的家族企业而言,其受到经济政策不确定性的正向激励作用更显著,有助于其开展创新研发活动。结论不仅验证了经济政策不确定性对于家族企业创新的激励作用,还揭示了融资约束以及政府补助的调节作用,可为政府制定相应补助政策,构建完善的金融市场提供理论支持和经验证据。     

Progress of e-development in China since 1998

In this paper, a holistic analytical framework for tracing and understanding the progress of e-development is developed and adopted in an empirical case study of China’s e-development since 1998. In particular, the progress is analyzed systematically by benchmarking various ICT infrastructure and e-devices, the composition of Internet users, and the key dimensions of e-government, e-working, e-commerce, and e-networking. In addition, the questions of whether the geographical digital divide in the country has been narrowed is examined. Our findings show that (1) China has made noticeable progress in the e-development since 1998; yet, progress varied in different dimensions; (2) based on the overall performance, 2004 can be considered as the watershed for China to move from the formative stage to the developmental stage; (3) during the e-development, digital disparities in China have dramatically decreased at the provincial level, however, the urban-rural digital gap widened. We suggest that other than promoting affordable ICT possession, the wider and more diversified e-applications for different walks of life will be important for China to move towards the mature stage.     

Institutions,moral hazard and expected government support of banks

We model the expected support of banks with credit ratings from Moody's and Fitch, taking explicitly into account the capacity and willingness of governments to provide support in case of need, as well as their concerns about moral hazard (i.e., that the expected support may induce banks to assume bigger risks). Our results suggest that moral hazard concerns are relatively weak. In addition, a substantial part of the expected support can be attributed to the quality of a country's institutions. These findings have important implications for the dynamics of banking crises, the value of the ‘fair’ insurance premium banks might be called upon to pay for the expected support, as well as for ways to reduce the resulting negative externalities.     

The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors

I examine whether stock ownership by politicians helps to enforce noncontractible quid pro quo relations with firms. The ownership by US Congress members in firms contributing to their election campaigns is higher than in noncontributors. This bias toward contributors depends on the financial incentives of politicians and the relation's value. Firms with a stronger ownership–contribution association receive more government contracts. The financial gains from these contracts are economically large. When politicians divest stocks, firms discontinue contributions to the politicians, lose future contracts, and perform poorly. Politicians divest the stocks in contributors, but not in noncontributors, in anticipation of retirement.