Subprime Crisis Damages China''''s Textile Exports

As the effects of the subprime crisis in the U.S.continue to grow and spread across the World.     

Estimation in Two-Stage Models with Heteroscedasticity

A surprising number of important problems can be cast in the framework of estimating a mean and variance using data arising from a two-stage structure. The first stage is a random sampling of "units" with some quantity of interest associated with the unit. The second stage produces an estimate of that quantity and usually, but not always, an estimated standard error, which may change considerably across units. Heteroscedasticity in the estimates over different units can arise for a number of reasons, including variation associated with the unit and changing sampling effort over units. This paper presents a broad discussion of the problem of making inferences for the population mean and variance associated with the unobserved true values at the first stage of sampling. A careful discussion of the causes of heteroscedasticity is given, followed by an examination of ways in which inferences can be carried out in a manner that is robust to the nature of the within unit heteroscedasticity. Among the conclusions are that under any type of heteroscedasticity, an unbiased estimate of the mean and the variance of the estimated mean can be obtained by using the estimates as if they were true unobserved values from the first stage. The issue of using the mean versus a weighted average which tries to account for the heteroscedasticity is also discussed. An unbiased estimate of the population variance is given and the variance of this estimate and its covariance with the estimated mean is provided under various types of heteroscedasticity. The two-stage setting arises in many contexts including the one-way random effects models with replication, meta-analysis, multi-stage sampling from finite populations and random coefficients models. We will motivate and illustrate the problem with data arising from these various contexts with the goal of providing a unified framework for addressing such problems.     

The relationship between supervisor and workers — The case of professional baseball in Japan

This paper analyzes the relationship between the workers' productivity and the supervisor from the point of view of the Matching Hypothesis using data from professional baseball in Japan. The main findings of this paper are the following three points. The first point is that the Matching Hypothesis is rejected in the case of pitchers and hitters. The second one is that the depreciation rate of the effect is about 10–15% per year and differs from zero significantly. Hence, the effect continues for a long time after the matching is broken. Lastly, we cannot find a learning curve for the managers' ability.     

Positive effects of conflict: A cognitive perspective

Managers rated the extent to which conflict produces both positive and negative effects. Results indicated that they rated several negative effects significantly higher than any positive effects. However, virtually all managers reported personal experiences in which conflict yielded beneficial outcomes. These and other findings suggest that practicing managers perceive conflict as having the potential to yield positive as well as negative effects. A review of recent literature on human cognition identified several factors that may play a role in determining whether conflict yields predominantly positive or negative effects. These factors include the impact of strong negative emotions on cognition, stereotype-driven thinking, and attributional processes. Techniques for modifying conflict situations so that they are more likely to result in positive effects are suggested.     

日本银行的信贷扩张及其危机效应

通常人们将日本银行的坏账和不良资产问题归咎于日本的泡沫经济以及东南亚的经济危机．而在具体、现实的解释上，日本银行自身经营的失败和机制的缺陷才是最重要、最直接的危机成因，对日本银行信贷扩张历程的分析展现了日本银行不良资产困境及其危机效应的形成过程。     

Comparing mean efficiency and productivity scores from small samples: A bootstrap methodology

This paper provides a bootstrap methodology for constructing confidence intervals for means of DEA and econometrically estimated efficiency scores, Malmquist productivity indices, and other similar measures in small samples. The procedure is nonparametric since no distributional assumptions are required. An empirical example is provided.This research was performed while Wilson was under contract with the Management Science Group, US Department of Veterans Affairs, Bedford, MA 01730.     

关于《企业会计准则——租赁》融资租赁业务的处理

本文着重从四个方面分析了入关后对企业财务管理的影响。     

Stock authorizations: A sequential equilibrium analysis

We develop a sequential equilibrium model of the common stock authorization process. We provide conditions under which actions that increase the number of slack shares, such as stock authorizations, generate negative announcement effects.     

The relationship between domestic and outward foreign direct investment: The role of industry-specific effects

Previous research has been inconclusive as regards the effect of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) on domestic investments. In this article, we show that this inconclusiveness can be explained at a disaggregated level as a function of the way industries are organized. Based on a simple theoretical framework including monitoring and trade costs, we argue that a complementary relationship can be expected to prevail in vertically integrated industries, whereas a substitutionary relationship can be expected in horizontally organized production. The empirical analysis confirms a significant difference between the two categories of industry as regards the impact of outward FDI on domestic investment. The results may thus have profound policy implications. JEL no. F12, F21, F23, G34.     

Profit sharing and monitoring in partnerships

We consider partnerships among risk-averse professionals endowed with (i) a risky and personally-costly production technology and (ii) a personally-costly monitoring technology providing contractible noisy signals about partners’ productive efforts. Partners shirk both production and monitoring tasks because efforts are unobservable. We characterize optimal partnership size, profit shares and incentive payments when every partner performs the same tasks, and show that medium-sized partnerships are dominated by either smaller or larger partnerships. Prohibiting some partners from monitoring increases the incentives for others to monitor. We illustrate how task assignments and incentives interact, leading to improvements in partner welfare.