Local formal interpersonal networks and SMEs internationalisation: Empirical evidence from the UK

This article uses data from the UK Longitudinal Small Business Survey (2015) to empirically test the relationship between local (formal and informal) interpersonal networks and exporting. Our results suggest that local interpersonal networks increase the likelihood of exporting. More importantly, we find that the role of formal interpersonal networks (e.g. accountants) on internationalisation increases as firm size increases, while the link between informal interpersonal networks (e.g. family) and exporting becomes weaker. We argue that larger firms have more complex operations and diverse structures than smaller firms that require the engagement of formal interpersonal networks to help with the internationalisation process.     

创新驱动战略下省域协同创新合作水平比较研究

鉴于创新要素流动受到省域户籍、财政等政策的影响,以省域为研究载体,研究省域协同创新主体间互动可以动态反映在同一基础条件下创新驱动经济的协同过程。以复合系统理论为基础,构建了包含科技服务子系统的协同创新联盟复合系统理论模型,基于湖北、湖南和江西三省2009-2014年面板数据,运用复合系统协同度模型对协同创新联盟复合系统进行实证分析。通过比较各省复合系统中子系统有序度、协同度以及各个协同创新子系统有序度,发现不同地区创新优势不同,各地协同创新联盟核心创新主体应有差异;政府是否参与协同创新应有所选择;湖北省复合系统应深化科技服务子系统下层子系统与高校子系统、科研机构子系统间联系;江西省复合系统应以产业子系统为突破口,形成多向发展的可能。     

中部地区与发达地区高校产学研合作绩效比较研究

基于高校产学研合作框架,从产学研合作规模、合作水平及科技成果转化能力3个维度构建高校产学研合作绩效评价体系。以2011-2015年中部地区的湖北、安徽、河南和湖南,发达地区的上海、广东和江苏等省市相关数据为样本,采用省际间横向比较方法,比较中部地区与发达地区高校产学研合作绩效。结果显示,发达地区高校产学研合作绩效在3个维度上均好于中部地区, 湖北、江苏两省高校产学研合作绩效分别在中部地区和发达地区领先;科技成果转化能力弱是中部地区高校产学研合作绩效的制约因素。由此,针对当前主要问题提出系统性改进建议。     

产学合作数量与学术创新绩效关系

采用面板分位数回归方法,基于《2016中国大学评价报告》中前100所大学2011-2015年数据,对产学合作数量与学术创新绩效关系进行研究。结果显示：①产学合作数量与学术创新绩效之间存在明显的倒U型关系,表明存在最优的产学合作数量使高校获得最佳学术创新绩效;②不同分位点处存在异质效应,表明产学合作数量对学术创新绩效高低分位的影响具有差异,因此,不能搞“一刀切”的产学合作治理结构;③合作广度、知识能力对产学合作数量与学术创新绩效的关系产生了正向调节效应。     

非正式社会化对知识共享影响机制研究

知识是一种独特的有价值的关键资源,对知识的管理和有效利用对于增强组织核心竞争力有着至关重要的作用。但组织内知识流动并非易事,知识共享通常不是自然发生的。组织中员工知识共享水平的提高,需要员工之间进行沟通与交流,社会化为员工沟通交流提供了机会。非正式社会化作为发生在个人层面的社会化类型,对组织中人与人之间的知识共享行为具有非常重要的作用。对来自长江三角洲的13家企业问卷调查数据进行分析,搭建非正式社会化、社会交互作用、权力距离、知识共享4个变量之间的交互作用模型,采用探索性因子分析、验证性因子分析和结构方程分析方法,就非正式社会化对知识共享的影响机制进行了讨论。     

Does it pay firms to register for taxes? The impact of formality on firm profitability

This paper estimates the impact of registering for taxes on firm profits in Bolivia, the country with the highest levels of informality in Latin America. A new survey of micro and small firms enables us to control for a rich set of measures of owner ability and business motivations that can affect both profits and the decision to formalize. We identify the impact of tax registration on business profitability using the distance of a firm from the tax office where registration occurs, conditional on the distance to the city center, as an instrument for registration. Proximity to the tax office provides firms with more information about registration, but is argued to not directly affect profits. We find tax registration leads to significantly higher profits for the firms that the instrument affects. However, we also find some evidence of heterogeneous effects of tax formality on profits. Tax registration appears to increase profits for the mid-sized firms in our sample, but to lower profits for both the marginal smaller and larger firms, in contrast to the standard view that formality increases profits. We show that owners of large firms who have managed to stay informal are of higher entrepreneurial ability than formal firm owners, in contrast to the standard view (correct among smaller firms) that informal firm owners are low ability.     

论民间金融的边界

要解决中小企业融资难问题需要界定民间金融与正规金融的边界。通过将社会网络关系引入民间金融模型,揭示民间金融中行为人的行动逻辑,证明在特定的网络范围内,民间金融能够满足行为人的融资需求。进而,将正规金融引入模型界定民间金融和正规金融的边界,证明在中小规模融资中,民间金融存在成本优势。     

我国民间融资研究最新进展及述评

本文从经济学、法学、哲学伦理三个角度对民间融资的研究文献进行了系统梳理,专家学者从不同角度,基于不同学说和理论,对其存在的效果、影响及地位等方面展开了较为深入的分析和探讨,但仍存在不足之处,需要进一步加强对民间金融的定量分析和比较研究,以适应当今民间金融蓬勃发展之势。     

欧盟成员国科技项目合作倾向分析--以欧盟框架计划为例

通过对欧盟框架计划中欧盟27国任意两国之间项目合作的计量分析,展示了欧盟成员国的科技项目结构,揭示出该合作结构的主要特征：科研特色和优势是影响欧盟成员国科学合作最重要的因素,地理因素次之,语言因素的倾向性相对最小。国家间的科技项目合作强度随着科研特色差异、地理距离和语言差异度的增大而降低,三者均呈负指数分布。     

Contract enforcement and the size of the informal economy

This paper describes a model where the size of the informal sector decreases as the degree to which financing contracts can be enforced in the formal sector rises. Agents who choose to operate in the informal sector can evade taxes, but they have no access to official means of contract enforcement. Numerical simulations of the model suggest that lax tax enforcement alone does not suffice to generate a large informal sector. Contractual imperfections, on the other hand, can generate a large informal sector and account for several distinguishing features of the organization of production in developing economies. I would like to thank Tim Kehoe, Ed Prescott and Manuel Santos for their guidance, and seminar participants at ITAM, the Universidad Torcuato di Tella and the University of Montréal for their valuable comments. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and may not reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.