Welfare costs of reclassification risk in the health insurance market

We assess the quantitative importance of reclassification risk in the US health insurance market. Reclassification risk arises because the health conditions of individuals evolve over time, while a typical health insurance contract only lasts for one year. Thus, a change in the health status can lead to a significant change in the health insurance premium. We measure welfare gains from introducing explicit insurance against this risk in the form of guaranteed renewable health insurance contracts. We find that in the current institutional environment individuals are well-sheltered against reclassification risk and they only moderately gain from having access to these contracts. More specifically, we show that employer-sponsored health insurance and public means-tested transfers play an important role in providing implicit insurance against reclassification risk. If these institutions are removed, the average welfare gains from having access to guaranteed renewable contracts exceed 4% of the annual consumption.     

Does risk sharing increase with risk aversion and risk when commitment is limited?

I consider a risk-sharing game with limited commitment, and study how the discount factor above which perfect risk sharing is self-enforcing in the long run depends on agents׳ risk aversion and the riskiness of their endowment. When agents face no aggregate risk, a mean-preserving spread may destroy the sustainability of perfect risk sharing if each agent׳s endowment may take more than three values. With aggregate risk the same can happen with only two possible endowment realizations. With respect to risk aversion the intuitive comparative statics result holds without aggregate risk, but it holds only under strong assumptions in the presence of aggregate risk. In simple settings with two endowment values I also show that the threshold discount factor co-moves with popular measures of risk sharing.     

Can Agents Be Better Off with Pay Caps?

A popular way to discipline the managers of companies or banks that got into trouble during the recent financial crisis has been to impose caps on managers' pay. Using a small extension of the standard principal–agent model, we argue that pay caps might serve the opposite purpose, because the agent might be better off with a pay cap. Specifically, we show that, given a fixed effort level to be implemented, the agent's expected utility can be decreasing in an upper bound for the agent's reward. The effect of pay caps on the general structure of optimal incentive contracts is also characterized. While an improvement of contracting information always helps the principal, it might increase or decrease the marginal cost of imposing pay caps.     

Optimal Social Insurance with Endogenous Health*

In this paper, I analyze optimal insurance against unemployment and disability in a private information economy with endogenous health and search effort. Individuals can reduce the probability of becoming disabled by exerting prevention effort. I show that the optimal sequence of consumption is increasing for a working individual and constant for a disabled individual. During unemployment, decreasing benefits are not necessarily optimal. The prevention constraint implies increasing benefits while the search constraint demands decreasing benefits while being unemployed. However, if individuals respond sufficiently to search incentives, the latter effect dominates the former and the optimal consumption sequence is decreasing during unemployment.     

The determinants of employers’ use of temporary contracts in the frictional labor market

This paper focuses on the following two primary reasons that employers use temporary contracts: to flexibly adjust employment and to screen workers. A search-matching framework is used to not only address employers’ endogenous choices in using temporary contracts, but also numerically identify the situations in which these contracts are likely to be used as a screening tool for permanent positions. This numerical exercise demonstrates that reducing employment protections in permanent jobs, reducing benefits for unemployed workers and raising the conversion probability from temporary to permanent employment will increase the relative proportion of employers who use temporary contracts as a screening device.     

Search efficiency,wage dynamics and welfare

Advances in information technology have improved the job-search process in the labor market. We analyze the effects of this improvement by constructing a search-and-matching model with two sectors: a risky sector with firm-specific productivity shocks and a risk-free sector. The risky sector is characterized by a low level of commitment between employers and workers – either party can end the employment relationship. We show that a better job-search process generates more job matches in the risky sector, and this benefits workers by improving their outside options. The effect on employers is subtle: while it is easier to fill vacancies, workers become more expensive. At the same time, the ease of finding new workers makes it harder for employers to keep their wage promises to workers and increases wage volatility. Our paper contributes to the literature by offering a novel explanation for the observed rise in wage volatility.     

Multiperiod Loans,Occasionally Binding Constraints,and Monetary Policy: A Quantitative Evaluation

We introduce multiperiod mortgage loans, fixed interest rate, a lower bound constraint on newly granted loans, and a possibly slack collateral constraint, in an otherwise standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with housing. Our nonlinear estimation shows that all those features are important to understand the evolution of mortgage debt during the recent U.S. housing market boom and bust. The transmission of monetary policy becomes dependent on the housing cycle, with weaker effects when house prices are high or start falling sharply. Higher average loan duration makes monetary policy less effective, eventually leading to asymmetric responses to positive and negative monetary shocks.     

Individual labour income,stock prices and whom it may concern

In this paper, a panel model which describes the relationship between individual labour income and stock prices in Germany is estimated. The specification allows the individuals to cluster concerning the model parameters that describe first the individual labour income dynamics and second the relationship between the individual labour income and financial markets. Methodically, a Bayesian model-based non-Gaussian panel data approach, proposed by Juarez and Steel (2010a), is used. A group of individuals with a high cluster assignment probability is found. The characteristics of this group, whose individuals share the same autoregressive dynamics and a common, relatively high dependence on financial markets, are investigated further. It can be shown that this group has a statistically significantly different partition of the major occupational groups. This leads to implications for various branches of the literature, such as the pricing of human capital contracts, the hedging of individual income risk, portfolio optimization or asset pricing.