英文经济合同语体特征研究

语言因其使用目的、场合、交际对象等的不同而形成不同的语体.语体的差别体现在词汇、句式结构、语言风格等方面.了解英语的不同语体有助于对英语语言的准确理解和恰当运用.本文对英文经济合同的语体特征进行了归纳和分析.     

论西方企业契约理论的局限性

西方企业契约理论在理论的范式基础、理论内在的逻辑矛盾以及理论与历史、现实的冲突等方面存在局限性,我们在学习和借鉴时必须引起高度重视.     

Incentive Contracts for Infrastructure,Litigation and Weak Institutions

In this paper we revisit incentive contract design in a simple setting, after developing a model that captures the fact that in weak institutional settings the procurement of large scale public works through contracts with strong incentives for private firms, may result in excessive litigation over contract terms. This result is possible because we assume that parties in litigation can influence (by purchasing better or more legal services) the observable merits of their case. In weak institutional settings, governments have an inherent disadvantage in these litigation contests. We show that a commitment to a prespecified level of litigation effort by the government, together with weaker incentive contracts, is a more efficient procurement mechanism.Jel Classification: D8, H57, H54, K41, K23, L51     

Chasing the carrot – actual working hours of fixed-term employees

Fixed-term contracts can serve as a screening device to reveal the true ability of workers. To achieve promotion to a permanent position, fixed-term employees have an incentive to prove themselves by providing higher effort than competing co-workers by means of longer working hours. Applying fixed effects estimation to the German register data, we find that employees work longer hours on fixed-term contracts. This effect is stronger for labour market entrants and employees that are newly hired. We further show that actual hours of work are particularly large when there is competition among co-workers to receive promotion to a permanent position.     

Pareto-improving firing costs?

We examine self-enforcing contracts between risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms (the ‘invisible handshake’) in a labor market with search frictions. Employers promise as much wage-smoothing as they can, consistent with incentive conditions that ensure they will not renege during low-profitability times. Equilibrium is inefficient if these incentive constraints bind, with risky wages for workers and a risk premium that employers must pay. Mandatory firing costs can help, by making it easier for employers to promise credibly not to cut wages in low-profitability periods. We show that firing costs are more likely to be Pareto-improving if they are not severance payments.     

Athlete Endorsement Contracts: The Impact of Conventional Stars

Despite a continuing increase in the dollar value of athlete endorsement contracts and the prominence of athlete endorsements as a marketing tool, the value of endorsement contracts has gone largely unexamined. Employing event study analysis, this paper assesses the effects of endorsement contract announcements on changes in the share price of firms. In contrast to previous studies which focus on a single megastar athlete or sporting event and find significant positive returns to the firm, this study evaluates 148 endorsement announcements for conventional athletic stars in various sports and finds that the average endorsement contract has an insignificant impact on the market value of the firm. Also, there is no support of the product–endorser match-up hypotheses but endorsements by golfers do exhibit significant abnormal returns.      

电子格式合同效力的实证论析

文章在考察了电子技术特别是计算机网络技术对缔约形式的影响后认为:(1)电子格式合同(如拆封合同、按键合同)已成为软件业乃至整个新经济的基本交易形态,并给传统合同法的改革带来了新的契机;(2)应在法律效益原则的指引下,突破传统要约与承诺的狭窄、僵固模式,赋予电子格式合同以法律效力和可执行性;(3)电子格式合同同样应满足一般合同法上诚信和公平原则的基本要求;(4)根据电子商务的特性,对电子格式合同公正性的检测,其着眼点应是程序公正,以程序公正实现实体公正。     

Supply Chain Pricing in B-to-B Markets – A Case Study Application

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate an effective coordination process in the B-to-B section of a supply chain. In particular the paper focuses on the interactions between a supplier of raw materials and a buyer processing them into end products in the food industry. These interactions are governed by a delivery contract. Under the terms of the current contract a season's entire crop is purchased at time of planting at an unit price per pound regardless of volume and quality delivered. This simplicity of the contract is an attractive feature of the interaction in the B-to-B section. It is shown that the supply chain's optimum cannot be realized with a single price. From several alternatives a pricing scheme is proposed in which prices are related to quality. The goal is to determine prices which facilitate the supply chain's maximum performance assuming rational behaviour of the supplier and the buyer. Conditions for realizing the supply chain's maximum are formulated and an approach is presented which generates a significant improvement in performance. The authors thank an anonymous referee for his/her constructive suggestions.