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571.
融资契约是实现公司财务资源配置的基本工具,它包括债务融资契约和股权融资契约。融资契约安排对公司具有一定的财务治理效应。实证研究表明,无论是债务融资契约还是股权融资契约都具有加强公司财务治理、提高公司价值的积极作用。 相似文献
572.
Orlando C. Richard Amy McMillan-Capehart Shahid N. Bhuian Edward C. Taylor 《Journal of Business Research》2009,62(8):818-825
Exploring the role of psychological contracts, this study proposes that different organizational cultures are associated with relational psychological contracts compared to transactional contracts while both types of contracts serve as mediators. While clan cultures positively impact relational contracts and are negatively associated with transactional contracts, hierarchical cultures have the reverse effect. In addition, psychological contract types mediate the two culture types' relationship to both organizational commitment and employee yearly earnings. In sum, clan cultures relate to more positive organizational outcomes than hierarchical cultures, a finding which as implications for future research and practice. 相似文献
573.
解雇成本、市场分割与《劳动合同法》——基于理论模型对《劳动合同法》争议的新解释 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
基于理论模型的研究发现,《劳动合同法》有助于知识员工和知识密集型企业达成"双赢",但是可能导致体力员工和劳动密集型企业"双输"。《劳动合同法》之所以备受争议,其对低端劳工市场的消极影响是主因,外界经济环境恶化带来的经营压力和就业压力是辅因,而且,主辅因的结合打乱了政府预期的经济转型之路。 相似文献
574.
Helmut Bester 《Economic Theory》2009,41(2):269-296
The assignment of authority entitles the decision maker to undertake decisions that impose externalities on the payoffs of other members of the organization. This paper studies how the optimal allocation of decision rights depends on the preferences of the organization’s members. It adopts a mechanism-design approach to show how the communication of private information affects the efficient allocation of authority. An extension to multiple decision areas shows that decentralized control rights may enhance organizational efficiency unless there exist strong complementarities between different decisions. 相似文献
575.
We consider a model of team production in which the principal observes only the team output, but agents can monitor one another (at a cost) and provide reports to the principal. We consider the problem faced by a principal who is prevented from penalizing an agent without evidence showing that the agent failed to complete his assigned actions. We show the first-best (high effort but no monitoring) can be achieved, but only if the principal assigns second-best actions. The principal requires monitoring, but agents do not monitor, and as long as output is high, the principal does not penalize agents who fail to monitor. If the principal has the responsibility for monitoring, the first-best outcome cannot be achieved, thus we identify an incentive for delegated monitoring even when agents have no informational advantage. 相似文献
576.
This essay draws on the transaction costs model of the firm and an Austrian perspective on the knowledge problem in centrally planned orders to propose an empirically useful Austrian theory of central planning. After an initial review of existing theories of the firm, part two develops insights from the calculation debate to sketch a theory of planning centered on the interrelated problems of purpose, information and control in both individual and central planning. Part three joins this theory to the basic framework of the transaction cost model to produce an Austrian theory of the private firm that addresses the relation between knowledge and power in planned orders, and illustrates its principal themes through a discussion of the historical development of American manufacturing in the fifty years prior to World War I. 相似文献
577.
Alfredo?GarciaEmail author James?D.?Reitzes Juan?Benavides 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2005,27(1):5-24
In this paper we revisit incentive contract design in a simple setting, after developing a model that captures the fact that in weak institutional settings the procurement of large scale public works through contracts with strong incentives for private firms, may result in excessive litigation over contract terms. This result is possible because we assume that parties in litigation can influence (by purchasing better or more legal services) the observable merits of their case. In weak institutional settings, governments have an inherent disadvantage in these litigation contests. We show that a commitment to a prespecified level of litigation effort by the government, together with weaker incentive contracts, is a more efficient procurement mechanism.Jel Classification: D8, H57, H54, K41, K23, L51 相似文献
578.
We evaluate the effect of the recently approved transfer system for European professional football which will replace the current system (implemented by the Bosman judgment in 1995). The focus is on the comparison of wages, profits, the length of contracts and investment incentives. Our main findings are that (i) the new regime reduces a player's overall payoff because it increases the new club's renegotiation payoff, and (ii) since training generates a general skill, the new regime will also diminish incentives to invest in the education of young talents, because a new club benefits more from the initial club's investment. 相似文献
579.
Behavioral and Welfare Effects of Tournaments and Fixed Performance Contracts: Some Experimental Evidence 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Using experimental economics, we compare the efficiency and welfare effects of tournaments and fixed performance contracts. Our subjects (agents) were generally better off under fixed performance contracts, but the advantage of the fixed performance contract disappears if the relative magnitude of the standard deviation of the common shock exceeds a critical value. Efficiency wise, agents tend to exert higher effort under fixed performance contracts, on average. Additionally, an increase in the common shock standard deviation appeared to be associated with lower effort under tournaments. Our results shed light on the potential impact of legislative proposals to ban tournament contracts. 相似文献
580.
Should a firm favor insiders (handicap outsiders) when selecting a CEO? One reason to do so is to take advantage of the contest to become CEO as a device for providing current incentives to employees. An important reason not to do so is that this can reduce the ability of future CEOs and, hence, future profits. The trade-off between providing current incentives and selecting the most able individual to become CEO is the focus of this paper. If insiders are good enough (better or nearly as good as outsiders), incentive provision to insiders typically dominates and it is optimal to handicap outsiders, sometimes so severely that they have no chance to win the contest. However, if outsiders are sufficiently better than insiders, selection dominates and it is the insiders who are severely handicapped. This finding is in sharp contrast to the existing literature which has so far ignored this trade-off. In all, our model provides useful insight into contests to become CEO and rationalizes empirical regularities in the source of CEOs chosen by firms. In particular, our analysis helps to explain the lower tendency of firms in more heterogeneous industries and firms with a product or line of business organizational structure to select an outsider as CEO. 相似文献