随机需求下供应链协调的联合契约模型研究

市场需求为随机需求且受零售价格与销售努力影响的条件下,讨论了三级供应链契约协调问题,设计了基于数量折扣契约和收益共享契约的联合契约模型.证明了通过合理设置契约参数,可以实现供应链整体利润的最优化和各成员利润的帕累托改进,并用一个算例分析了契约参数对供应链各成员利润的影响.     

The employee brand: Is yours an all-star?

In this article, a typology is presented which will help organizations better reflect the brand image they desire. The assisting typology is based on the extent to which employees know and understand the organization's mission, values, and desired brand image, and the degree to which they perceive their psychological contracts with the organization as being honored. Organizations can be classified as all-stars, rookies, injured reserves, or strike-out kings, based on the characteristics of a preponderance of their employees. As categorized, rookie organizations cannot deliver the desired brand image because most of their employees lack the knowledge and understanding to do so. Injured reserve organizations, on the other hand, cannot achieve the same because firm employees perceive their psychological contracts with the organization as having been violated, which renders the individuals unwilling and unmotivated. For their part, strike-out king organizations share rookie and injured reserve organizations' worst characteristics. Finally, and conversely, all-star organizations consistently deliver the desired brand image to others because their employees are both able and motivated to do so. To help firms attain this highly desired status, specific guidelines are presented herein which may help organizations become “all-stars” in their own right.     

"Is It Commercially Irresponsible to Trust?"

This paper considers a recent U.K. legal dispute where a supplier sued a large organization, which had been a long-term customer, for breach of implied contract. It uses this case to discuss aspects of the nature of trust between organizations. The discussion encompasses a consideration of the distinction between trust and reliability; and, why the concept of blanket trust is not helpful. In conclusion, by contrasting business-to-business and personal relationships, the paper suggests that firms in their relationships with other institutions should never follow an unquestioning form of strong trust.     

英国对消费者电子资金划拨不公平合同条款的管制

电子资金划拨是计算机技术和电子网络技术发展的结果。在消费者电子资金划中 ,由于作为消费者的客户与作为服务提供者的银行之间在经济、技术上的不平衡性 ,银行往往利用标准合同条款将使用计算机技术进行资金划拨所带来的风险与不利后果转嫁给客户 ,对其进行管制以成为现实的法律需要。了解英国电子资金划拨标准合同类型及其管制方式 ,从而对我国消费者电子资金划拨得以借鉴     

基于PEST模型的施工企业国际工程承包业务分析

随着全球经济一体化的不断深化,我国施工企业国际工程承包业务,从数量上来看,具备了相当的规模,但相对于市场的发展来说还处于初级阶段,还存在着不少问题;从实践中来看,还有不少存在亏损状况;中国企业要想避免亏损摆脱现状,扩大市场份额,就需要付出加倍的努力。文章通过对中国施工企业的PEST分析,提出中国施工企业国际工程承包业务的发展战略。     

Italian households’ debt: the participation to the debt market and the size of the loan

This paper analyses Italian households’ participation to the debt market, separating the probability of demanding a loan from the probability of being rationed by lenders; on the supply side of the market specific attention is paid to enforcement costs of the loan contract when customers default. A new result is that the age of the household head acts essentially as a demand factor, rather than a variable influencing the lender’s choice. Both current and future households’ income increase the demand for loans and reduce credit rationing. Self-employed workers are more rationed by lenders. Credit constraints are also linked to the area where the household lives, partly because of different enforcement costs. The final part of the paper analyses the equilibrium quantity of the loan, for households who have a loan and are not constrained. The loan size is positively linked to household net wealth and income profile. An important contribution of this paper is the finding that, not only the participation to the debt market, but also the loan size is negatively affected by enforcement costs.      

Public–private partnerships: Task interdependence and contractibility

We examine the proper scope of public–private partnerships in the context of a project consisting of two tasks, building and operation of a facility. We investigate the optimal arrangement regarding bundling versus unbundling and private ownership versus public ownership. Like Bennett and Iossa (2006), we assume that the innovative activity in the building stage has impacts on, among other things, the subsequent operational cost. We relax the nature of task interdependence and study different contractual frameworks. The general insight is that given limitations in contractibility, contrary to common sense, complementarity between tasks favors unbundling over bundling.     

World War II prime defence contractors: Were they favoured?

Between 1940 and 1944 the US government placed $175.066 billion of prime defence contracts with US corporations. Two-thirds of these awards went to only 100 companies and 20% to only five companies leading to charges that the prime contractors were favoured. This article examines the common stock returns of World War II prime contractors relative to broad market indices and to the returns on the non-prime contractors in the same industry. The analysis begins in 1938 with the Anschluss and ends with the 1950 outbreak of the Korean War. Little evidence is found to support the charges.     

The role of implicit contracts: Building public works in the 1840s in Portugal

This article studies financial schemes for building public works in the 1840s. The study of the Portuguese case clearly illustrates the importance of implicit contracts with governments in peripheral Europe, shedding light on solutions for financing the provision of public goods. Building roads and railways seems to have been the fruit of an implicit contract behind the tobacco monopoly in a country involved in social turmoil and civil wars. Reputation effects are called to explain the relevant range of the partners' negotiations, to reject the traditional historiography based on wrong management and speculation in a period of savage capitalism.     

Switching costs and implicit contracts

When firms can discriminate between old and new customers and when multiperiod binding commitments are too costly, the effects of switching costs may be mitigated thanks to implicit contracts offered (competitively) by firms in equilibrium and backed by reputation.